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Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph. D.: 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE, PUBLIC SECTOR GROWTH 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
NORMAN GEMMELL 
Abstract 
This thesis examines some aspects of the process of structural 
change during development. It is concerned particularly with the 
growth of service sectors, both privately- and publicly-owned. 
Three aspects of structural change towards services are 
examined, Firstly, it is desired to establish whether there are 
uniform patterns of structural change for the service sector across 
countries. Secondly, evidence of substantial social service growth, 
most of which is publicly-owned and 'non-marketed' (i. e. not sold 
via the market mechanism) suggests that there may be important 
macroeconomic consequences for the economies concerned. The thesis 
extends existing analysis to permit examination of the relationship 
between non-market sector growth and macroeconomic performance. 
Thirdly, when public expenditure rises in association with 
increases in the non-market sector, increased tax revenue may be 
required. This thesis therefore provides a model of tax revenue 
growth during development which identifies automatic and dis- 
cretionary tax changes. 
These three aspects of structural change are then examined in 
the context of the Egyptian economy since 1960. The pattern of 
Egypt's structural change is examined and possible explanations 
are investigated. The effects of growth in Egypt's non-market 
sector are also examined, and some aspects of tax revenue growth 
are considered. 
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PART 
INTRODUCTION 
C HAP TER 
INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE 
Interest in 'structural change' has been fundamental to development 
economics since the earliest days of the subject. Following the seminal 
contribution of Lewis (1954) it has become commonplace to assume, when 
modelling the process of development, that it is appropriate to divide 
an economy, for analytical purposes, into at least two sectors. These 
have usually taken the form of a rural/agricultural/traditional sector 
and an urban/industrial/modern sector, where these two sectors have 
sufficiently different characteristics to warrant distinguishing 
between them. Thus, according to Chenery (1979), 'Economic development 
can be viewed as a set of interrelated changes in the structure of an 
economy that are required for its continued growth ... These 
structural changes define the transformation of a traditional to a 
modern economic system'. (p. xvi) 
So much has been written on the issue of structural change, 
both theoretical and empirical, that it might be asked whether a 
further study can contribute to our understanding of the process. 
Recent evidence from developing countries, however, has suggested that, 
at least for some purposes, a dual economy model with traditional and 
modern sectors, may need to be replaced by a three sector model which 
can account for significant differences between rural and urban 
'traditional' sectors. Recent migration models, for example, such as 
Fields (1975) and Mazumdar (1973) included an urban 'traditional' sector 
because the observed processes of labour resource transfers were 
clearly not adequately depicted by shifts from a rural/agricultural 
labour force to a modern/industrial labour force. 
For developed countries, since the work of Fisher (1933,1939) 
and Clarke (1940) economic activity has often been divided along 
structural lines into agricultural, industrial and service sectors 
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(or primary, secondary and tertiary). The roles of these sectors 
(whose definitions are considered more closely below) were argued to 
change with the level of development or per capita income reached. 
Indeed the recent growth of service sectors in developed countries has 
generated renewed interest and a great deal of discussion among 
economists. 
The role of service activities in developing countries however 
remains a subject which has received relatively little research effort. 
While the growth in urban traditional or 'informal' activities, many 
of which could be classed as services, has been studied in recent years, 
the growth of modern services has generally received little attention. 
This is perhaps most apparent with reference to publicly-provided 
services which have been examined and analysed at length in developed 
countries, but remain largely neglected in developing countries. In 
particular, the causes and consequences of structural change involving 
public service sectors during the development process have received 
little attention, most previous work being concerned with specific 
economies at particular stages in their development. 
This thesis aims to fill some of these gaps by examining some 
aspects of the growth of service activities during development. It 
was readily apparent at the initial stages of this study that the 
growth of publicly-provided services is an important component of a 
more general growth in services experienced by many countries. In 
many important respects publicly- and privately-provided services 
differ from each other such that to understand the processes and 
consequences of service growth overall it is often necessary to 
examine these two forms of service activity separately. The nature of 
these differences and their implications for economic analysis will 
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become clear in subsequent chapters and need not be rehearsed here. 
However one important difference between private and public services 
is that while the former are generally provided through the 'market- 
place', the latter, in general, are not. The processes determining 
the production of these two services may therefore be expected to 
differ. In examining structural change during development this thesis 
will therefore consider the respective roles of private and public 
services. 
The thesis is concerned primarily with three aspects of 
structural change towards services during development. Firstly, 
it is desired to establish whether there are uniform patterns of 
structural change for the service sector across countries. Previous 
evidence (mainly by Chenery and various associates1) has generally 
supported the existence of uniform patterns across countries for 
agricultural and industrial sectors, but has offered less support to 
the view that service sector growth is also similar across countries. 
Secondly, evidence of substantial social service growth most 
of which is publicly-owned and 'non-marketed' (i. e. not sold via the 
market mechanism) suggests that, following the analysis of Bacon and 
Eltis (1976), there may be important macroeconomic consequences for 
the economies concerned. The Bacon and Eltis analysis is therefore 
extended here to permit examination of the relationship between 
non-market sector growth and macroeconomic performance. 
Thirdly, this thesis proposes a method of analysing the growth 
of tax revenues during development. When public expenditure increases 
to provide more non-marketed services, taxation increases may be 
sought to finance this increased expenditure. It is important therefore 
to be able to identify the extent to which tax revenue will rise 
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automatically when incomes increase (often referred to as the `built- 
in flexibility' of the tax system) and the consequences of discretionary 
changes to the tax structure by the tax authorities. 
These three aspects of structural change are then considered in 
the context of the Egyptian economy since 1960. Egypt is a particularly 
interesting case to examine because, as shown in Part 3, it has 
experienced substantial growth in service activities, both privately- 
and publicly-owned. This has been associated with large increases in 
public expenditure which have generally exceeded increases in tax 
revenues. In addition the macroeconomic changes associated with the 
growth in Egypt's non-market services appear to be similar to those 
identified in the U. K. by Bacon and Eltis. 
1.1 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organised into four parts. In Part 2 the three 
aspects of structural change towards services discussed in the previous 
section are considered using international evidence and/or 'general' 
models of the processes being analysed. In Part 3 structural changes in 
the Egyptian economy are examined in relation to the international 
evidence, and the models developed and discussed in Part 2 are applied 
to Egypt. Part 4 summarises the main results in Parts 2 and 3, draws 
some general conclusions and suggests possible avenues that future 
research might usefully pursue. 
Chapter 2 provides evidence on patterns of structural change during 
development, examining in particular how cross-section studies can 
accommodate the recent evidence on 'de-industrialisation' in many 
developed countries. It is argued that the functional forms of equations 
previously used to test for patterns of structural change are now 
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inappropriate, and new functional forms are proposed. Applying these 
to a sample of 30 developed and developing countries it is found that 
empirical evidence supports the existence of clear patterns of structural 
change across developed and developing countries. This is the case 
for agricultural, industrial and service sectors. 
In chapter 3 market and non-market sectors are introduced and 
the implications for an economy's macroeconomic performance of 
differing rates of growth of the non-market sector are examined. The 
chapter then provides a framework within which international 
comparisons of non-market sector expansion can be made and identifies 
possible consequences of employment growth in both market and non- 
market sectors. This analysis is applied to a sample of developed and 
less developed countries, which suggests that, among developed countries, 
the adverse effects associated with non-market sector expansion have 
probably been greatest in the U. K. Similar effects however are 
evident in several less developed countries, including Syria and Egypt. 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide models of tax revenue growth during 
development. Chapter 4 provides a method of examining the built-in 
flexibility of various progressive income tax structures. A non- 
linear tax schedule is used in conjunction with a lognormal distribution 
of incomes. Schedules of effective average and marginal tax rates, 
and revenue elasticities are obtained. The model allows the effects of 
discretionary changes in the tax system at different average income 
levels to be isolated. The model is also tractable, and is able to 
capture the main characteristics of actual systems, using few parameters. 
These properties are useful where the model is to be integrated into 
a wider fiscal model as in chapter 5. 
The tax/transfer model in chapter 5 includes income tax, a 
social insurance tax, value added tax and a system of income transfers 
to the low paid. The model identifies the importance for revenue growth 
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of interdependencies between component taxes/transfers in the model 
and the extent of indexation of tax thresholds. Effective average 
tax rate schedules are derived under different indexation assumptions, 
using a simulated lognormal income distribution. 
Of the five chapters in Part 3 on the Egyptian economy, chapters 
6,7 and 8 are concerned with the extent of, and influences on, the 
structural shift in employment towards services. Chapters 9 and 10 
examine the role of the non-market sector and the development of tax 
revenues in Egypt respectively. 
Chapter 6 examines the evidence on structural change in Egypt 
and highlights the growth in service activities during 1960-75. This 
is compared to other countries' recent performance using the methodology/ 
results from chapters 2 and 3 and to Egypt's earlier historical 
experience. Some of the reasons proposed by economic theory for 
relative service sector growth are then discussed. These are used in 
chapter 7 to try to explain the observed relative growth in service 
employment. Two methodologies are used: (1) a simple regression 
model to identify the roles of income elasticities and factor prices 
and (2) a comparison of employment, output and productivity growth 
rates. The results suggest significant differences in causal factors 
between services, requiring a more disaggregated analysis in chapter B. 
A detailed study of factors affecting output and productivity 
growth in various services in chapter 8 allows tentative conclusions 
on the reasons for Egypt's expansion of service employment over the 
period. These appear to differ primarily between 'commercial' and 
'social' services and between private and public sectors. Factors 
found to be important are rural-urban migration, government education 
and employment policies. 
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Chapter 9 considers some of the consequences of changes in the 
composition of demand for market sector goods and services. It is 
shown that increases in the relative size of the non-market sector raise 
the rate of productivity growth necessary to maintain marketed output 
growth and avoid inflationary pressures. For the Egyptian economy, 
during 1960-76, it is argued that an increasing non-market sector is 
at least partly to blame for the country's worsening balance of 
payments, low growth and inflationary pressures. Excessive increases 
in both defence and non-defence public expenditures are identified. 
Finally, in Part 3 the growth of Egyptian tax revenues during 
1960-78 are examined in chapter 10. After considering how the 
models developed in chapters 4 and 5 can be adapted/applied to the 
Egyptian tax system, the flexibility of the Egyptian tax structure 
is examined in the light of the earlier tax model results. Evidence 
suggests that although there is considerable built-in flexibility in 
the income tax, discretionary tax changes have kept income tax 
revenues growing in line with average incomes. The proportional 
or regressive structure of most indirect taxes suggest little 
flexibility for these taxes. 
1.2 SOME DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Already in this chapter terms such as 'structural change', 
'non-market sector' and 'development', which may have different 
meanings in different contexts, have been used. They will be used 
repeatedly in subsequent chapters and it is important that their 
meaning in the context of this thesis should be established at an 
early stage. 
There is a long tradition within economics that an explanation 
of the growth of various economic aggregates such as output, employment 
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and investment, necessitates an understanding of the composition or 
structure of these aggregates. Adam Smith, for example, found it 
useful to distinguish between 'productive' and 'unproductive' labour 
in an explanation of capital accumulation. These terms were associated 
with different types of employment, the former being involved in 
producing 'vendable commodities' while the work of the latter 
'perishes in the very instant of its production' (Smith (1789, 
p. 430-1)). 
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Clearly the relevant-structure or components will depend 
on the aggregate under investigation and what factors are thought to 
constrain or facilitate the growth of that aggregate. In the case of 
total production and employment it has often been argued that growth 
may be constrained by the type of commodities produced and distinctions 
have been drawn between 'agricultural', 'industrial' and 'service' 
commodities. Other structures which have been argued to be important 
however include the destination of goods produced, namely foreign or 
domestic, the time period over which the goods are consumed, the 
production ownership structure and the division of sales revenue 
between wage costs and profits. 
The structural divisions with which this study is concerned 
however are those between agricultural, industrial and service 
activities. The term 'structural change' as used in this study 
therefore relates to the processes by which economic resources are 
transferred from one form of production structure to another such 
that the proportion of these resources devoted to agricultural, 
industrial and service production changes. 
The criteria used in decomposing economic activity into these 
three categories have been widely discussed elsewhere and it is not 
proposed to examine these here. 
3 
However fundamental to any division is 
the view that there is more homogeneity within than between categories 
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which is sufficient to require separate treatment of these categories 
in economic analysis. Some of the reasons for examination of separate 
sectors are discussed in subsequent chapters. In discussing these 
sectors this thesis adopts two types of classification. Firstly, 
activities are divided into agriculture, industry and services 
using the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). 
The detailed allocation is given in chapter 2; and in chapters 7 and 8 
services are compared with a 'goods' sector which includes agricultural 
and industrial activities. 
A second distinction which is drawn is that between 'marketed' 
goods and services and 'non-marketed' services. 
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Once again the 
reason for this distinction stems from the belief that the processes 
operating in the 'marketed' sector are different from those in the 
'non-marketed' sector. For Johnston (1975), who introduced the 
definitions, the crucial difference between the sectors was that only 
price movements in marketed outputs were important for inflation. 
Bacon and Eltis (1976) argued that the distinction was important 
because only the market sector could produce the consumption, investment 
and exportable goods and services necessary for an economy's internal 
and external equilibrium. 
The non-market sector is therefore a subset of the service 
sector, marketed services being combined with goods production to give a 
'market' sector. The non-market sector may also be thought of as a 
subset of the public sector since almost all non-marketed services 
5 
are produced and/or distributed under public ownership. The public 
sector in many countries is of course also involved in the producticn 
of marketed goods and services. In this thesis 
however the term 
'public sector' is generally applied only to that part which 
is 
non-marketed. Finally in some parts of the thesis the ISIC category 
13 
'community, personal and social services' is considered separately 
(and abbreviated to 'social services'). Most of this group of services 
in most countries is publicly-owned and non-marketed, though there are 
likely to be varying degrees of private and marketed services within 
it. However as indicated in chapters 2 and 3 data limitations sometimes 
necessitate the use of 'social service' data to approximate the non- 
market sector and for this reason the terms 'social services' and 
'non-market sector' may be used interchangeably. 
The term 'development' or 'economic development' is also used 
extensively throughout the following chapters. There is now a vast 
literature within economics (and other disciplines) devoted to 
defining what is meant, and ought to be meant, by 'development'. It 
is increasingly recognised and advocated that the earlier use of per 
capita income increases as an index of development must now be 
supplemented by indices of income distribution, consumption of 'basic' 
commodities and other social indicators. In this thesis however the 
term 'economic development' is used to refer to the growth in per capita 
incomes. This is not intended to convey any view of development, but 
rather is used to express in summary form the processes by which per 
capita income increases. 
Before turning to an examination of structural change two further 
methodological issues bhould be considered - problems of measurement of 
service sector outputs, and problems of causality associated with 
the 
structural change/development relationship and the market/non-market 
analysis. 
Any analysis of structural change involving service sectors must 
handle the problem of measuring the outputs of some services. 
The use 
of net output or value added to measure the flow of goods and services 
produced is only reliable for those goods and services which 
have 
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exchange prices by which they may be valued. Non-marketed services, 
by definition, have no exchange prices and must therefore be valued 
by some other measure. For these services output has usually been 
measured by non-material inputs costs - mainly wages and salaries. 
Thus changes in the 'output' of these services are more accurately 
to be seen as changes in inputs, making comparisons with marketed 
outputs difficult. Indeed some would argue that output comparisons 
of this sort are meaningless or misleading. 
The primary concern of this thesis is however with structural 
changes in employment which can-be more readily--compared across sectors. 
However as will be seen in Part 3, explanations of employment growth 
differences across sectors often rely on output or productivity 
differences and hence measurement problems persist. The view taken 
here is that it is preferable to use available service 'output' data 
despite their difficulties, provided they are treated with caution and 
used in conjunction with other information on service sector real 
output and productivity. 
Causality problems are common within economic relationships 
where a priori reasoning may simultaneously suggest that for two 
variables x and y, y= f(x) and x= g(y). This is true for the 
structural change/development relationship. Engel's law may be used 
for example to predict that increases in per capita incomes will cause 
the composition of an economy's output to change towards industrial, and 
away from agricultural, goods. Alternatively it has been 
argued that it is the process of structural change, whereby resources 
move from low productivity (often agricultural) sectors to 
high 
productivity (often industrial) sectors, which generates per capita 
income increases. Examining patterns of structural change in chapter 2 
it is not desired to establish or test for causality 
in the structural 
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change/development relationship. Rather the objective is to identify 
the nature and extent of the relationship across countries and over 
time. 
The Bacon and Eltis (1976) analysis has also been criticised on 
causality grounds. In particular conclusions on the effects of non- 
market sector growth on the rest of the economy based on accounting 
identities have been criticised. Since accounting identities do not 
model economic behaviour, clearly they cannot be used to establish 
behavioural patterns. They may however assist in understanding the 
processes which affect economic behaviour. Chapter 3 considers these 
issues in more detail. 
16 
Footnotes 
1. See, for example, Chenery (1960), Chenery and Taylor (1968), 
Chenery and Syraquin (1975). This literature is discussed in chapter 2. 
2. Page references are those of the 1970 edition edited by Andrew Skinner. 
3. A useful summary of the arguments may be found in Gershuny (1977 1978) . 
4. In principle there is no reason why some goods should not be 
included in the non-marketed sector, though in the original 
definition by Johnston (1975) only services were included. Free 
school milk and meals would be examples of non-marketed goods. 
5. Bacon and Eltis however argue that the non-market sector should 
include that part of private sector output subsidised by government. 
See Bacon and Eltis (1976, pp. 27-31). 
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PART 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE, THE NON-MARKET SECTOR 
AND TAX REVENUES 
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CHAPTER 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
THE ROLE OF THE SERVICE SECTOR 
19 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
There have been many attempts over the last thirty years or so to 
identify patterns of structural change during the development process. 
Most of the early attempts concentrated on the relationship between 
the agricultural and industrial sectors using cross-section and/or 
time series data, of which Kuznets (1957) and Chenery (1960) are 
among the most prominent. In more recent years increasing attention 
has been devoted to the role of the service sector, and differing 
methodologies have been adopted to analyse its development path. 
These methodologies fall into three categories: 
(i) Cross-section/time series studies of developed and less 
developed countries (e. g. Fuchs (1968), Chenery and Taylor (1968), 
Bhalla (1973), Chenery and Syrquin (1975)). 
(ii) Comparisons of sector shares in contemporary LDCs with the 
earlier economic history of now developed countries, (e. g. Turnharn 
(1971), Berry (1978)) . 
(iii) Country case studies, such as Bhalla (1970), for Taiwan and 
Philippines, and Berry (1978), for Columbia. 
The 1970s also witnessed increasing documentation of the phenomenon 
usually referred to as 'de-industrialisation'. This literature, including 
OECD (1975), Bacon and Eltis (1976), UN-ECE (1977), and Blackaby (1978), 
has highlighted the decline in the absolute or relative size of the 
industrial sector (or parts of it) in many developed countries. A 
decline in the manufacturing sector's share of employment over the 
decade has been identified most frequently, though a similar decline 
in the sector's output share is also confirmed 
in several countries. 
l 
This decline is almost always accompanied by a rising share of the 
service sector, public and/or private, and 
has created renewed interest, 
2 
in developed countries, in the sector's economic characteristics. 
20 
This chapter will investigate how cross-section studies of 
structural change can accommodate the recent evidence on 'de-industriali- 
sation' and in particular . assess the choice of appropriate functional 
forms for such studies. Alternative functional forms are proposed 
which, it is argued, provide a better description of recent patterns 
of structural change than those previously used. 
In Section 2.2 current approaches to, and evidence on, relation- 
ships between the agricultural, industrial and service sectors during 
the development process are considered. Section 2.3 investigates 
alternative functional forms which in Section 2.4 are tested using 
data from 30 developed and less developed countries in 1960 and 1970. 
These results allow some observations on the role of the service 
sector to be made in Section 2.5, and the results are summarised and 
some conclusions drawn in Section 2.6. 
2.2 STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 
2.2.1 Current Evidence 
Testing the relationship between sector shares and per capita 
income has not always produced consistent results on the role of the 
service sector. For example, Chenery and Taylor (1968), using cross- 
section data for 54 countries over the period 1950-63, 
found strong 
evidence for a relationship between per capita 
income and the shares 
of industry and agriculture in GNP, but little evidence 
to support 
a similar relationship for the service sector. 
3 
They used a relation- 
ship of the form 
log Y=a+ß log x+Y (log X) 
2+3 
log N (2.1) 
where Y represents the respective sector share 
in GNP, X is per capita 
21 
income, and N is population. Similar results were obtained using a 
semi-log form, by Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and Chenery (1979) who 
also included a term in (log N) 
2 
in some regressions. 
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On the other 
hand Fuchs (1968) tested the hypothesis 
Y=a+ ß/X (2.2) 
where Y now represents the respective sector shares in employment, 
and X is per capita income, for 20 OECD countries in 1960. He found 
highly significant regression co-efficients for all three sectors. 
The evidence of Chenery and Taylor (1968), Fuchs (1968), and 
Chenery and Syrquin (1975) may be summarised as strongly supporting 
the following hypotheses, where YA and YI are the shares of GNP (or 
employment) in the agricultural and industrial sectors respectively, 
and X is per capita income: 
a YA/ä X<Oa2 YA/ax 
2>0 
(2.3) 
aYI/a x>oa2 YI/a x2 <0 (2.4) 
Fuchs (1968) also found support for the hypothesis that 
Y/ax >o s a 
2Ys/axe <o (2.5) 
where Ys is the share of services in total employment. 
The relationships found by Fuchs, which are illustrated in 
Figure 2.1 indicate that agricultural employment falls most rapidly 
in the early stages of development, giving rise to rapid increases in 
the shares of industry and services in total employment. However the 
decline in the share of agriculture slows with increasing development, 
approaching asymptotically a share of about 3%, while industry and 
S 
services approach asymptotically, shares of about 57% and 40% respectively. 
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FIGURE 2.1 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SECTOR SHARES AND PER 
CAPITA INCOME. (FUCHS, 1968) 
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Broadly similar paths were obtained by Chenery and Taylor (1968) and 
Chenery and Syrquin (1975) using logarithmic forms. 
2.2.2 Functional Forms 
Precise functional forms are rarely dictated by economic theory 
but it is important that they should not be at variance with the main 
relevant theoretical postulates, and can at least approximate these 
within an appropriate range of values. The choice of the above 
functional forms by Chenery and Taylor, Chenery and Syrquin, and Fuchs, 
while chosen partly for analytical convenience, can be supported by 
a priori economic reasoning. Development theory suggests, not only 
that a relative transfer of resources from agricultural to non-agri- 
cultural sectors may be expected as per capita income rises, but also 
(under the assumption of diminishing marginal returns) that the pace 
of resource transfer will slow as income rises. At low income levels, 
when the economy is almost entirely agrarian and marginal productivity 
in agriculture is low, a larger decrement in the agricultural labour 
force is possible for a given increment in productivity, than when 
the share of the agricultural sector in the total economy is smaller, 
and marginal productivity higher. Since it has been observed that 
income and productivity tend to rise together over time, ceteris paribus, 
equal and successive rises in income can be expected to be associated 
with successively smaller decrements in the resource share of the 
agricultural sector. Both the logarithmic and reciprocal functional 
forms can accommodate this. 
Economic theory can however also support the evidence of a relative 
resource transfer from industry to services. It is frequently argued, 
for example, that service outputs possess higher income elasticities of 
demand in aggregate, than industrial outputs, so that, ceteris paribus, 
as per capita income rises, industrial outputs will rise faster than 
24 
service outputs at first, but slower later (assuming the coincidence of 
higher elasticities with higher income levels). Secondly, there is 
evidence suggesting that service sector productivity tends to increase 
more slowly than industrial productivity. Thus, at higher income 
levels, with agricultural surplus labour all but exhausted, a transfer 
of labour from the industrial to the service sector will be required 
even to maintain relative output growth rates between sectors. Baumol 
(1967) has explicitly modelled this process. Thus it can be argued 
that the process of structural change for any country can be expected 
to follow paths similar to those shown in Figure 2.2, with the industrial 
and service employment shares both growing at the expense of the 
agricultural share as income rises. 
6 
However once the agricultural 
share becomes fairly small (though it may continue to fall), the 
service sector share begins to expand at the expense of the industrial 
sector share. 
It is clear that, in testing for the patterns of structural change 
proposed in Figure 2.2, neither the reciprocal functional form used by 
Fuchs, nor the logarithmic forms preferred by Chenery and Taylor or 
Chenery and Syrquin, will suffice. The simple form used by Fuchs 
clearly can not capture the rise and subsequent decline in the share 
of industry, nor can it model the sigmoid shape proposed for the service 
sector. The quadratic log and semi-log forms, while- they can account 
for the declining industrial share, are also unable to model the service 
sector share. Alternative functional forms are therefore proposed in 
Section 2.3. 
2.3 AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
2.3.1 Alternative Functional Forms 
It was noted in Section 2.2 that the increase in the service sector 
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FIGURES 2.2 and 2.3 
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share at the expense of the industrial sector share tends to occur 
only when the agricultural share is already very small. Thus, in 
specifying functional forms for the three sectors, YA, YI and YS 
the simple form 
YA = al + b1 /X 
which Fuchs (1968) found predicted well, may still be used for the 
agricultural sector. 
(2.6) 
The most appropriate functional form to approximate YS in Figure 
2.2 is a cubic in X, whereby 
YS = a2 + b2X + c2X2 + d2X3 (2.7) 
This will give the sigmoid shape which it is desired to capture in the 
YS function. It might in fact be expected that the service sector 
share will eventually approach some maximum value asymptotically, which 
cannot be accounted for by a cubic functional form. However, it is 
likely to provide a suitable approximation over the range of values 
currently available, and indeed, for some way beyond. In fact, to 
approximate YS a function with a single inflexion point, rather than 
the maximum and minimum normally associated with cubic functions, is 
required. This will occur if a2 = b2 = c2 = 0, which can be achieved 
by moving the origin in Figure 2.2 to the point of inflexion, as in 
Figure 2.3. 
The YI function could be specified as a quadratic in X, but this 
would impose the restrictions that the decline in the industrial sector 
share exactly mirror its earlier increase and will predetermine the 
per capita income at which the maximum industrial share occurs. In 
addition, it is unlikely that specifying all three functions thus would 
yield values for the three sector shares which meet the required condition 
YA + ys +i _1 (2.8) 
YI will therefore be treated as a residual for estimation purposes and 
specified as, 
YI =1- YA - YS (2.9) 
Letting the new origin at the inflexion point in YS be (f, g), new 
variables y and x can be created such that, 
y=Y-g (2.10) 
x=X-f (2.11) 
and the new functions yA, yI and yS will be 
yA +g= a1 + b1{1/(x + f)} (2.12) 
YS = d2x3 (2.13) 
X, =1- 3g - ys - yA (2.14) 
2.3.2 Inter-sectoral Relationships 
An alternative method of testing the hypothesis that an increasing 
service sector share is associated first with an increasing industrial 
share and then with its decline is to examine inter-sectoral relation- 
ships directly, rather than considering sector shares as functions of per 
capita income. Thus, a direct relationship between Yz and YS may be 
examined. The main problem with this approach is of course that both YI 
and YS are endogenous variables and therefore neither is truly 
'independent'. However for the purpose of describing how these sectors 
change relative to each other, either can be used for statistical 
purposes, as an 'independent' variable, though it is important to stress 
Ad 
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that this approach provides no basis for discussion of causality 
between variables. 
There are however two reasons why it may be preferable to 
examine directly inter-sectoral relationships such as these. First, 
it is suggested that inverse movements in the industrial and service 
sector shares can be expected once there is a relatively small 
proportion of the population in agriculture, and therefore little 
surplus labour remains in the sector. This is likely to occur at 
higher income levels, but different countries may reach this 
position at different per capita incomes. Kaldor (1966) and Lewis 
(1978) have argued that the U. K., for example, reached a low share of 
its population in agriculture at low levels of per capita income 
compared to other developed countries. 
7 
Of course, the use of cross- 
section data to examine patterns of structural change taking place 
over time must always involve the problem that different countries, 
while experiencing similar changes, will not necessarily experience 
them at exactly the same income levels. When testing for the relation- 
ships shown in Figure 2.2, however, this can lead to substantial 
horizontal, or near horizontal sections to the YI and YS functions, 
where no statistical relationship would be identified, making the 
sigmoid shape of the YS function difficult to identify in particular. 
By considering a direct relationship between YI and YS, which will be 
first positive, and then negative-sloping (see Figure 2.4B), these 
horizontal sections will appear as a point, or number of proximate 
points, making this function more readily identifiable. 
Second, there are numerous problems associated with international 
comparisons of per capita incomes, especially when both developed and 
less developed countries are included. In many LDCs 
income estimates 
are unreliable because of poor collection methods and 
differing 
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definitions, and their coverage is frequently less comprehensive than 
in developed countries. In addition, conversion to dollar-equivalents 
may be inaccurate due to under (or over) valued, and fluctuating 
exchange rates, though this problem can be partially overcome using 
procedures developed by Kravis et. al. (1975,1975). The coverage of 
demographic data in many LDCs, though also incomplete, is usually 
more reliable than income data. Therefore it is considered preferable 
here to examine patterns of structural change using inter-sectoral 
relationships despite the econometric limitations. 
2.3.3 Testing the Hypothesis 
Equations (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14) may be solved to eliminate x 
giving relationships between yA, yi and yS, such that 
YI r-YA1 (2.15) 
II z+ 
ys 
z2 
L0] 
3 
Z 
where z= (yA + Y)-1, y= (g - a1) and R is a2x4 matrix. 
Furthermore 
yI = ul + u2{1/y1/3 + d) 
}- ys (2.16) 
where coefficients ul and u2 can be determined 
from the n matrix, 
8 
and 
f d1/3. These functions suggest that non-linear relationships can 
be expected between sector shares, possible outcomes of 
which are 
illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
To examine how patterns of structural change may 
have varied in 
the light of the 'de-industrialisation' evidence, regressions 
on 
equation (2.16) are of most significance. 
Since the agricultural sector 
30 
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share is already small when inverse movements in the service and 
industrial sector shares can be expected, regressions with yA as the 
independent variable are unsuitable. However, if the functional 
forms proposed in (2.15) and (2.16) are valid, then regressions on 
(2.15) also ought to provide a suitable description of changes in y S 
and yI relative to y 
In testing for these relationships, sectoral definitions slightly 
different from--those discussed above are adopted. In particular, using 
the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), the service 
===sector- is defined to include transport, communications, finance, whole- 
sale and retail trade, and community, social and personal services, 
while the industrial sector includes only manufacturing. Public 
utilities, construction, mining and quarrying (including petroleum 
and gas) are therefore excluded. This avoids the arbitrary classification 
of those activities which do not fall clearly into any one sector, and 
allows regression results to be interpreted without considering whether 
some marginally included sub-sector is biasing the results of the 
aggregate sector. Previous studies of structural change which have 
classified all economic activities into three sectors have included 
public utilities and construction variously in the service or the 
industrial sector, with mining and quarrying allied either with 
agriculture or industry. 
9 
It is shown in Appendix 2.1 that the 
effects of excluding these activities on (2.15) and 
(2.16) is to alter 
the values of the intercept terms in the first equation of 
(2.15) and (2.16). 
Results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on 
these equations, 
using a sample of 30 developed and less 
developed countries in 1960 and 
1970, are shown in Table 2.1(A)10 Before discussing 
the results, however, 
some explanation of the sample and the regression methodology 
is 
necessary. 
The sample of 30 countries was selected to give roughly equal 
numbers of developed and less developed countries. This avoids the 
problem of poor predictions for developed countries arising from 
estimated equations based on samples of mainly less developed 
countries. Secondly, countries with particularly small economically 
active populations (less than one million) were not included to avoid 
possible distortions in data on sector shares. Less developed 
countries with small populations are particularly heterogenous, with 
some being geographically small and with small agricultural sectors 
(e. g. Kuwait), while others may be large, sparcely populated, agrarian 
societies (e. g. Niger ). Unfortunately data are only available on 
the basis of nation states though this may not be the most economic- 
ally meaningful classification. Thirdly, to minimise inconsistencies 
in data classification across countries, all data are from the I. L. O. 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics in which all countries are classified 
by the 1958 ISIC (for 1960 data) and the 1968 ISIC (for 1970 data). 
In addition, in all countries in the sample, data are based on census 
returns in years around 1960 and 1970, rather than inter-census pro- 
jections. Since most such censuses are decennial there are few 
countries for which comparable data are available after 1970. 
The sector shares data require some adjustment before performing 
the regressions. Since using per capita income as an independent 
variable has already been rejected, partly because of inaccuracies 
inherent in such data, its use to estimate g and f (the coordinates 
of the inflexion point in YS) is also prohibited. However for the 
purpose of performing OLS regressions on (2.15) and 
(2.16) only g 
needs to be predetermined. This was achieved by running OLS 
regressions on (2.16) using an iterative procedure to obtain 
the 
value of g which minimised the sum of squared residuals. 
This yielded 
32 
A 
a final value of g=0.366 suggesting the turning point in the 
industry/service relationship from a positive-sloping to a negative- 
sloping one, occurs with a service sector share around 37%, 
11 
Finally, it is interesting to examine the development of the 
service sector at a more disaggregated level since it is often 
claimed that the service sector contains a greater diversity of 
economic activity than other sectors. Table 2.1(A) therefore 
includes regressions for the social service sub-sector which tends 
to be publicly-owned, being made up mostly of education, health and 
public administration services. It-is shown in Appendix 2.2 that if 
the social service sector share, yss, is approximated by a similar 
cubic function to that proposed for the aggregate service sector, 
then inter-sectoral relationships involving yss can be estimated in 
the same way as for those involving ys. With the additional 
assumption that the points of inflexion in both functions occur at 
the same per capita income level, the value of unity imposed on the 
co-efficient on ys in (2.16) is unnecessary on the coefficient on 
y 
ss ' 
Thus results for both sectors should be similar if the cubic 
functional forms proposed for both sectors are valid. 
2.4 REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 2.1(A) presents regressions on the pooled 1960 and 1970 
data for the 30 country sample, while Tables 2.1(B) and 2.1(C) 
present similar regressions for each year, allowing 
differences 
between the two years to be investigated. 
In each table, regressions (i), (ii) and (iv) are on equations 
(2.15) and (2.16) in Section 2.3.3, and regressions 
(iii) and (v) 
are for the social service sector, Regressions 
(vi) to (x) are 
comparable linear regressions for the 
inter-sectoral relationships 
33 
A 
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in (i) to (v). These linear forms would be obtained if the reciprocal 
form yi =a+ ß/X was assumed for all z sectors, such as Fuchs (1968). 
Thus it is easily seen how the explanatory power of the proposed 
functions in (i) to (v) compare with at least one alternative. 
Examining regressions (i) to (iii) in Table 2.1(A) reveals 
that all co-efficients have the predicted signs; results from both 
service sectors in regressions (ii) and (iii) are similar; and both 
have opposite signs on co-efficients to those in regression (i), as 
predicted- 
12 
Although the t-statistics suggests that individuall 
co-efficients are not significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level, as can frequently occur with polynomial regressions, when 
considered together, an F-statistic confirms all regressions sig- 
ni£icant at the 1% level. Comparing R2s between regressions (i) - (iii) 
and (vi) - (viii),, it is clear that both linear and non-linear forms 
perform equally well. The R2s in comparable regressions are both high, 
and very close. In regression (ii) for example, an R2 = 0.8784 compares 
with R2 = 0.8760 for the linear regression in (vii). Tables 2.1(B) and 
2.1(C) present results for 1960 and 1970 separately, and confirm that 
the similarity in predictive ability is evident in both years, though 
the explanatory power of the regressions is noticeably better for 1960 
than for 1970. This result confirms that the non-linear function, 
while not necessary to predict structural patterns involving the 
agricultural sector, can nevertheless provide as good an explanation 
as the linear form. Figures 2.5A and B illustrate the similarity in 
the predictions of these two functions for the service /agriculture 
and industry/agriculture relationships. 
Comparing regressions (iv) and (ix) where yT is related 
directly to ys the improvement in the predictive ability of the non- 
linear form, from the linear, is considerable, with the non-linear 
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Notes to Tables 2.1(A)-2.1(C) 
* F-statistic significant at the 1% level. 
t Parameters constrained to values of -1.00 as dictated by (2.15) and 
(2.16) 
. 
fit Regression of y'S on yI' (not yA). S 
(1) Ys fl/(Y 
Sl/3) + 
6)}, Yssa = {1/ (Y8S1/3) + A) .z (YA + Y)- 
l 
(cS = 0.90; A=1. -35; Y- = 2.10) . 
(2) y= -Y- - g, - -where g=0.366 ; y' =Y- in, where m=0.15 3. See 
Appendix 2.2. 
(3) Figures in parentheses are t-values. All regressions are run 
over 56 observations (1960 = 30,1970 = 26). 
Source: Appendix 2.3. 
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FIGURE 2.5A 
LINEAR AND NON - LINEAR RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SHARES 
OF AGRICULTURE AND SERVICES IN EMPLOYMENT (1960 AND 1970) 
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FIGURE 2.5B 
LINEAR AND NON-LINEAR RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SHARES 
OFAGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY IN EMPLOYMENT(1960 AND 1970) 
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regression giving an R2=0.78, and the equivalent linear regression 
giving an R2 = 0.62. A similar improvement is evident in the industry/ 
social service relationships in regressions (v) and (x), the linear 
form giving an R2 = 0.54, compared with R2 = 0.70 in the non-linear 
regression. Again, in all cases, the sign predictions on co-efficients 
are satisfied, and F-statistics are significant at the 1% level. 
(Comparisons of the alternative functions are illustrated in Figures 
2.6A and gß. 
13 
Tables 2.1(B) and 2.1(C) confirm that the improvement in R2 by 
choosing the non-linear function, occurs both in 1960 and 1970, despite 
the fact that fewer observations- exist on the negatively sloping 
2 
portion of the relationship, in 1960. The improvement in the R is 
however especially evident in 1970; in the industry/social service 
relationship, for example, the linear form in (x) gives an R2 of only 
0.28, while the R2 of 0.58 is produced by the non-linear regression 
in (v). However it is also clear that a reduction in the predictive 
ability of the regressions from 1960 to 1970 occurs in the non-linear 
as well as in the linear regressions, suggesting that there are other 
factors affecting the 1970 sector shares, not accounted for by the 
use of the non-linear form. 
Since the regressions in Tables 2.1(A)-(C) have been estimated 
separately it is necessary to ensure that regressions within each 
table are mutually compatible, i. e. that they satisfy the condition 
yA + YI + YS + YR =1 (2.17) 
where YR represents employment in activities not 
included in the three 
main sector definitions. From equation 
(2.10), since Yi = yi + g, 
this is equivalent to testing 
YA + YI + YS + YR =1- 4g (2.18) 
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which may be done by estimating yI. ys and yR, for each observation of 
yA, from regressions (i) and (v) in Table 2.1(A) and regression (A3.9) 
in Appendix 2.1. yl must also be estimated using regression (iii) in 
Table 2.1(A). If the mean of yA + yI + ys + yR is not significantly 
different from -0.464 (1 - 4(0.366)), the null hypothesis that the 
aggregation condition in (2.18) is satisfied by the regressions, may 
be accepted. Performing such a test does indeed confirm that neither 
of the estimated means (using the two estimates of yI) are significantly 
different from -0.464 at the 5% level, so supporting acceptance of 
the null hypothesis, and hence the-values of the coefficient estimates. 
A similar test for the linear regressions in Table 2.1 also indicated 
acceptance of the null hypothesis. 
2.5 THE ROLE OF THE SERVICE SECTOR 
The results of Table 2.1 confirm that, although changes in the 
industrial and service sector shares may not be uniquely associated 
with per capita income levels, patterns of structural change involving 
all three sectors can be discerned across countries. It has also 
been shown that 'de-industrialisation' is a phenomenon which can be 
incorporated into this method of modelling structural change. Indeed 
the regression results confirm that the systematic pattern of develop- 
ment of the service sector in particular will not now be adequately 
identified using functional forms which have been commonly used in 
the past. This was found to be especially true of the social service 
sector where the goodness of fit obtained for non-linear regressions 
between the industrial employment share, y1, and the social service 
employment share, ySS, was a considerable improvement over the linear 
alternative. In 1970 for example, the linear regression suggested a 
statistically significant but weak relationship between y and y I SS 
22 
(R = 0.28) but the non-linear form, with an R of 0.58 reveals much 
greater cross-section similarity. 
The results of this analysis provide some interesting general 
observations on the role of the service sector. Firstly, the service 
sector share begins to expand at the expense of the industrial sector 
share at values of about 37% and 34% for the two sector shares res- 
pectively, and about 18% for the social service sector. The service 
sector is therefore already large--relative to manufacturing when it 
begins to expand in association- with a contracting manufacturing 
- sector. -More re-levant than -the -precise share values at the 
'turning 
point' (which are bound to vary between countries for different 
domestic reasons), is the extent to which sector shares change. It 
may be noted from Figure 2.6 for example, that as the industrial 
sector share declines the social service share increases by more than 
the total service sector implying a rise in the share of the social 
component of total services. This accords well with expectations 
- the 'post industrial' phase of development being associated 
particularly with increased provision of public welfare services, 
with fairly high income elasticities as proposed by the Clark-Fisher 
14 
hypothesis. 
The data also confirm that the de-industrialisation phase is not 
a temporary phase, as is sometimes claimed, arising from slower growth 
or recession affecting the industrial sector disproportionately, hence 
reducing its share. The data here represent the relatively fast 
growing period up to 1970, and examining changes in individual 
countries between 1960 and 1970 in Figure 2.6 shows many were 
experiencing de-industrialisation. In any case, the cross-section 
data in Table 2.1(B) suggests some evidence of de-industrialisation 
43 
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was already present by 1960. 
The service sector is of course composed of many different types 
of service activity. Some services may be expected to decline in 
importance in association with the industrial decline. In the USA 
for example, the falling share of manufacturing in employment has 
been associated with a falling employment share of the 'distribution' 
-----sector - -a sector largely involved in transportation of industrial 
goods. Restaurant, hotel and catering services on the other hand 
may-be considered to be-less influenced by the manufacturing sector 
(though backward linkages obviously exist) offering to the consumer 
an alternative type of expenditure to manufactured goods. In the 
de-industrialisation stage of development therefore the increasing 
share of services in aggregate is likely to be accompanied by 
changing weights of individual services within the total. The 
previously noted relative increase in social services is an example 
of a sector with relatively few backward linkages to the manufacturing 
sector which is therefore relatively unconstrained by declines in 
the manufacturing sector's employment share. 
2.5.1 Predicting Structural Change 
The role of the service sector in earlier stages of development 
is also highlighted by this cross-section evidence, offering general 
support to previous theoretical predictions. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 
indicate that in the early stages, when the agricultural sector is 
still large, the service sector expands faster than manufacturing. 
At an intermediate stage (with the manufacturing employment share 
in 
excess of about 20%) the reverse is true with manufacturing 
becoming 
the fastest growing sector in employment terms. Thereafter services 
again dominate, changes in the manufacturing share eventually 
becoming 
negative. Several authors have pointed 
to the need of a newly 
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industrialising country to invest in infrastructure facilities 
including electricity, drainage and transport systems. This has 
been advocated particularly in the literature on public sector 
growth during development, since it is common for many of these 
services to be publicly provided. 
15 
More recently, migration theory 
and evidence on the 'informal' sector suggest that various types of 
-- small-scale services can be expected to grow rapidly during industrialisation. 
While the evidence presented here explicitly excludes public utilities, 
it is--likely that it is the expansion of many of the services discussed 
above in the early stages of development, which is being picked up in 
the data. Once many of these- 'prerequisites' for industrial growth 
have been provided however the growth of many services, relative to 
industry, will be curtailed. Whether this applies to the informal 
service sector remains unclear with little evidence yet on whether 
significant and sustained industrial development will encourage or 
discourage this sector. It may be that the growth of informal services, 
unique to developing countries, will not be suitably represented by 
cross-section data involving developed countries. Nevertheless the 
empirical predictions of this model seem to be in agreement with 
the available theoretical predictions. 
It is also interesting to note from Figure 2.6 that a service 
sector can be expected to emerge before a manufacturing sector 
(when 
YI = O, YS > O) , but the reverse 
is true of the social service sector 
(when YSS = 0, YI > 0). Both these observations accord well with 
the predictions of development theory -a sector providing mainly 
agricultural services is likely to exist, 
if limitedly, before a 
country begins to industrialise, but social services, 
frequently 
financed by governments, are only possible when a country achieves 
sufficient productivity gains to provide a marketable 
surplus to 
pay for these services. 
process. 
This tends to occur in the industrialisation 
The data in Figure 2.6 confirm the evidence of Berry (1978) and 
others that Latin American countries have experienced a considerable 
expansion in their social and total services, most notably Argentina 
(4) and Mexico (6) . 
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It must be stressed, however, that the functions employed here 
are not meant to be used-to-predict_atvery large values of the service 
sector share-since, as was pointed out earlier, they do not account 
for a slowing down of the increase in the service sector share which 
can be expected as it approaches high values. In the absence of 
observations in that range at present, this study has not attempted 
to construct more complicated functions to incorporate this phenomenon. 
Finally it is interesting to apply the functional forms illustrated 
in Figure 2.2 to the 1960 data used by Fuchs (1968), since Table 2.1(B) 
suggested that the alternative functional forms proposed also perform 
better in 1960 than the linear functions. Fuchs hinted that such a 
pattern might be relevant for the U. S. A. but considered that his data 
supported a different pattern among his 20 O. E. C. D. country sample, 
namely the pattern illustrated in Figure 2.1. In fact, had Fuchs 
applied the functions forms in (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14) to his 
data he would have found that they fitted equally well, and with 
the inclusion of the U. S. A. in the sample, the data fit better to 
these functional forms than to the reciprocal forms which Fuchs used. 
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2.5.2 Changes since 1970 
The absence of strictly comparable data for most countries 
in 
the sample after 1970, as discussed in Section 
2.3.3 makes comparisons 
with more recent evidence on structural change rather 
difficult. 
Nevertheless it is interesting to examine the extent 
to which the 
patterns identified in 1960 and 1970 remain representative. Table 
2.2 presents some summary statistics on changes in the four sectors 
in developed and less developed countries between 1970 and 1978.18 
Of the 30 countries in the previous sample there is evidence on 
sectoral shares in the late 1970s in 26, usually from labour force 
sample surveys. This source can sometimes suggest markedly different 
sectoral shares from census data, in the same year, so that the 
data in Table 2.2 must be interpreted with care, and provide only 
general indications of sector share trends. The table shows the 
average percentage point change in sector employment shares for the 
period, for a group of 15 developed countries, and a group of 11 less 
developed countries. Standard deviations are given in parentheses as 
one indicator of the degree of similarity of sector share changes 
across countries. 
It can be seen that the decline in the share of agriculture was 
much greater on average in LDCs, with a mean percentage point change 
of -8.0 compared to only -2.3 in the developed countries. There was 
however much more diversity among the LDCs. For the manufacturing 
sector, as expected the LDCs show a rise on average of just over 1 
percentage point while the developed countries record a 3.3 percentage 
point fall. It is interesting to note that, apart from the agricultural 
sector the differences among LDCs as measured by the standard deviation, 
are not very different from developed country differences. The service 
sector shows a slightly larger rise in the developed countries than 
in less developed countries (5.1 and 4.8 percentage points respectively), 
but relative to manufacturing, the service sector share 
has increased 
by 8.4 percentage points in the developed countries, as against only 
3.7 percentage points in the LDCs. The pattern 
for social services 
is again similar to that for total services. 
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TABLE 2.2 
PERCENGAGE POINT CHANGES IN SECTORAL 
EMPLOYMENT SHARES, 1970-78 
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Social Services 
11 Less Developed 
Countries: 
mean -8.0 +1.1 +4.8 +3.3 
standard (8.2) (2.2) (3.1) (2.4) 
deviation 
15 Developed 
Countries 
mean -2.3 -3.3 +5.1 +3.9 
standard (1.9) (2.7) (3.1) (2.9) 
deviation 
Note: Of the 30 countries listed in Appendix 2.3, the four omitted here are Argentina, 
India, Greece and Yugoslavia. 
Source: I. L. O. Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Geneva, 1976-80. 
4ý 
It would seem then that time-series changes in the sample 
countries after 1970 are broadly in agreement with the earlier cross- 
section evidence, despite data difficulties. The post-1970 evidence 
confirms that the agricultural share falls most rapidly in the 
earlier stages of development; the service share increases sizably 
in both groups of countries, but only in the developed countries is 
this associated with a declining manufacturing share; and social 
services increase with manufacturing in the LDCs but at the expense 
of manufacturing-in the developed countries. Perhaps the most sur- 
prising result of Table 2.2 is that both service sector shares in LDCs 
appear to be increasing much faster than manufacturing. It may be 
that this partly reflects the faltering pace of industrialisation in 
the 1970s in many LDCs, causing employment to increase particularly 
in service sectors. 
2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter began by considering alternative methodologies 
used to examine the role of the service sector in development, and 
discussed some of the recent evidence on 'de-industrialisation'. 
Following the cross-section approach Section 2.2 briefly outlined 
some of the evidence already available on changes in economic 
structure during the development process, highlighting the work 
of Fuchs (1968) , Chenery and Taylor 
(1968) and Chenery and Syrquin 
(1975). It was argued that, in the light of the increasing evidence 
of de-industrialisation in many developed countries, 
it was no longer 
appropriate to use the functional forms used hitherto 
to estimate 
structural change from cross-section data, because these would 
lead 
to false predictions. 
5C 
Section 2.3 proposed alternative functional forms which are more 
in agreement with theoretical predictions, and can allow for the 
industry/service relationship to be both positively and negatively 
sloping for different ranges of income. In Section 2.4 it was 
discovered that the empirical evidence strongly supported these 
functional forms, in preference to linear alternatives. However, 
even adopting these functional forms, there was some weakening of 
the relationships between 1960 and 1970 suggesting that there were 
factors affecting the relative sector shares not accounted for by 
these functional forms. Nevertheless strong support was obtained 
for the view that service sectors expand particularly rapidly 
relative to industry in the earlier and later stages of development, 
with substantial similarity across countries. 
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1. See Brown and Sheriff (1978). 
2. Two books in particular, Bell (1974) and Gershuny (1978) have 
examined growth of the service sector in the U. K. in some detail. 
Until the 1970s most analyses of the service sector had been con- 
fined to U. S. A. data. 
3. Using ordinary least squares Chenery and Taylor (1968) obtained 
insignificant co-efficients for-the service sector relationships 
and R2s less than 0.4, most of this appearing to be due to the 
-inclusion of log N in the-function. Chenery and Syrquin (1975) 
found significant co-efficients but still obtained Rs of less 
2 
than 0.3. When employment share, rather than GNP share, was 
used as a dependent variable, R2s improved to around 0.5. See 
Chenery and Syrquin (1975, pp. 38-9 and 49). 
4. See Chenery and Syrquin (1975, pp. 16-18). 
5. See Fuchs (1968, pp. 24-31). 
6. Fuchs was aware of this tendency in the U. S. A. but seems to have 
seen this as a deviation from the established pattern among his 
20 O. E. C. D. country sample. See Fuchs (1968, p. 31). 
7. In 1970 the U. K. had only 2.5% of its economically active pop- 
ulation in agriculture compared to 7.5% in West Germany and 
4.2% 
in the U. S. A., though per capita income in the U. K. was only about 
60% of U. S. and 80% of West German G. D. P. 
(See Kravis et. al. 
(1975, p. 9)) . 
8. It can be shown that, 
11 l= Tr 21+ TT 11+y, 
and u2 - (Tr 23 
, Tf 2 2) 
6 
9. See Fuchs (1968, pp. 14-16). 
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10. Data for Brazil (1970) and Peru (1970) were omitted because 
earlier regressions indicated they diverge strongly from the 
pattern of other LDCs. Their inclusion would not significantly 
alter the comparisons in Table 2.1. Also data on economically 
active population rather than employment was used because 
although it may include varying amounts of unemployment, this 
effect is likely to be small and allows a larger sample of LDCs 
to be taken. 
11. The turning point will, in fact, occur with a service sector 
share slightly higher than g, -since the continuing, if small, 
decline in y, will allow y2 to continue to increase until the 
acceleration in the growth of ys, outweights that effect. 
12. In (2.15) 
13. 
1- 3g + d2f3 
II = 
-d2f3 
-3d2b1f2 3d2b2f -d2b3 
3d2b1f2 -3d2b2f d2b3 
so that sign predictions are clearly satisfied in regressions 
(i) , (ii) and (iii) . 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 suggest that heteroskedasticity may be 
present in the regression equations. However testing each of 
the ten regressions in Table 2.1(A) using the Spearman Rank 
Correlation test did not confirm heteroskedasticity with 
correlation coefficients of -0.54, -0.46, -0.16,0.08,0.10, 
-0.35, -0.30, -0.14,0.41 and 
0.16 for the ten regressions respectively. 
Only in regressions (i) , (ii) and 
(ix) could an argument for 
heteroskedasticity being present be made. Even here it does not 
seem inappropriate to assume ho moskedasticity. 
14. Fisher (1939) and Clarke (1940) provided one of the earliest, 
but still persuasive hypotheses on the development of the service 
sector. They argued that countries could be expected to move 
from mainly primary to secondary to service production during 
development. Because high income elasticities are associated 
with many service activities, it is argued that this sector only 
becomes large after the'basic necessities' of the primary sector 
are provided and most demands for manufacturing goods are sat- 
isfied. This process has become known as the Clark-Fisher 
hypothesis. 
15. See Katousian (1970) and Thirlwall (1972, p. 40-1), on the growth 
of the service sector in general in the early development stages; 
and Bird (1971), Musgrave (1969) on the public service sector in 
particular. 
16. In the case of Argentina, there has also been a fall in the in- 
dustrial sector share as services have expanded. The Mexican 
service sector data is also likely to be over-estimated in 1970 
because of changes in definitions. See Appendix 2.3. 
17. Running OLS regressions on Fuchs (1968) data, using functional 
forms in (2.13) and (2.14) gives R2s of 0.72 and 0.63 for Industry 
and Services respectively. ((2.14) expressed in terms of X becomes 
yT =a-b (X - f)3 - c/X). This compares with Fuchs results of 
0.73 and 0.65 respectively (see Fuchs (1968, p. 29n)). Including 
2 
data for the United States in 1960, changes in the Rs res- 
pectively to 0.72 and 0.71, while adding the U. S. observation to 
regressions of the functional forms used by Fuchs gives R2 = 0.65 
for Industry and R2 = 0.61 for Services. Thus, with the inclusion 
of the U. S. data, the functional forms of (2.13) and (2.14) give 
unambiguously improved results, even from this limited sample. 
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18. Where 1978 data were not available the nearest available year was 
used (usually 1977 or 1979). In the case of Sudan (where data are 
for 1956 and 1973) and Iraq (where data are for 1957 and 1977) it 
was assumed that structural changes took place evenly over the 
whole period, and only the latter half of the period was used 
to maximise comparability with other countries in the sample. 
APPENDIX 2.1: THE EFFECTS OF INCLUDING A 'RESIDUAL' SECTOR 
Letting all sectors excluded from yA, yI and ys be represented by 
yR, and assuming 
yR = a0 + ßO/X ß0 <© (Al. 1) 
and yA = of + ßl /X >0 (Al. 2) 
it can be shown that 
YR = 113 + 11 4YA u4 40 (A1.3) 
where 11 3= a0 - al 
(ß 1 ßi) - g{ 1- (ß0 ßi) } uý = ßý 
I ýI 
Also, equation (2.14) (see text) now becomes 
yI =1- 4g - yA - ys - yR (Al. 4) 
whence yr = (1 - 4g + d2f3 - u3) - 3d2b1f2z + 3d2b2fz2 - d2b3z3 - (1 + u4)yA 
(Al. 5) 
Similarly, substituting equation (2.13) into (2.12) gives 
yA = (al - g) + b1d1/3(y1/3 + f) (Al. 6) 
Substituting A1.6 into A1.4 gives 
yi = (Z - 3g - a1 - 13) - 
1/3 
(1 + 14) (ys/3 + f) -1 - ys (Al. 7) 
If u4 = 0, the inclusion of yR alters only the intercept terms in the 
first equation of (2.15) (equivalent to appendix equation A1.5), and (2.16) 
(equivalent to appendix equation Al. 7). If however p4 <0 this has the 
additional effect of removing the constraint that the co-efficient on y 
in (2.15) be equal to unity and alters the value of u2 in (2.16). 
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From A1.1, if ßo = 0, then ', i4 =0 which can be tested for the 
sample of 30 countries in 1960 and 1970. The results of an OLS 
regression are (where estimated t-values are in parentheses) 
yR = -0.253 
(-43.84) 
R2=0.2246 
- 0.09 7y 
(-3.96) A 
n= 56 
(A1.8) 
(Only 56 observations are used because two data points are unavail- 
able and_a further two are excluded: see- footnote 10. ) 
As may be expected when countries with very large agricultural 
sectors are included, the hypothesis that ßO =0 may be rejected, 
though the co-efficient on yA, despite being significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level, is small. However, a similar regression, 
excluding countries with very large agricultural sectors (Sudan, 
India, Pakistan and Turkey) gives 
yR = -0.231 
(-22.70) 
R2 = 0.224 
- O. O3lyA 
(-1.04) 
n= 49 
(Al. 9) 
which would suggest that the hypothesis that ßO = O, probably most 
accurately describes the data. Therefore equations (2.15) and (2.16) may 
be tested, maintaining the constraints on the relevant variables. 
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APPENDIX 2.2: ESTIMATING THE SOCIAL SERVICE SECTOR 
(a) If the Social Service employment share is a similar cubic 
function of income as the aggregate Service sector, then estimation 
of intersectoral relationships involving the Social Service sector 
requires a new origin at the point of inflexion in YSS' Letting 
this point be (2 , m) , new variables y' and x' can be constructed, 
such that, 
y' =Y- (A2.1) 
x' =X-Q (A2.2) 
By a similar procedure to that used for the aggregate service sector 
it can be shown that if 
yss _ e2x'3 (A2.3) 
then YSs 11 + n2z' n3z '2+ fl3Z' 
3 (A2.4) 
and yI = u4 - 115{1/(yS1/3 + X)} - YS 
(A2.5) 
-1 (Y 0=m- al, and A= e2/3 where z' _Ä+ 9) , 
Assuming additionally that both the yS and y' SS 
functions in (2.13) 
and appendix equation (A2.3) reach their points of 
inflexion at the same 
value of X, (i. e. Q= f) then, as shown 
in Section (b) below, (A2.5) 
becomes 
1/3 
yi n6 - n7 {1/ Ns + ý'ý n8yss 
(A2.6) 
Thus the value of unity imposed on y5 in 
(A2.5) is not necessary on 
the coefficient on yss in 
(A2.6). 
Z)8 
(b) From equation (2.13) and appendix equation (A2.3) 
Y5 -g= d2 (X - f) 
3 
(A2.7) 
and YSS -m= e2 (X - JZ) 
3 
(A2.8) 
Letting Q=f, solving (A2.7) and (A2.8) simultaneously gives 
Ys -g= (d2/e2) (Yss - m) (A2.9) 
Also, since m and g are both constants then m=g+k is also a 
constant, and therefore 
YS -m+k= (d2/e2) (YSS m) (A2.1O) 
i. e. yS = -k + (d2/e2)Y'SS (A2.11) 
Substituting (A2.11) into (A2.5) gives 
yI = n6 - n7{1/ (YSS 
3+ 
ý) }- n8y, ss 
(A2.12) 
I 
T' n7 = n5. Ti 
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Notes to Appendix 2.3 
+ Data for Egypt are for 'employment', and have been omitted from all 
regressions. 
* 'Services' excluding 'Transport and Communications', 'Finance', 
'Retail and Wholesale Trade'. In Yugoslavia, 'Finance' is 
included. 
f Includes 'gas, water, storage and sanitary services'. 
Source: I. L. O., Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Geneva (various 
issues) . 
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C HAP TER 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF THE EFFECTS 
OF NON-MARKET SECTOR GROWTH 
62 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The relative merits of private versus public production within a 
mixed economy have always been, and continue to be, an important 
subject of discussion in economics. Private and public sectors have 
been analysed and compared in terms of their efficiency, the type and 
desirability of the goods they produce, and the effects of their 
ownership structure. In recent years, the inter-relationship between 
private and public sectors has been of considerable interest both to 
politicians and economists, The election of the Thatcher administration 
in the U. K. and the Reagan administration in the U. S. A. was associated 
with strong arguments in favour of a diminishing role for the public 
sector, and a rise in private production which is alleged to be necessary 
to combat the macroeconomic ills of inflation, unemployment and slow 
productivity growth. 
Economists have often tried to explain macroeconomic problems 
using a structural approach involving private and public sectors. 
Perhaps the best known attempt is Baumol (1967), who developed a model 
showing that productivity differences between a 'progressive' and a 
'non progressive' sector can cause problems of cost-inflation and slow 
growth. These two sectors were assumed to consist respectively of, 
mainly private, manufacturing activities and, mainly public, service 
activities. More recently Johnston (1975) suggested an alternative 
division of economic activity could best aid an understanding of 
inflation. Johnston argued that the distinction between sectors 
producing 'marketed' outputs and those producing 
'non-marketed' 
outputs was more useful than a private/public 
division. This 
distinction was taken up by Bacon and Eltis (1976) who argued 
that 
growth in the non-market sector 
in the U. K. was partly responsible 
for the U. K. 's slow growth in marketed output, high 
inflation rates 
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and balance of payments problems, It is with the Bacon and Eltis 
approach that this chapter is most concerned. 
The Bacon and Eltis analysis has been applied to non-market 
sector growth in several countries. These have included studies of 
the U, S. A  Canada, Egypt and Greece. 
i 
In each case, it has been 
argued that expansion of the non-market sector at the expense of the 
market sector can have adverse macroeconomic effects. To date, 
however, there has been no consideration of how these effects may 
best be compared across countries, 
This chapter provides a framework in which international comparisons 
of the macroeconomic implications of different market and non-market 
growth rates can be identified. In Section 3.2 market and non-market 
sectors are defined and the relationship between employment growth and 
the growth of market sector output is discussed. Section 3.3 then 
presents a framework for making international comparisons, which in 
Section 3.4 is applied to cross-section data for 27 developed and less 
developed countries in 1960 and 1970. The results of this investigation 
are summarised in Section 3.5. 
3.2 MARKET AND NON-MARKET SECTORS 
The market sector of an economy may be defined following Johnston 
(1975), as all sectors producing outputs sold 'in the market-place', 
including agricultural and industrial goods, and services such as 
banking and i. nsurance. 
2 
The non-market sector represents those out- 
puts provided 'free' and is therefore usually wholly publicly 
owned. 
3 
Alternatively non-marketed outputs may be defined as 
those outputs for 
which there is no charge directly related 
to the amount consumed, such 
as state-provided education, 
defense, etc, 
The relationship between marketed and non-marketed outputs 
may 
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be easily derived from the familiar national income identity. 
Y- C+ I+ G+ X- M (3.1) 
This can be divided into marketed and non-marketed outputs such that 
Y =YY 
g=Cm 
+T 
m+Gm+ 
(X - M) +G9 (3.2) 
that is, total output or income (Y) consists of marketed goods and 
services (Y 
m) 
plus non-marketed outputs (Y ). These non-measurable 
outputs are usually estimated using-wages and salaries of public, non- 
market sector employees. Marketed output is purchased by market sector 
firms and--workers for consumption and investment (Cm + Im), by foreigners 
in the form of exports and by Public Authorities and their employees, 
(the non-market sector), (Gm). 
4 
Public Authorities also use non-marketed 
outputs measured by the amount of wages and salaries paid to their 
employees, (G ). 
9 
Thus, since Y=G 
9g 
YmCm +T 
m 
+G 
m 
+X-M (3.3) 
Cm +T 
m 
+G 
m 
+B (3.4) 
where B is the current account surplus on the balance of payments. This 
is similar to the identity used by Bacon and Eltis. However, they define 
marketed output in terms of final outputs so that 
Oc +x +C +I +X (3.5) 
mmmuu 
where 0 is total final sales of domestically produced goods and services 
m 
plus final use imports and Cu + Tu is equivalent to Gm in equation 
(3.3). 
5 
Using the definitions in equ4tion (3,4) allows marketed output to 
be 
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estimated using annual data on value added. This avoids the need to 
extrapolate between years when input-output tables are available to gain 
annual estimates of final expenditures necessary to estimate equation 
(3.5). In many less developed countries the accuracy of such tables 
is in any case extremely dubious. 
From (3.4), since Gm includes investment goods (I 
u) 
and consumption 
goods (C 
u 
), (3.4) may be rewritten as 
Y-C+C+I+B 
mmu (3.6) 
Differentiating (3.6)-with respect to time and dividing throughout by Ym, 
gives 
Ym = atC + ßtCu + YtI + atB (3.7) 
where at, ßt, yt and at represent the respective instantaneous shares of 
C, C, I and B in marketed output, Ym, and where iM, C 
in ,Cu, 
i and i mu 
represent the rates of change in each of the variables. 
In addition it can be shown that the rate of growth of consumption in 
each sector is equal to the sum of the rates of growth of consumption per 
employee in each sector, cm and cu, and the rates of employment growth in 
each sector, im and E. This implies that faster employment growth can 
only be achieved at the cost of slower growth in consumption per employee, 
if total consumption growth is to remain constant. Equation (3.7) may 
therefore be rewritten as (omitting time subscripts) 
ym =a (cm + Em) + (cu + Eu) + yl + aB (3.8) 
The growth of marketed output is now expressed as a weighted average of 
the growth in consumption and employment in both sectors, investment and 
the balance of payments. Equation (3.8) shows that, for a given value of YID, 
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faster employment growth in either sector must reduce the growth in con- 
sumption per employee, if C is to remain constant. If this does not 
occur and consumption growth increases, investment and net export growth 
will be limited. Of course if sector employment growth rates tend to 
compensate for each other, (as for example when, with a constant labour 
force, reallocation takes place between sectors) this will allow 
increased growth of consumption per employee in both sectors without 
raising the overall growth of consumption. The extent of this increase 
will be dependent on the relative size of employment in both sectors, 
the size of the labour transfer, and both sectors' propensities to 
consume. 
Notice that (3.8) is an ex post equation and does not attempt to 
identify causality. It is not possible to say a priori whether or not a 
change in one of the variables on the right-hand side of (3.8) will lead 
to a change in i__ via multiplier effects or to an opposite change in one m 
or more of the remaining right-hand side variables (though on a full 
employment growth path the latter is more likely). However equation 
(3.8) does permit ex post consideration of the effects on the right- 
hand side variables of one or more of them growing faster than marketed 
output. It may be argued, for example, that allowing non-market 
employment to grow faster than marketed output will have multiplier 
effects and thus eventually raise marketed output growth. Nevertheless, 
as long as 
iu exceeds im other variables in (3.8), (which also have 
associated multiplier effects) will be reduced. 
To examine the implications of different employment growth rates in 
the market and non-market sectors relative to marketed output, it is 
helpful to rearrange equation (3.8) to give 
y- (aE + ßE )= ac + ßc 
u+ 
yI + aB 
mmum 
(3.9) 
Since aEm + xu is the growth in consumption as a result of employment 
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expansion in either sector, equation (3.9) shows that growth in con- 
sumption per employee, investment growth and net export growth are 
limited in the aggregate to the difference between marketed output 
growth and the growth in consumption arising from increased employ- 
ment. Thus countries that experience faster expansion of market and/or 
non-market employment relative to Ym, must also experience reduced 
consumption growth of marketed output by the existing labour force, 
and/or investment, and/or a worsening balance of payments. 
Equation (3.9) also indicates that in countries experiencing rapid 
population growth where employment creating policies (in either sector) 
are often adopted to minimise unemployment, adverse macroeconomic con- 
sequences will occur if marketed output growth is not simultaneously 
raised. However for countries which increase non-market employment 
growth, rather than adopt policies to encourage faster market employ- 
ment growth, simultaneous and commensurate increases in Ym may be less 
likely. As Bacon and Eltis (1976) have emphasised, in the short run 
increases in the growth of market employment can be expected, via the 
production function relationship, to increase Ym whereas increases in 
non-market employment growth will only change Ym to the extent of the 
net multiplier effects. Of course, if non-marketed outputs are inputs 
to the market sector, expansion of the non-market sector may enable 
marketed output growth to increase. In some less developed 
countries where a large proportion of the market sector is publicly 
controlled, it is tempting for governments to expand market employment 
beyond that dictated by the production function, so that Ym will not 
6 
necessarily increase with Em. 
Finally it has been argued in much of the literature on the choice 
of criteria for investment allocation, that social welfare functions 
should include effects on consumption, the balance of payments, and 
7 
income distribution. 
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Equation (3.9) shows that government decisions about employment in the 
non-market sector also have important implications for social welfare 
via the balance of payments and consumption. But even if employment 
creation enters the social welfare function independently, (3.9) 
shows the trade-off between employment growth and other variables in 
the equation. 
3.3 CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 
It was shown in equation (3.9) that the difference between the 
two left-hand side variables, Ym and (aE 
m+ 
ßE 
u) 
is equal to the sum of 
the growth in consumption per employee, investment and net exports, all 
of which are frequent policy goals of governments. It is interesting 
therefore to assess how this constraint varies for different countries. 
This may be done by considering differences in Ym and (aE 
m+ 
ßE 
u) 
which 
can be shown diagrammatically, as in Figure 3.1 where N= aE + ßE . mu 
In quadrant A, OP indicates points of equality between Ym and N, 
i. e. positive values for any variable on the right-hand side of (3.9) 
must be balanced by similar negative values among the other right-hand 
side variables. Clearly the difference beteen Ym and N will be constant 
along lines parallel to OP, such as RS, and Ym-N is greater on lines 
further from OP in a north-westerly direction. (Y m-N 
will of course be 
negative for points below OP). These parallel lines may be referred to 
as 'isodifferential lines'. Thus countries on the same isodifferential 
line experience the same overall constraint on the growth of consumption 
per employee, investment and net exports. For countries seeking to 
maximise these variables' values, a position on an isodifferential line 
furthest from OP in a north-westerly direction is to be preferred. 
Although most countries may be expected to be in quadrant A, where 
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FIGURE 3.1 
GROWTH IN MARKETED OUTPUT AND MARKET AND 
NON-MARKET SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 
.. 
P 
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both variables are positive, observations are also likely in quadrant B. 
In this quadrant marketed output growth is positive but weighted employ- 
ment growth, N, is negative, allowing a larger differential for each 
value of Ym than in quadrant A. In fact isodiffential lines in quadrant 
A can be extended through quadrants B and C, and points above PQ in 
Figure 3.1 will experience increasing values of (Y 
m- 
N). 
8 
Finally it is interesting to compare the growth in marketed output, 
not only with a weighted rate of growth of total employment, but also 
with the non-market employment growth component, ßE 
u, 
since it has been 
argued that non-market employment growth in particular can have adverse 
effects. This can be done in exactly the same manner as that discussed 
above by considering the differential Y- ßE Larger values of Y- ßE 
mumu 
enable growth in consumption per employee, investment, net exports and 
market sector employment to increase. This comparison identifies those 
countries which have primarily expanded non-market sector employment, 
relative to marketed output. 
3.4 SOME INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
In this section the framework outlined in Section 3.3 is applied to 
evidence from a sample of 27 countries (14 developed and 13 less developed). 
The purpose of the evidence considered here is to provide a broad 
indication of various countries' relative positions which can be gained 
using available data. 
Employment and output data, disaggregated into market and non-market 
sectors are of course not readily available. Estimating 
these categories 
therefore involves two, often conflicting, objectives - maximising 
accuracy within a country's data and maximising consistency across 
countries' data. Having defined the market sector, estimating 
marketed 
TABLE 3.1 EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT GROWTH IN 27 COUNTRIES, 1960-1970 
Av. Annual Growth in 
Economically Active Population 
and Marketed Output 
w 
_ Social Market Sector 
Services + 
(Eu) iEm) (Ym) aßE 
1. Egypt (a) 
2. Tunisia+(a) 
3. Argentina 
4. Brazil+ 
5. Canada 
6. Mexico + 
7. Peru 
8. U. S. A. (1960-71) 
9. India +(b) 
10. Iran+ 
11. Philippines+ 
12. Syria+ 
13. Austria (b) 
14. Belgium 
15. Denmark 
16. France 
17. W. Germany 
18. Greece+(b) 
19. Italy. 
20. Norway 
21. Portugal 
22. Spain 
23. Sweden 
24. Turkey+ 
25. U. K. (a) 
26. Yugoslavia 
+(b) 
27. Australia (b) 
4.0 3.1 4.4 
. 68 . 18 2.8 
6.1 2.1 6.9 
. 64 . 19 2.5 
3.3 1.5 4.6 
. 70 . 09 1.3 
9.1 1.2 7.6 
. 69 . 15 2.2 
5.2 2.3 5.8 
. 64 . 14 2.2 
5.0 -0.1 6.4 . 81 . 05 0.2 
3.1 1.1 5.0 
. 68 . 08 1.0 
3.9 1.7 4.0 
. 64 . 18 1.8 
-1.5 -0.3 3.7 . 44 . 20 -0.4 
3.6 1.3 8.9 
. 70 . 10 1.3 
7.8 3.4 5.6 
. 82 . 09 3.5 
4.3 4.5 5.8 
. 74 . 14 3.9 
-1.5 -0.7 5.1 . 59 . 13 -0.6 
0.0 0.3 5.0 
. 70 . 13 0.2 
1.9 0.6 4.7 . 66 . 13 0.6 
0.8 0.5 6.1 . 65 . 14 0.4 
0.0 -0.1 5.0 . 57 . 14 -0.1 
-1.9 -0.8 8.0 . 75 . 11 -0.8 
3.4 -0.9 5.9 . 64 . 12 -0.2 
1.3 0.2 4.8 . 58 . 14 0.3 
-0.2 -0.8 6.3 . 77 . 11 -0.6 
1.5 0.0 8.3 . 72 . 09 0.1 
2.8 -0.1 4.0 . 60 . 17 0.4 
9.5 2.6 5.8 . 75 . 13 3.1 
2.2 -0.2 2.9 . 66 . 17 0.2 
2.4 0.2 6.6 . 52 . 14 0.4 
1.9 2.0 5.7 . 65 . 10' 1.5 
(a) Employment growth rates 
(b) Rates of growth over the period, 1961-71 
+ Indicates less developed country (LDC). An LDC is defined here as a 
country having 40% or more of its economically active population in 
agriculture in 1960. 
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output is not difficult and can be obtained from national accounts using 
the identity in (3.6). Estimating market and non-market employment is 
more difficult since even a private/public division is not readily 
available in many LDCs, (though it is usually available in output and 
expenditure data). In addition, because of substantial public owner- 
ship of the market sector in many LDCs, a public/private distinction is 
often not very useful. Non-market sector employment has therefore been 
estimated from the ISIC classification of 'community, social and personal 
services', using International Labour Office (I. L. O. ) statistics. 
9 
In 
most countries these services are substantially publicly-owned and non- 
marketed, though in most cases a small proportion of these services, 
such as domestic service, are private and marketed. Possible inaccuracies 
arising from this classification of the data have been examined for some 
countries where more detailed data are available. This suggests that the 
results in Table 3.1 are a reasonable approximation. 
10 
In addition, as 
will be shown later, the results of this study are in broad agreement 
with individual country studies which have used more detailed data. 
In order to maximise consistency, the data in Table 3.1 have been 
taken from the same I. L. O. source and each is based on census data which, 
particularly in LDCs, have greater coverage and are more accurate 
than 
labour force sample surveys. The shares of market and non-market con- 
sumption in marketed output, a and ß respectively, 
have been estimated 
from the shares of public and private consumption in GDP 
in 196011 for 
each country, as published in national accounts. 
Using the data from 
Table 3.1, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the comparisons of Ym with 
N and 
aE 
u 
respectively. 
Figure 3.2 provides some interesting observations. 
First, those 
countries furthest from the origin are predominantly 
LDCs, suggesting 
that they have experienced higher rates of marketed output 
growth and/or 
market and non-market employment over 
the period, which is what may be 
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expected. It is also clear from Figure 3.2 that this has not necessarily 
meant larger values of (Ym - 
indicate that developed and 
with no obvious tendency for 
performance (in terms of the 
N) in these LDCs. The isodifferential lines 
Less developed countries are similarly spread, 
either group to exhibit better or worse 
size of Y- N) as a whole. m 
Secondly, many countries, particularly the more developed, are 
clustered round the im axis (in both quadrants A and B), which arises 
because a negative weighted rate of growth of market sector employment 
(aEm) is being counteracted by a positive weighted rate of non-market 
employment growth, (SEu). Thus, in West Germany (number 17 in Table 3.1) 
and Spain (22), for example, almost none of the fairly high rates of 
marketed output growth is being taken up in employment growth. The same 
is true of the U. K. (25) but with a much lower rate of marketed output 
growth, and its poor performance relative to other developed countries 
is evident in Figure 3.2, showing that only the U. S. A. (8) in this sample, 
has a similar differential. 
Finally, in Figure 3.2, the worst performers in terms of total marketed 
output available to increase consumption, investment and the balance of 
payments position appear to be Egypt (1), Philippines (11), and Syria (12), 
while Iran (10), Spain (22) and Greece (18) show particularly healthy 
performances. 
The relationship between marketed output growth and consumption 
growth due to increasing non-market employment (SEu) is illustrated 
in 
Figure 3.3 providing three further points of interest. First, the general 
pattern that emerges is that different countries' relative positions are 
broadly similar to those in Figure 3.2. The best and worst performers 
tend to be the same in both cases. 
Secondly, there is a greater relative dispersion of 
ßEu values than N 
values, implying that there 
is greater variability between countries in 
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the consumption growth due to non-market employment expansion. Thus 
Tunisia (2), Brazil (4) and Turkey (24) have experienced much higher 
values of aE 
u 
than the rest of the sample, though high rates of marketed 
output growth keep them on higher isodifferential lines. 
Thirdly, some countries show relative movements between isodifferential 
lines when compared to Figure 3.2. Sweden (23) for example clearly 
becomes one of the worst performers when only non-market employment is 
considered and the--U. K. is on the lowest isodifferential line of all 
countries in the- sample. Table 3-. l confirms that both Sweden and the U. K. 
- have high proportions of marketed output devoted to non-market consumption, 
(particularly when compared to other developed countries), and that in 
both countries non-market employment grew much faster than market 
employment. The U. S. A. also appears to have a high weighted rate of 
non-market employment growth relative to marketed output and evidence 
on the U. S. A. by Bacon and Eltis (1978) confirms that America has 
suffered macroeconomic problems similar to those of the U. K. Because 
many social services in the U. S. A. are privately produced however, the 
observation in Figure 3.3 may be thought to be biased downwards relative 
to other countries. Comparing growth rates of government and non- 
government employment in the U. S. A. over this period however gives 
similar results to those obtained in Table 3.1. 
Syria (12) shows an interesting movement in the opposite direction 
to Sweden. Having had one of the lowest YM-N differentials in Figure 
3.2, it becomes a fairly typical performer in Figure 3.3. This suggests 
that the low differential in Figure 3.2 is mainly due to market employ- 
ment growth. In fact Syria may be an example where expansion of 
the 
market sector has been a result of over-zealous employment creating 
policies as discussed in Section 3.2. 
These observations are in general agreement with the more 
detailed 
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studies conducted to date. Bacon and Eltis (1978) found that the U. S. A. 
and Canada have both suffered problems similar to those of the U. K., 
though to a lesser extent, and this is confirmed by Figures 3.2 and 3.3. 
Gemmell (1982) (see chapter 9) argued that the Egyptian economy suffered 
severe macroeconomic problems due to excessive non-market sector growth, 
during 1960-76, and Figures 2.3 and 3.3 also confirm this. For Greece, 
Bacon and Karayiannis-Bacon (1980) found that growth was very rapid over 
the period 1958-74, with real. -consumption rising by-more-than 5% per 
annum-, along with-steady--growth in-investment. However, their analysis 
suggests that the healthy position of the economy between 1960 and 1970, 
--shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3-, may not have continued into the middle to 
late 'seventies. 
Finally, the relative effects of market and non-market employment 
growth (which cannot be distinguished in Figure 3.2 and are weighted by 
the consumption proportion ß in Figure 3.3) can be assessed by considering 
the growth rate differentials (Y M-E) 
and (Y -E). These are shown mmu 
in Figure 3.4. (Y 
M-Em) 
is equivalent to market sector productivity 
growth12 so that Figure 3.4 shows the association between market sector 
productivity growth and non-market employment growth. Larger values of 
(Y -Ei. e. faster market-sector productivity growth, imply faster m M. 
consumption and investment growth and/or improvement in the balance of 
payments. 
Points furthest from the origin in Figure 3.4 are experiencing 
fastest market sector productivity growth and slowest non-market employ- 
ment growth (relative to marketed output growth). Countries 
identified 
in Figure 3.2 as exhibiting the healthiest overall performance are 
evident here - Iran (10) , Greece (18) , and Spain 
(22) . For points 
closest to the vertical axis, market sector productivity growth 
is 
associated with faster non-market employment growth, so 
that for countries 
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such as Mexico (6) and Italy (19) the relatively low values of Y-E 
M '1 
are not as problematic as for countries such as Egypt (1) or Canada (5), 
because they have simultaneously achieved relatively high rates of 
productivity growth in the market sector. 
For points to the left of the 450 line in Figure 3.4, Eu>Em and, 
perhaps surprisingly, it can be seen that most developed and less 
developed countries were in this position 1960-70. Indeed perhaps the 
most interesting feature of the diagram is that in all but four of the 13 
LDCs in the sample, 
13 
marketed output growth exceeds non-market employ- 
ment growth by only 3% or less, (Y 
m-Eu< 
3%), and in three cases 
Eu>Ym. This means that in most LDCs, improvements in market sector 
productivity were, in general, associated with faster non-market employ- 
ment growth than in the developed countries. This can be explained by 
the rapid expansion in social expenditure programmes (mainly health, 
defence and education) in many LDCs in recent years. It serves to put 
the recent literature on the growth of non-market sectors in some 
developed countries in perspective. 
3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has attempted to provide a method of comparing some 
implications of expansion in an economy's non-market sector across 
countries. Section 3.2 discussed the relationship between marketed 
output and employment growth in the two sectors, which enabled a 
framework to be set up in Section 3.3 allowing simple comparisons of 
the relationship between increasing market and non-market employment 
and overall macroeconomic performance to be made across countries. In 
particular, consequences for the growth of per capita consumption, 
investment and the balance of payments, can be identified. For countries 
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experiencing slow growth in investment or net exports for exa. ole this 
analysis can readily show the extent to which this is associated with 
expansion of the non-market sector, and how this compares with other 
countries. 
It is not suggested that non-market sector expansion per se is 
necessarily harmful. Rather it is intended to emphasise some macro- 
economic implications of the non-market sector growing faster than 
marketed output, so that governments can assess the alternative effects 
on social welfare. It may be noted, for example, that for governments 
who consider employment growth as a worthwhile policy goal in its own 
right, expansion of the non-market sector may have greater adverse 
repercussions on the growth of other variables, than increasing market 
sector employment. 
Section 3.4 examined the relative positions of a sample of 27 
developed and less developed countries, for 1960-70, and found that 
for countries such as Egypt, Philippines and Syria, the growth of 
consumption, investment and the balance of payments was severely limited, 
without similar limits to employment growth, especially in the non-market 
sector. of the developed countries, the U. K. probably experienced the most 
severe constraints. 
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Fnntnntcc 
1. See Bacon and Eltis (1978), Bacon and Karayiannis -Bacon (1980), and 
Gemmell (1982). A revised version of the Egyptian study is presented 
in chapter 9. 
2. Market and non-market sector definitions are discussed in more detail 
3. 
4. 
in Bacon and Eltis (1978). It may be noted that the definition of 
the non-market sector closely resembles the Niskanen (1971) definition 
of bureaus. Niskanen has defined bureaus as 'non-profit organisations 
which are financed, at least in part, by a periodic appropriation or 
grant' (p. 15). The non-market sector may be considered as only that 
part which is financed in this way. 
It is perhaps unfortunate, in the context of LDCs, that those labels, 
which were first used when analysing developed countries (see 
Johnston (1975), Bacon and Eltis (1976)), have been adopted. The 
non-marketed sector in LDCs is often taken to mean that proportion of 
output, usually agricultural, which never reaches the market place, 
and therefore does not enter the money economy, because it is either 
consumed by the producer or traded in the barter economy. However, 
to avoid further proliferation of classifications of economic activity, 
the terms marketed and non-marketed will be used as defined in the text. 
Gm therefore includes consumption out of wages received by non-market 
sector employees, transfers, debt interest and direct purchases of 
final consumption and investment goods by the non-market sector. This 
differs from the classifications used in most National Accounts which 
include all government investment with 'Gross Fixed Capital Formation'. 
5. Since Ym in equation (3.3) is value added in the market sector it 
is equivalent to total final sales (expenditure), 0, less total 
imports. 
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6. In economies experiencing a transfer of labour from the market to 
the non-market sector in absolute terms there will of course be no 
change in total consumer demand assuming the same propensity to 
consume by both groups. 
7. See Kahn (1951) , Chenery (1953) , Galenson and Leibenstein (1955) 
and Sen (1968). A summary of this literature is contained in 
Thiriwall (1978, pp. 169-211). 
8. Observations in quadrants C and D are less likely, at least in the 
longer term, with marketed output growth negative in both quadrants, 
and N negative in quadrant C. 
9. All data are taken from various issues of the International Labour 
Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics. For the non-market sector 
1970 data are classified as 'community, social and personal' services 
using the 1968 ISIC, while 1960 data are classified, using the 1958 
ISIC, simply as 'services'. This classification change was however 
only a change in name. In estimating Eu and Em data on economically 
active population, rather than employment, have been used to allow a 
larger sample of LDCs to be taken. 
10. In the U. S. A. and U. K. for example the annual growth rates of 
government and non-government employment (which approximate the 
market and. non-market sectors fairly closely) were respectively 4. i% 
and 1.4% in the U. S. A. and 1.4% and -0.1% in the U. K. These yield 
values for N of 1.6% for the U. S. A. and 0.17% for the U. K. giving 
both countries similar relative positions to those shown in Table 3.1. 
11. Since a and ß are instantaneous shares, they should, ideally, be 
calculated for each year, 1960-70, along with actual annual growth 
rates. Also since GDP includes non-marketed outputs, this method 
will slightly underestimate a and ß. However, the effect should be 
similar across countries so that inter-country comparisons will not 
be significantly affected. 
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12. Since Y=PE, when Pm=Ym /E 
m, 
then differentiating logarithmically 
mmm 
with respect to time gives, 
(dY /dt) /Y = (dP /dt) /P + (dE /dt) /E mmmmmm 
or Y =p +E 
mm in 
13. The exceptions are India (9), Iran (10), Greece (18) and Yugoslavia 
(26) . 
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CHAPTER 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INCOME TAX REVENUE 
85 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Examining the growth of the public sector must necessarily 
involve studying both the growth of public expenditures and the 
methods of financing those expenditures, of which taxation is 
frequently an important part. Both of these aspects have been 
prominent in attempts to understand and explain the changing 
role of the public sector during economic growth or development. 
On the-expenditure side there is a long history of interest among 
economists in the growth of public expenditures. The- early work 
of the German political--economist Adolf Wagner (18&3) - continues 
to generate discussion, while the more recent contribution of 
Peacock and Wiseman (1961) has formed the basis of much subsequent 
research, especially in the U. K. The arguments of Bacon and Eltis 
(1976) concerning the growth of the non-market sector (which forms 
a part of the public sector) have also been widely discussed. Some 
developments from their approach were considered in chapter 3. 
On the taxation side most interest has centred round the 
changing capacity to tax during development and in the composition 
of the tax structure at difference stages of development. Studies 
such as Martin and Lewis (1956), Williamson (1961), Hinrichs (1965, 
1966) and Abizadeh and Wyckoff (1982) have typically used cross- 
section and/or time series data, often applying regression techniques, 
to identify changes in, for example, tax ratios as per capita income 
increases. The concern of this, and the next, chapter is not 
however with the 'appropriate' or 'typical' tax structure at 
different stages of development but with tax revenue changes for 
a given tax structure. The purpose of these two chapters is to 
consider how revenue from particular taxes and tax systems can be 
expected to vary as incomes increase. In this chapter revenue from 
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a progressive income tax is examined, while revenue from a system 
of direct and indirect taxes is examined in chapter 5. 
The models developed in both chapters use simulated data to 
examine revenue growth but may be applied to a large number of 
countries which use similar taxes to those discussed. To enable 
comparisons with an actual tax system for which certain parameter 
estimates are available, the models are constructed to approximate 
the U. K. tax structure in particular. This need not however 
restrict the general applicability of the models since many aspects 
1 of the U. K. tax system are widely used. 
4.2 BUILT-IN FLEXIBILITY 
It is well known that if personal income tax allowances are 
not indexed to allow for inflation, then a general increase in 
money incomes will increase tax revenue per person for two reasons. 
First, it increases taxable income as a proportion of total income 
for those already paying income tax, and secondly it brings more 
people into the tax 'net'. The precise extent of this increase, 
which has become known as the 'built-in flexibility' of the tax, 
depends of course on the way in which marginal tax rates increase 
as income increases, and on the distribution. of before-tax 
income. 
A variety of methods (based on regression techniques) 
have 
been used to examine the built-in flexibility of the U. K. tax system. 
A useful survey of these methods is provided by Dorrington 
(1974) 
who presents a comprehensive simulation analysis of the 
U. K. tax 
system. More recently, Hutton and Lambert 
(1980) have suggested a 
convenient method of calculating revenue elasticities 
for a system 
consisting of a sequence of fixed marginal 
tax rates and thresholds. 
Hutton and Lambert (1980a) have also proposed a model of 
the U. K. 
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tax system which is described as a 'linear-Pareto' model; since it 
has a fixed marginal rate applying to a large proportion of taxable 
income and a structure of higher marginal rates applying to top 
incomes which are assumed to follow the Pareto distribution. 
While previous studies have usually estimated the built-in 
flexibility of a particular tax structure for specific years, the 
model presented in this chapter is capable of identifying some of 
the general properties of a progressive income tax system2 The 
model gives schedules of total revenue, effective marginal rates 
- and revenue elasticities as -income increases- This allows the 
effects of discretionary changes in the tax system at different 
average income levels to be isolated. A simple, but extremely 
flexible, tax function is used which is nevertheless capable of 
reproducing the Essential features of many progressive tax 
systems in use. A non-linear tax schedule is used in conjunction 
with a lognormal distribution of pre-tax incomes (which covers the 
complete range of income) so that the model presented here may be 
described as a 'non-linear-lognormal' model. In addition to being 
flexible, the model has the advantages of tractability, and of 
being able to capture the main characteristics of actual systems 
with few parameters. These properties are particularly important 
where the model is to be integrated into a wider fiscal model, such 
as that presented in chapter 5.3 Before examining the properties 
of alternative systems in Section 4.4, the main details of the model 
are described in Section 4.3 
4.3 A SIMPLE TAX MODEL 
4.3.1 The tax schedule 
Consider the following income tax schedule, which uses a 
single value of 'personal' allowances applied to every individual. 
4 
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Denoting gross income as y, and total income tax as T(y), then in the 
absence of a negative income tax, 
T(y) =0y<a 
1 
= t1 (y - a1) a1 <y< a2 
= t1 (a2 - a1) + (c - by-k) (y - a2) y> a2 (4 01) 
with h= (c - t1)a2 (4ý2) 
k<1 (4.3) 
A 'standard rate', tl, is therefore applied t6 incomes between the 
thresholds a1 and a2, Thereafter-marginal -rates, increase non-linearly. 
5 
The condition in (4.2) ensures that the marginal tax rate at the level, 
a2, when individua-ls-begin-to pay higher marginal rates of income tax, 
is equal to t1 The maximum rate is of course equal to c. The condition 
in (403) that k<1 ensures that the tax schedule is progressive, 
that the marginal tax rate increases as gross income increases, and 
that the marginal rate exceeds the average rate. 
6 
An increase in k 
implies that marginal tax rates increase more rapidly from t1 (at 
the threshold income a2) to their maximum of c. 
The tax schedule specified in (4.1) - (4.3) is therefore 
extremely flexible and is capable of describing a wide range of 
profiles of marginal and average tax rates. To give some idea of 
the extent to which the schedule in (4.1) can approximate the complex 
schedule actually used in the U. K., Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
situation for the financial year 1977/78. The parameter values 
used are as follows: a1= 2000, a2 = 8000, k=0.66, tl = 0.34 
and c=0.95 (whence h= 229.8). 
7 
Notice that it is necessary to 
use a value of c which is higher than the actual maximum marginal 
rate (of 0.83), since c is an asymptote and it is necessary to 
ensure that the profile has a marginal rate of . 83 at appropriate 
income levels. 
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The tax schedule can easily be fitted to any actual schedule of 
marginal tax rates, using ordinary least squares regression. Over the 
range y> a2 the marginal rate, from equation (4.1), is given by 
dT (y) /dy =c- (c - t1) 
[(l 
- k) (y/a2) 
1-1 
+k (y/a2) -1-k] (4.4) 
For a fixed k (and a2, which is obtained directly) a regression 
of the form z=a+ ßx, where x is the term in square brackets in 
(4.4), may be run. Results using different values of k may be 
compared to find that-which gives-the best fit. 
8 
4.3.2 Total income tax revenue 
If the distribution function of before-tax income is denoted by 
F(y), then total income tax revenue per person, Rt, is given as 
Rt = IT (Y) dF (Y) (4.5) 
where integration is over the complete range of incomes 0<y<¢. 
When the tax schedule (4.1) to (4.3) is substituted into the 
general expression (4.5) it can be seen that a number of terms appear 
of the form f ya 
rdF (y) . Since by definition JyrdF (y) is the r th 
moment about the origin, denoted p', the total revenue per head 
r 
involves 'incomplete' moments (as integration is over a specified 
section of the income distribution). Simplification therefore 
requires the concept of the 'r th incomplete moment distribution' 
of y, denoted Fr (y) -and defined as9 
Fr (y) = IYurdF (u) /furdF (u) (4.6) 
After some manipulation it can be shown that 
Rt = t1 {G(1, a1) - G(1, a2) }+ cG(1, a2) - hG(1 - k, a2) (4.7) 
where in general the function G(r, y) is defined as 
G (r, y) ur{1 Fr (Y) } Yur-1 {l - Fr-1 (Y) } (4.8) 
Total income tax revenue per person is therefore a convenient function 
of just five parameters, c, al, a2, t1 and k, in addition to those 
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required to describe the moment distributions of the distribution of 
income. 10 The values of these parameters are available for many tax 
systems, and although, particularly in developed countries, there 
is often a variety of threshold levels (depending on personal 
circumstances) it is not difficult to specify an appropriate value 
for the single threshold, al. 
4.3.3 The distribution of income 
The expression for total revenue in (4.7) would serve little 
purpose if it-were not- possible to obtain convenient expressions for 
the various moment distributions Fr(y), and moments p'. Fortunately 
the properties of the lognormal distribution A (u, a2) can be used, 
since this describes reasonably well the distribution of the large 
majority of tax payers, and 
A (u. Q2) =A (u + rc2, a2) (4.9) 
ur 
= exp (rp- + /r 
2, 
J2) (4.10) 
u and Q denote the mean and the variance respectively of where 
2 
the logarithms of income. 
11 
The term Iii is the arithmetic mean 
income of the population, which may also be denoted y. The terms 
in (4.8) can therefore readily be evaluated for alternative tax 
2 
schedules and assumptions about u and a 
4.4 PROPERTIES OF ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS 
Having set out the analytics of the tax model in the previous 
section, the built-in flexibility of various tax structures can now 
be examined. A useful feature of the model is that it can be used 
to examine the properties of tax parameters for a wide variation in 
average income. An equal proportionate increase in all incomes will 
change the mean of the logarithms of income, but will leave relative 
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dispersion unchanged. 
12 
The effect on total revenue of a general 
increase in incomes, with an unchanged tax schedule, can therefore 
be examined b considering variations in 
2 
Y4u, with G2 unchanged. 
Comparisons between structures can also be made, in order to consider 
the implications of discretionary changes at different average income 
levels. It is most convenient to illustrate the results diagramatically, 
which have been obtained using a simple computational method for 
evaluating the distribution function A. 
13 
4.4.1 Effectiveaverage tax rates 
It is useful to measure changes in total income tax revenue 
per person, Rt, expressed as a ratio of average income, y, which 
may be called the effective average rate. Figure 4.2 provides 
three examples using equation (4.7), where it is assumed that a2 
remains constant at 0.2. This roughly reflects the dispersion 
of male earnings over all age groups in the U. K. The profile 
marked A in Figure 4.2 corresponds to the tax schedule which is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1. This profile can be seen to be sigmoid 
in shape, and asymptotically approaches a maximum rate of 0.95, 
which is the limiting case where all individuals pay the highest 
marginal rate. The section of the profile corresponding to low 
values of y relative to the threshold may be thought to be 
appropriate for a country with a very small direct tax base. 
Figure 4.2 shows two further profiles. The effects of a 
reduction in the standard rate t1, to 0.30, and an increase in the 
level of income a2 at which higher marginal rates become payable, 
to £9000, are illustrated in profiles B and C respectively. Although 
all three profiles are sigmoid in shape, they become approximately 
linear over a range of mean income from approximately E5000 to £9000. 
This arises because within that range a large proportion of incomes 
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lie between a1 and a2 and are therefore subject to a constant 
marginal tax rate. As y rises further this effect will diminish, 
and the profiles will become more concave. 
From these profiles it is not difficult to determine the 
extent of an inflation tax. An increase in money income due 
solely to inflation will lead to an increase in the effective 
average tax rate (Rt/y) as a result of a movement along a particular 
profile. Constancy in the affective-average tax rate can, of 
course,, -be=maintained by=-increasing-a1_ and a2- by the same 
proportion as y, so moving the profile to the right. 
4.4.2 Effective marginal rates and revenue elasticities 
This method of examining income tax revenues also allows 
direct calculation of effective marginal tax rates (EMR), 
dRt/dy, and elasticities of tax revenue with respect to mean 
income, (dRt/dy)(y/Rt). These measures can be calculated for 
any tax structure or series of tax structures. This is an 
advantage of the present model, since previous studies of income 
tax elasticities apply to particular years only and have not 
examined the extent to which elasticities vary as average income 
increases, using an unchanged tax schedule. 
14 
Figure 4.3 shows- elasticities and EMRs- associated--with the 
profiles in Figure 4.2. As may be expected, elasticities are higher 
the lower the mean income level, while EMRs rise with mean income. 
Figure 4.3 shows clearly that the revenue elasticity schedule levels 
out at higher mean income levels, as a consequence of the `standard 
rate' section in the tax function. However, the elasticity schedule 
will decline as mean income rises beyond £9000 (when more incomes 
become taxable at higher marginal rates). The effect of the 
94 
standard rate on the Eifit profiles is rather different. EMRs increase 
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at a declining rate at mean income levels below about £5000. But 
the increase in EMRs is more uniform as y rises beyond this level. 
However the rate of increase will decline as mean income increases 
beyond £9000,15 
Finally it is interesting to note the effects of some 
parameter changes on elasticities and EMRs. Figure 4.3 shows 
that reducing the standard tax rate to 0.30 (profile B) increases 
the revenue elasticities and reduces the EMRs associated with 
each level of mean income. The--effects are-however greatest at 
higher mean incomes. Increasing the value of the paremeter a2 
to £9000 (profile C) causes both elasticities and EMRs to decrease 
for each value of y. It may also be seen that, unlike profile B, 
the decrease in the EMR compared to profile A is much greater at 
higher mean income levels. 
Since the tax function in Figure 4.1, from which profile A 
is derived, approximates the U. K. in 1977/78, the results may be 
compared with estimates for the U. K. obtained by Hutton and Lambert 
(1980a). They found an elasticity of 1.78 and, although they do 
not present an estimate for the EMR, a value of 0.30 is implied. 
16 
These estimates may be compared with values obtained from profile A 
at the appropriate mean income level of about £5000, where the 
elasticity and EMR are respectively- 1.75 and 0.36. This simple 
method of modelling a complex tax system can nevertheless produce 
sensible values for the measures commonly used to examine the 
built-in flexibility of tax systems. 
17 
4.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this chapter has been to provide a method of 
examining and comparing various progressive income tax structures. 
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The tax structure is modelled by a simple non-linear schedule which 
allows for a wide range of variations in marginal tax rates, and the 
distribution of income is approximated using the lognormal distribution. 
The model may therefore be described as a 'non-linear lognormal' model. 
Using a simple computational method, schedules for the effective 
average tax rate, revenue elasticity and effective marginal rate were 
obtained. It was shown that effective average tax rate schedules are 
sigmoid in shape. These schedules can be used to identify the effects 
of discretionary tax changes. The extent to-which the revenue 
elasticity and effective-marginal rate vary as mean income varies 
was examined for a. variety of tax structures. It was shown that 
for each structure the elasticity falls, and the effective marginal 
rate rises, as mean income increases. However, the rate of change 
varies considerably across tax structures. 
These results clearly indicate that the extent of income tax 
revenue growth as nominal incomes increase is heavily dependent on 
the relationship between real and money incomes and the extent of 
indexation of income tax allowances. It was shown for example that 
where nominal incomes rise solely because of inflation, an increase 
in tax revenue results from the 'inflation tax'. Shifting of tax 
allowances in proportion to inflation will however remove any built- 
in flexibility. The consequences-of alternative forms of indexation 
of allowances are examined in chapter 5 in the context of a wider fiscal 
model. Further discussion of the implications for income tax revenue 
growth as incomes grow is therefore postponed to chapter 5. 
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F'rýý tr . -. 1- n . -. 
1. See chapter 10. 
2. However, various elasticity schedules relating to the West German 
tax system have been obtained by Spahn (1975), who identifies 
'population effects' in addition to 'income effects', using cubic 
spline-functions to describe the income distribution. 
3. The model is also used in Creedy and Gemmell (1984) to examine 
the progressivity of direct and indirect taxes, with income 
transfers, for the U. K. system. 
4. This simplifying assumption is not entirely realistic for most 
income tax systems, but it is not difficult to obtain a 
representative value. A single value of allowances was also 
used by Hutton and Lambert (1982) in their 'linear-pareto' model. 
5. This schedule can also be applied to tax systems which do not 
use a standard rate, by setting t1 and a1 to zero. Equation 
(4.2) must then be respecified as h= (c - m) ak2, where m is 
the marginal tax rate at the level of income where individuals 
begin to pay tax, a2. This function is therefore described by 
only four parameters, c, m, a2 and k. 
6. The condition k<1 is required since the marginal tax rate is 
given by dT(y)/dy =1- (1 - k)y, and dT(y)/dy = k(l - k)y-1-k 
-k 22 
which must be positive. 
7. These values may be compared with the schedules given in Kay and 
King (1980, pp. 22-3) for the tax year 1979/80, for a variety of 
countries. 
8. For 1977/78 values (using the middle of each income range as the 
y value, with £30,000 as the maximum mid-point), the following 
result was obtained using data from Meade (1978) : 
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z=1.05 - 0.71x R2 = 0.997, k=0.5 
(112.44) (-50.32) 
Figures in parentheses are t-values. This gives an asymptote of 
1.05 and a 'standard rate' of 0.34 (ß =c- t1), and provides 
a very good fit. Slightly different values of c and k were 
used for the schedule of Figure 4.1 as the line was not constrained 
to go through the midpoints of the ranges. 
9. For a useful-discussion---of moment distributions in the measurement 
of -inequality see Hart (1975). The-well known Lorenz curve is 
of course the relationship between the first moment- distribution, 
F1 (y) , and the distribution function, F (y) . Notice that r can 
be non-integer. 
10. In the case where a standard rate does not operate (4.7) simpliies 
to 
Rt = cG(1, a2) - hG(1 - k, a2) 
11. See Aitchison and Brown (1957, pp. 8,12). On the use of the 
lognormal to describe the distribution of income see (ibid. 
pp. 107-120). 
12. In fact it is not necessary to assume equal proportionate changes, 
so long as the relative dispersion of incomes remains unchanged. 
13. In the calculations reported here the approximation given in 
Aitchison and Brown (1957, p. 71) was used. 
14. See Hutton and Lambert (1980, p. 903), Hutton and Lambert 
(1980a, p. 17) and Dorrington (1974, p. 576-8). More detailed 
results are given in Hutton and Lambert (1982) . As noted in 
footnote 2, more general results for the West German system 
have been obtained by Spahn (1975). 
15. Excluding a standard rate from the tax schedule changes both 
the elasticity and EMR schedules. The tendency, evident in 
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Figure 4.3, for the elasticity schedule to level out is removed 
and the schedules decline more uniformly. The EMR schedules 
increase at a diminishing rate as mean income increases over 
the whole range of mean incomes. See Appendix 4.1. 
16. This is based on their earlier estimate of the average tax 
rate in Hutton and Lambert (1980, p. 902). 
17. The values are not very sensitive to changes in the dispersion 
of pre-tax incomes (as measured by cf2kr over the relevant 
. range of average -income. - For example, when a2 takes the 
value of 0.15, the-values of the revenue elasticity and 
effective- marginal rate are respectively 1.72 and 0.359, at 
the mean income of £5039. The corresponding values for 
2 
Q=0.25 are 1.75 and 0.378. 
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APPENDIX 4.1 REVENUE, ELASTICITY AND EFFECTIVE MA GINAL RATE 
SCHEDULES (WITHOUT A STANDARD RATE) 
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Comparing Figures 4.2 and 4.4 it can be seen that in the absence 
of a 'standard rate' of income tax the revenue schedules no longer 
display the approximately linear section between about E5000 and £9000. 
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FIGURE 4.5 ELASTICITIES AND EFFECTIVE MARGINAL RATES 
(without standard rate) 
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CHAPTER 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND REVENUE FROM A TAX/TRANSFER SYSTEM 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of chapter 4 provided a method of modelling the 
flexibility of a progressive income tax which, though based on the U. K. 
income tax, is likely to be applicable to a wide range of income tax 
regimes. In order to finance changing levels of expenditure, governments 
are of course interested in revenue from the tax system as a whole and 
its flexibility at different levels of income. The purpose of this 
chapter is therefore to extend the tax model of chapter 4 to consider 
the flexibility of various direct and indirect taxes. Since in most 
tax systems revenues raised by particular- taxes are not independent 
of each other it is necessary to produce a tax model which is capable 
of taking into account the main interdependencies between individual 
taxes. It is apparent for example that revenue from expenditure taxes 
cannot be treated separately from personal income tax revenue, since 
changes in the latter will affect disposable income and hence 
expenditure. 
Rather than consider a hypothetical tax system, the model is 
based on the U. K. tax system and includes the personal income tax 
discussed in chapter 4, the National Insurance system (a social 
insurance tax), Value Added tax and a simplified system of income 
transfers to the low paid. 
1 
Corporate taxation is not included in 
the model. Although the particular forms of the taxes considered are 
specific to the U. K. in certain respects, similar taxes and transfers 
are used in a wide range of countries. 
The growth of tax revenues will of course be influenced by the 
ways in which tax thresholds are indexed to changes in nominal incomes. 
It is important therefore, in analysing the built-in flexibility 
properties of particular taxes, to examine the effects of indexation 
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of these thresholds. In the U. K. the extent of indexation has 
varied across taxes and over time, particularly during periods of 
inflation. In some cases legislation has stipulated certain 
minimum levels of threshold indexation. Possible effects of 
different forms of indexation on tax revenues are discussed in 
Section 5.3. First however the tax/transfer model is described 
in Section 5.2. Simulating indexation of thresholds in the model 
in Section 5.4 allows the flexibility properties of the tax 
system to be examined. Section 5.5 summarises and concludes the 
chapter. 
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5.2 THE TAX/TRANSFER MODEL 
This section describes the main components of the model which is 
used in section 5.4 to examine tax revenue growth. It is required 
to capture some of the main characteristics of the U. K. system in 
order to clarify the interdependencies, without wishing to include 
all of the fine detail of each component. 
5.2.1 Income taxation 
The analysis uses the same non-linear tax schedule as that 
described in chapter 4, and considers only income from employment, 
(which forms over 70% of average household income in the U. K. ). 
This limitation is made so that income taxation and National 
Insurance, discussed in 5.2.2 below, apply to the same measure. 
Letting T(y) be the tax paid by an individual with income y, the 
schedule was defined in chapter 4.3 as follows 
T (y) =0 y< a1 
=t (y - a1) a1 <y< a2 
=t (a2 - a1) + (y - a2) (d - by-k) a2 <y 
with h= (d - t) a2 and k<1 (5.1) 
The same allowances or threshold levels a1 and a2 apply to all 
individuals and although this assumption is not entirely realistic 
the schedule can be used to approximate the U. K. structure closely, 
as shown in chapter 4. For present purposes the schedule may be 
assumed to apply to a particular type of household, and individual 
variations in allowances (arising for example because of differences 
in mortgage and other payments) are ignored. 
2 
The values of d and k 
may be estimated using regression analysis (see chapter 4), and values 
of 0.95 and 0.65 are used for d and k respectively. 
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5.2.2 National insurance contributions 
The schedule relating NI contributions, C(y), to income, y, 
in the U. K. is as follows 
C (y) =0 
= cy 
= cyU 
y yL 
yL y yU 
yýyU (5.2) 
Thus contributions are paid when earnings exceed a lower limit yL, and 
are directly proportional to gross earnings, up to an upper limit yU. 
The marginal rateof contributions is therefore zero-above the upper 
limit. An important feature of the system--is that NI contributions 
are not deducted from income in the calculation of taxable income. 
To illustrate the interaction between income tax and NI, consider 
a standard rate taxpayer who is also within the NI earnings limits. 
Total income tax and NI payments are therefore t (y - a1) + cy. The 
variations in the contributions rate and standard tax rate which would 
leave the individual's total payments unchanged are therefore given by 
dc = dt{ (a1/Y) - 11 (5.3) 
Thus if earnings are double the tax threshold (that is, y= 2a1) a 
change in the National Insurance contributions rate of 1 percentage 
point is equivalent to a change in the standard rate of income tax of 
2 percentage points. 
5.2.3 Transfer payments 
Many individuals may pay little in the form of income tax and 
NI contributions but will pay indirect taxes in the form of Value 
Added Tax resulting from their expenditure. Some of this expenditure 
may in turn be financed from transfer payments, so that it is necessary 
to specify a form of transfers before an expenditure tax is considered. 
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There is in the U. K. a vast variety of means-tested and other 
benefits, but this model examines a simple 'guaranteed minimum income' 
whereby all those with a gross income below the level yB have their 
net income brought up to the level b. This kind of system actually 
gives a relationship between net and gross income which is broadly 
similar to the British social security system, though the latter is 
less smooth, and is administered in a much more complex way. 
4 
When considering alternative policies it is important to realise 
that the -value of the basic minimum, b, cannot be set independently of 
- the- values- of yB, a1, t and c. With yB > a1 > yL, in order to ensure 
continuity in the schedule relating net income to gross income, it 
is required to have 
b=yB(1 -c- t) +a1t (5.4) 
In this case individuals receive transfer payments and pay income 
taxation and National Insurance, as in the U. K. system. 
5.2.4 Value Added Tax 
The taxes and transfers considered above provide a non-linear 
transformation between gross income and disposable (post-income tax 
NI and transfers) income. To complete the specification of the model 
it is necessary to specify a relationship between expenditure and the 
amount of VAT paid. In the U. K., as in other countries, a significant 
number of goods and services do not attract VAT, and the proportion of 
expenditure devoted to zero-rated goods varies as total expenditure 
varies. Furthermore, VAT is levied on the tax-exclusive price of 
goods and services. 
If q denotes expenditure, V(q) the VAT paid, v the VAT rate, 
and r(q) the proportion of expenditure on zero-rated goods, then the 
MIG) , 
relationship between V (q) and q is given by 
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V (q) = q{ l-r (q) } {v/ (1 + v) 1 (5.5) 
For present purposes it is necessary to specify the form of 
r(q). The approach taken was to estimate a log-linear relationship 
between r (q) and q, using Family Expenditure Survey data for 1978 for 
all households combined. The Ordinary Least squares result is 
log r(q) = 0.654 - 0.302 log q R2 = 0.970 (5.6) 
(0.0633) (0.0143) 
The above results apply to weekly expenditure, so that the 
relationship between r (q) and q when -the latter is in annual terms 
is given by 
r (q)- _ 6.343 q 
0.302 
(5.7) 
The effects of varying the rate of VAT may be examined by 
substituting (5.7)- into (5.5) for alternative values of v. This 
method assumes that any substitution between zero and non-zero-rated 
goods as v varies is such as to leave the proportion of expenditure 
devoted to zero-rated goods unchanged at each expenditure level. 
It is useful to illustrate the different components of the 
model, as shown in Figure 5.1, for a particular set of rates and 
thresholds. The following values are used: the tax thresholds a1 
and a2 are £2000 and £8000 respectively; the NI lower and upper 
earnings limits are £700 and £5000 respectively; and a guaranteed 
minimum income of £1832 is received by individuals with a gross 
income below £2250; the standard tax rate is 0.32; and the NI 
contribution rate is 0.15. These values are representative of the 
5 
U. K. system in 1978, although they are rounded for convenience. 
Quadrant A of Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between the. 
sum of income tax and National Insurance contributions, and gross 
income. The relationship consists of five sections. An individual 
with gross income below £700 pays no income tax or national insurance. 
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Thereafter contributions are paid at the constant rate c until the 
£2000 income tax threshold is reached, where the rate is t+c up to 
£5000. There is a further linear section between the upper earnings 
limits and £8000 (a2). Above this level the non-linear section of the 
income tax schedule applies. 
The resulting relationship between gross income, y, and 
y- T(y) - C(y) is illustrated in quadrant B. This quadrant also 
shows the effects of a transfer system in which all those with a 
---- gross-income__less--than -£2250- receive benefits (after paying tax and 
NI) which raises their net-income to £1832. The present analysis 
assumes that all disposable income is consumed. This assumption 
avoids the complexities of a savings model and the tax treatment of 
different methods of saving. It may be noted that if in fact the 
proportion of disposable income which is saved increases with 
disposable income, then VAT is less progressive than implied in the 
results presented below. The built-in flexibility of VAT would also 
therefore be less. 
Quadrant C then shows the relationship between disposable 
income (expenditure) and VAT payments, from equation 5.5. Finally, 
quadrant D illustrates the relative magnitudes of direct taxes 
(income tax and NI) and indirect taxes (VAT) , showing the extent to 
which the former is relatively more important than the latter at 
high income levels. 
5.2.5 The distribution of gross income 
With the above framework it is not possible to obtain convenient 
analytical results for total tax revenue. In order 
to examine the 
effects on built-in flexibility of variations 
in the parameters of 
the model it is therefore necessary to use a simulated 
distribution of 
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gross income. The same distribution is used for each set of rates 
and thresholds considered, as no allowance is made for incentive 
effects. The results presented below are again based on a simulated 
lognormal distribution of income. 
6 
Initial parameter values of u=8.0 and a=0.2 were used to 
obtain the incomes of a simulated sample of 1000 individuals. These 
values of 
2 
V and a were chosen as corresponding closely to the 
distribution of gross -annual- earnings in Britain in 1978, though it 
- should- be stressed that the following results are not affected by 
the particular values used. 
7 
The effects of growth in nominal incomes 
are examined by adjusting all yi by a fixed proportion, d, per time 
period. Real incomes adjust by (1 -6- A) per time period where 
0 is the rate of price change per time period. Indexation is simulated 
by a simultaneous adjustment of tax thresholds at alternative rates. 
As with income tax in chapter 4, the built-in flexibility of each tax 
can be examined by considering changes in revenue per person as a 
proportion of average income as average income rises. 
5.2.6 The method of analysis 
The model outlined above can be applied to the simulated gross 
incomes. First, the National Insurance contributions of each individual 
are calculated, having set the values of the lower and upper earnings 
limits. The total value of contributions per person, Rc, is calculated. 
Each individual's income tax is then calculated using the schedule (5.1), 
giving the total income tax revenue per person, Rt. Since 
income tax 
and NI operate quite separately, the order of these calculations, 
is 
arbitrary. 
Before examining VAT payments it is then necessary to apply 
the 
system of transfer payments, as described in section 
5.2.3. Under that 
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system some individuals pay income tax and NI contributions and receive 
transfer payments to bring their gross income up to a specified level. 
The total value of transfer payments per person (that is, total 
transfers divided by the total population) is obtained as T. 
On the assumption that all disposable income is consumed each 
individual's VAT payments are then calculated for a specified rate of 
VAT. Total VAT payments per person are denoted RV. 
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5.3 BUILT-IN FLEXIBILITY AND INDEXATION 
An important property of the model outlined in Section 5.2 is 
that it captures some of the complex interdependencies of the main 
components of the U. K. tax system. Thus the value of transfer 
payments or revenue raised from VAT, for example, are dependent on 
the structure of income tax and NI. VAT revenue is of course also 
dependent on the value of transfer payments. These interdependencies 
are crucial-when examining effects-of indexation-on built-in 
flexibility, since if the, structure of one tax can affect the 
revenue raised by another, then similarly indexation of certain tax 
threshold levels can affect the built-in flexibility of a number of 
taxes. 
For each of the taxes/transfers considered in the model the 
form of indexation which is relevant may vary between the short and 
long-terms. Thus while non-indexation (or indexation at less than 
the inflation rate) of some tax threshold may be possible in the 
short-term it is much less likely to be politically possible in the 
longer term. If however the acceptable burden of taxation rises with 
long-run increases in real incomes, as some would suggest, this may 
be achieved by 'underindexing' thresholds rather than adjusting rates 
of taxation. If on the other hand it is desired to maintain the 
distribution of post-tax income constant over the long-term then, since 
different taxes/transfers have differing redistributive effects, 
earnings indexation of all thresholds is required, in the absence of 
other discretionary changes. In the short-run of course variations in 
indexation may be acceptable. 
5.3.1 Income Tax and National Insurance 
The type of indexation used in practice is likely to vary 
across taxes. In the U. K. legislation has to some extent governed the 
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indexation of National Insurance, requiring the thresholds yL and 
yU to be indexed to prices or average earnings. Indeed legislation 
has, at different times, required various forms of earnings or price 
indexation of thresholds, in addition to fixing the ratio of upper to 
lower earnings limits. Variations in income tax indexation have been 
regularly used by governments for both revenue and distributional 
considerations. It is well known that in times of inflation indexing 
thresholds at less than the inflation rate will increase government 
revenue from income taxes, although the likelihood of a resulting 
loss of some VAT revenue is rarely recognised. At times governments 
have been committed to price indexation of income tax thresholds, 
while the 1983 Budget provided an example of an attempt to reduce the 
tax burden by 'overindexation' of thresholds. 
In the absence of any indexation the built-in flexibility of 
the income tax and NI will move in opposite directions. Since income 
tax is progressive and NI slightly regressive (see Creedy and Gemmell 
(1984)), an increase in incomes will increase the revenue raised 
from income tax but reduce NI revenue relative to y. A similar 
effect will occur with 
thresholds if earnings 
an almost proportional 
only slightly offset t] 
thresholds to earnings 
removed, such that tax 
5.3.2 Value Added Tax 
price indexation of NI and income tax 
grow faster than prices. However since NI is 
tax the reduced revenue when income rises could 
he rising income tax revenue. By fully indexing 
any built-in flexibility can of course be 
revenue rises proportionately with incomes. 
There are no explicit thresholds in the value added 
tax and 
8 
therefore indexation as a policy variable is not relevant. 
However 
since VAT revenue is partly determined by 
individuals' allocation of 
116 
expenditure between VAT-rated and non-VAT rated goods it is important 
to allow for possible changes in this allocation in response to changes 
in incomes. That is, although it has been observed in cross-section 
that a greater proportion of expenditure is directed to VAT-rated goods 
by those with higher incomes, does this relationship hold as incomes 
rise over time? 
To test for changes in the relationship between total expenditure 
and the proportion devoted to non-VAT-rated goods, OLS regressions of 
the form r (q)- = aq were tested using Family-Expenditure Survey data 
for four years (1973,1975,1979,1980) . This period- witnessed a 
sizeable rise in nominal incomes and allowed changes in the short and 
longer term to be observed. The results suggested two useful 
properties for the modelling of VAT. Firstly the relationship between 
total expenditure, q, and r(q) showed considerable stability with the 
estimated value of ß constant (at about 0.34) over the four years. 
Secondly the relationship adjusted from one period to the next 
(a increased) such that the value of r (q) at mean expenditure levels 
remained constant. This stability suggests that with a general increase 
in nominal incomes, the proportion of expenditure on VAT-rated goods 
remains fairly constant, i. e. substitution towards VAT-rated goods seems 
negligible. 
It would seem most appropriate therefore to adjust the r(q)- 
expenditure relationship with nominal income changes, such that there is 
no built-in flexibility due solely to a changing allocation of expenditure 
with increases in incomes. This 'indexation' is designed to model 
behaviour most accurately, and unlike indexation of other taxes is not 
9 
a policy variable. 
VAT revenue depends on a number of other factors in addition 
to the r(q) -expenditure relationship. Firstly, the form of 
indexation of income tax and NI, by altering the flexibility of income 
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tax and NI revenues, changes the relationship between gross and net 
income and thus has differing effects on the VAT tax base. Price 
indexation of income tax thresholds for example reduces net relative 
to gross income (if earnings rise faster than prices) as incomes 
increase. This 'income effect' in turn reduces VAT revenue. 
Secondly, VAT revenue depends on the way in which the 
guaranteed minimum income, b, is adjusted and through income tax and 
NI, on-changes in yB (see_ equation (5.4)) .- Increases in yB relative 
to average income-increase the proportion Gf the population-eligible 
for transfers. Various-forces will be in operation here. Firstly 
different forms of adjustment of b will have differing effects on 
the dispersion of disposable incomes. This 'redistribution effect' 
will depend on how the transfer system operates. An increase in b 
which increases the equality of disposable income (reduces a measure 
of dispersion), by transfering income mainly from those with high 
incomes to those with low-incomes will increase the proportion of total 
expenditure on non-VAT-rated goods and hence have a reductive 
influence on VAT revenue. 
10 
Secondly, however, indexation of benefits 
also creates an 'income effect' by increasing disposable income of 
the lower paid (and non-working) which tends to increase VAT 
revenue (even in the absence of differences in the proportion of 
expenditure on VAT-rated goods). 
5.2.3 Transfer Payments 
Indexation of transfer payments, in a system of 'social 
security' is likely to depend on a number of factors. To the extent 
that transfer payments are a poverty relief instrument their 
indexation will depend on whether policy is aimed at absolute or 
relative poverty relief. if poverty is viewed relatively 
then 
indexation of the MIG to earnings would seem most appropriate. 
However an absolute poverty view would require only that the MIG be 
indexed to prices. Secondly, the appropriate indexation may vary 
according to who is in receipt of benefits. For example the use of 
earnings indexation allows non-earners to 'share' in productivity 
growth. In the case of pensioners it has been argued that this is 
justified because of past contributions to growth by past savings. 
In practice in the U. K--pensions have often not been indexed to 
earnings. For the unemployed, there has been- vigorous debate in 
recent years over whether benefits should be linked to average 
earnings or prices. Recent policy has moved towards price indexation. 
Further, for low-income earners incentive effects may vary between 
different forms of indexation. Finally, although the policy debate 
is most likely to be in terms of the value of the MIG, b, the 
resulting value of yB, the level of gross earnings below which 
benefits are payable, may be important. There could be significant 
incentive effects if large numbers of earners are subject to marginal 
tax rates of 100%. Changes in the relationship of yB to average 
earnings due to indexation may also have important effects by, for 
example, altering the relative returns to work and leisure. 
The influences on the built-in flexibility of transfer payments 
are perhaps greater than on any of the taxes considered. Total 
'expenditure' on transfers depends on the value of the MIG, the value 
of gross income determining eligibility 
for benefits and the numbers 
receiving benefits. For individuals who 
both pay tax and receive 
benefits the flexibility of income tax and NI will influence the value 
of transfer payments received. 
The proportion of the population receiving 
benefits is 
obviously important for total expenditure on 
transfers. This may rise 
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with increases in incomes if, for example, labour supply is 'backward- 
bending' or if longevity of pensioners increases at higher income levels. 
With an ageing population an increasing proportion of transfer recipients 
in the form of pensions can be expected. Changes in the value of b 
may affect those receiving benefits because 100% marginal tax rates 
will affect more people (via the direct link with yB in equation (5.4)), 
and because if the value of b changes relative to average income the 
decision-to-work may be affected. 
Even. if possible incentiva effects are ignored the way in which 
b is indexed will be important for transfers flexibility-by altering the 
nominal or real value of benefits. If b is indexed to prices 
(maintaining constant real benefits) the 'burden' of financing 
benefits is reduced if earnings grow faster than prices. If poverty 
is seen in relative terms this may not be acceptable. Recent practice 
in Britain however has been to index benefits to prices. 
While indexation of benefits to earnings ensures benefit 
recipients' disposable incomes rise commensurately with those of 
non-recipients, total transfers expenditure may still change relative 
to average income due to changes in the proportion of the population 
receiving benefits. Rearranging equation (5.4) gives 
yB = {1/(1 -c- t) }b -{t/(1 -c- t) 
}a1 yB > a1 > yL (5.8) 
and hence yB is determined not only by b but also by the marginal tax 
rates t and c and the income tax threshold a1. Since the relationship 
between b, yB and average income may be both economically and 
politically important it is interesting to note that 
b and yB will 
not necessarily adjust commensurately with respect 
to y. Differentiating 
(5.8) with respect to time gives 
yB = (b/ay3) b- (al ß /y$) al 
(5.9) 
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where a=1-c-t, ß= t/ (1 -c- t), and 
dotted variables represent rates of change. Equation (5.9) shows that 
if a1 and b are similarly indexed (to either earnings or prices) , then 
äl b and there is no divergence between b/y and yB /y, as y rises, 
since yB is equal to b. 
less than benefits, yB/y 
If income tax thresholds 
faster (declines slower) 
In- fact it can be- shown - 
However if income tax thresholds are indexed 
rises faster (declines slower) than b/y. 
are not indexed (äl = 0), then yB/y rises 
than b/y if, and only if, (b/yB) >1-c-t. 
that-the possibility of this condition 
holding-is dependent on the level of average income (being less at low 
average income levels) and- NI and income tax rates (being less likely 
with high values of-t and c) . 
Therefore it is clear that indexation of b and other thresholds 
is important for the built-in flexibility of transfer payments not only 
because it affects per capita benefits but because the numbers receiving 
benefits can vary. In addition, although much political and economic 
debate centres on the level of benefits relative to average earnings, 
these results show that changes in yB/y, equally important when 
assessing incentive effects, may be quite different from changes in 
b/y. The quantitative significance of this is examined in Section 5.4. 
Finally the form of indexation of NI and income tax thresholds may 
be important independently of those tax effects on yB. If NI and 
income tax thresholds are linked to prices and earnings outgrow prices, 
the additional tax paid by those below yB means that those 
individuals 
now need more in the form of transfers to bring their 
disposable 
income up to b. Notice however that net transfers remain unchanged 
since the increased value of transfers is entirely 
due to increases 
in taxation. This distinction may be quite important 
for policy. 
For governments concerned with the net tax revenue 
they receive it is 
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changes in the net value of transferswhich are important. However 
when social security expenditure is considered separately from taxation 
(as it frequently is) it is the total value of transfers, or the benefit 
level, which is often considered. Clearly the built-in flexibility of 
total and net transfers will not necessarily be the same. 
5.3.4 Net Revenue 
It was suggested earlier that correct evaluation of changes in 
the authorities' tax revenues mustincorporate a- transfer payments 
system since expenditure taxes-in particular are likely to be affected 
-= may- it. The -value of tax-revenue available for allocation- across public 
expenditure needs is important to governments and in this model is 
measured by net revenue- Rt+ Rc + Rv - T. Having considered the 
various influences on the built-in flexibility of individual taxes 
and transfers it is clear that the combined effects on the built-in 
flexibility of net revenue are not readily predictable, though such 
prediction may be important for tax authorities. It may be thought that 
the flexibility of net revenue will be greatest when tax revenue rises 
most rapidly and transfer payments rise least rapidly, relative to 
average income. However the interaction between taxes and transfers 
means that rapid increases in tax payments are likely to be associated 
with more rapid increases in transfers because some individuals pay 
tax and receive benefits. The question of whether flexibility in the 
various tax revenues can be expected to outweigh the flexibility of 
transfer payments is therefore an interesting one which cannot be 
answered on a priori grounds, but must await some quantitative results 
in Section 5.4. 
122 
5.4 SIMULATING INCOME GROWTH 
In this section some numerical examples are used to try to 
identify the quantitative importance of some of the effects of indexation 
on tax flexibility discussed in Section 5.3. Of particular interest is 
the sensitivity of tax revenues to different indexation regimes and 
rates of real earnings growth. 
As described in Section 5.2.5 a simulated lognormal distribution 
is used, with mean u=8.0 and variance a2 = 0.2. The initial, or 'base 
year' value of the sample arithmetic mean, y, -and the. coefficient of 
variation-of-gross incomes are respectively £3276 and 0.482. The same 
tax thresholds are used as those used in Figure 5.1, and values of c, 
t, and v of 0.15,0.30 and 0.15 respectively. Although the absolute 
values of tax revenues will obviously be sensitive to tax rates and tax 
rate changes, revenue flexibility is relatively unaffected by alternative 
rate structures. 
Income growth can then be simulated by annual growth rates of 
nominal incomes and prices. In this example an annual inflation rate of 
5% and nominal earnings growth of 7% were used, giving 2% real earnings 
growth. 
11 
The r(q) schedule is adjusted in the manner discussed in 
Section 5.3.2.12 A simulation of twenty years was used (5 years prior to, 
and 14 years following, the base yearl giving a range of mean incomes of 
about £2500 to E8500. 
The purpose of the results presented below is of course not to 
provide accurate estimates of the built-in flexibility of 
individual, 
or groups of, taxes. However, using figures which approximate recent 
U. K. experience, these simulations can identify, where appropriate, 
general conclusions on the effects of different 
forms of tax indexation 
for built-in flexibility of certain taxes. Detailed results of simulations 
are not therefore presented. 
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5.4.1 Revenue Growth without Indexation 
To identify generally applicable effects of indexation on tax 
revenues, various combinations of non-indexation, price indexation and 
earnings indexation of tax thresholds (al, a2, yL, yu) and benefits 
(b) are examined. It is again useful to consider changes in tax 
revenue per person as a ratio of average income, y, as average income 
changes, which measures the 'effective average rate' of tax. 
Figure 5.2 shows-the effective_--average rates (EARs) for each tax 
- and -transfer, -without indexation--of -thresholds--. It- can be seen- that 
the largest increase in EARs occurs with-the income tax, which may be 
expected from its relatively high degree of progressivity. Rc/y 
declines slightly reflecting the slight regressivity of NI. The 
decline in the effective average rate of VAT occurs because of the 
decrease in disposable income, and therefore its decline lessens as the 
effective marginal rates of other taxes decrease (as reflected in the 
slopes of the EAR schedules). The r (q) schedule is being adjusted in 
this case but, in fact, the decline in Rv/y is only slightly increased 
if r(q) does not adjust with average income. Thus the built-in 
flexibility of VAT is dominated by the effects of changes in 
disposable income and adjustments in the proportion of total 
expenditure allocated to VAT-rated goods has relatively little effect. 
Finally, in the absence of indexation, as expected the value of 
the effective average transfer, T/y, declines but at a diminishing rate. 
In the range of average income between £2500 and £4000 which may be 
thought of as currently most 'relevant' in many developed countries it 
is interesting that T/y is falling fairly rapidly - from around 12% 
at £2500 to only 4% by £3500. The overall effect is to create a net 
revenue profile R/y, which is broadly similar to that for 
income tax 
revenue. However the declining value of benefits serves to raise 
R/y 
particularly rapidly at lower average incomes. 
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5.4.2 Income Tax and NI Revenue 
It was noted above that the built-in flexibility of NI, without 
indexation, was much less than that of income tax. When considering 
the effects of indexation to prices or earnings however, both taxes 
exhibit similar patterns. Firstly either form of indexation drastically 
reduces the flexibility of both taxes. Figure 5.3 shows that with 2% 
real earnings growth the slopes of the EAR profiles for both forms of 
indexation (B and C) are much reduced from the non-indexation case (A) 
13. 
These profiles show for example that equal values of Rt/y (0.125) in the 
base year (when y= £3276) change very differently within 5 years (when 
y= £4600) when without indexation Rt/y = 0.175, with price indexation 
Rt/y = 0.14, while with earnings indexation Rt/y is constant at 0.125. 
Thus the possibilities for 'automatic' increases in income tax 
revenue are considerably reduced by indexation. Of course, loss of 
NI revenue is also substantially reduced by indexation, but since the 
decline in NI revenue is in any case small, this effect is unlikely to 
be quantitatively important. 
Secondly, Figure 5.3 shows sizeable differences do occur between 
full earning indexation and price indexation. With price indexation 
an increase in average income from £3276 to £4600 can raise the EAR 
of income tax 1/ percentage points above what would occur with earnings 
indexation. (The equivalent decrease in NI revenue-is only 0.3 percentage 
points) . Thus if tax authorities 
index thresholds to prices rather 
than earnings, positive real earnings growth can significantly increase 
income tax revenues, without any discretionary changes. 
5.4.3 VAT Revenues 
In section 5.3 it was suggested that VAT revenues could be 
expected to decline as y rises as a result of an 'income effect' due to 
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income tax changes, and a 'redistribution effect' resulting from different 
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forms of indexation of benefits. In Figure 5.2 it was shown that, 
without indexation, although these combined effects did not reduce VAT 
revenue at anything like the rate of increase in income tax revenues, 
nevertheless a fall in Rv/y from around 10% to 7% could be expected 
over the full range of incomes considered. Simulating the effects of 
indexing the income tax thresholds (al, a2) and the benefit level (b) 
suggests that the magnitude of the income effect is somewhat greater 
than the redistributive effect of changes in b. In Figure 5.4 the 
(unbroken) profiles A, B and C indicate the effects of changes in 
-income tax indexation, while keeping b indexed to prices. The (broken) 
profiles A', B' and C' show the equivalent profiles with b indexed to 
earnings. 
Consider profile B where both tax thresholds and b are linked to 
prices. This produces a modest decline in Rv/y as y rises. It can be 
seen from profiles B' and C that the increase in EAR is slightly less 
as a result of a change in income tax indexation (C) , than for a change 
in benefits indexation (B'). Notice that for a given form of income 
tax indexation, the increase in EAR achieved by changing benefits 
indexation is less the more income tax is indexed. Thus for example 
a change in benefits indexation can significantly increase EARS when 
al, a2 are fixed (A to A'), but when al, a2 are indexed to earnings, 
changing the indexation of b has much less effect on VAT revenue 
(c to c'). 
It can also be seen from Figure 5.4 that it is extremely difficult 
to generate an increase in Rv/y as y rises. Unless income taxes and 
benefits are indexed to earnings (which seems unlikely in practice) a 
decline in VAT revenue relative to average income can be expected. 
Finally, as expected, VAT revenue is not sensitive to the form of NI 
indexation since the sensitivity of NI revenue to indexation is itself 
s light. 
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5.4.4 Transfer Payments 
The extent to which the total value of transfers paid to 
individuals varies is important, not only to those receiving benefits, 
but also to the tax authorities for whom the proportion of tax revenue 
which is 'committed' to transfer payments is important. For 
distributional considerations in particular, the flexibility of 
net transfers is crucial. Benefits may be thought to be more 'generous' 
if the total value of transfers relative to average income, T/y, 
increases, but if this is in compensation for additional taxation 
raised partly or wholly from those receiving benefits there may be 
little or no change in net transfers, NT/y, and the increased 
generosity is illusory. In addition, governments are often concerned 
with the burden of 'financing' transfers. This can only relate to 
net transfers since any increase in total transfers which is not 
associated with a similar increase in net transfers must be being 
'self-financed' by benefit recipients! 
The results of the simulations suggest that in general the 
value of total transfers, T/y is sensitive to the form of indexation 
of b, but is not sensitive to the form of indexation of NI or income 
tax thresholds. Some examples are shown in Figure 5.5 With b, a1 
and a2 all linked to price increases, transfers become less generous 
relative to average income (profile A), such that T/y falls from about 
6% to 4% as y increases from about £2500 to £3500. (Net transfers 
similarly fall about 1% percentage point ). Changing the indexation 
of income tax so that thresholds adjust with earnings (profile C) 
has only a slight effect on the flexibility of transfers (and no effect 
on net transfers), while changing the indexation of b (profile B) reverses 
the direction of transfers flexibility. With b linked to earnings NT/y 
becomes constant as y (and T/y) rises, demonstrating the illusion of 
increased generosity. Transfers may of course still be more generous 
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to the extent that more individuals are eligible for transfer payments. 
Nevertheless it can be seen that the flexibility of net transfers is 
sensitive to the form of benefits indexation. With 2% real earnings growth 
the 1/ percentage points decline in NT/y- mentined earlier, is removed 
by increasing the real value of benefits in line with real incomes, 
instead of holding real benefits constant. 
The results for T/y suggest that full indexation of b to 
earnings can compensate those on low incomes for the built-in 
flexibility of income tax when tax thresholds are linked only to prices. 
This result is of particular interest because it shows that increases 
in income tax revenue due to less than full indexation of thresholds 
can be achieved simultaneously with improvements in the relative 
position of those on low incomes, if benefits are fully indexed. 
As with VAT however it is clearly more difficult to ensure 
that benefits do not become less generous than vice versa, 
by changing the form of indexation. That is, in the absence of 
discretionary action by the authorities the built-in flexibility of 
transfers is more likely to reduce their value relative to average 
income. Nevertheless it can be seen from Figure 5.5 that when T/y 
is declining it does so to a lesser extent as y rises. Profile B on 
. the other 
hand is almost linear so that similar increases in the 
effective average transfer can be expected as y rises, regardless of 
the level of y. 
The upward or downward flexibility in total transfers reflects 
the ability of increases in the burden of income tax and NI faced by 
the low paid to be compensated by increases in the value of benefits. 
The simulations suggest that, although earnings or price indexation of 
al, a2 have little effect on T/y, non-indexation can produce significant 
downward or upward flexibility depending on the level of mean income 
13' 
and the rate of real earnings growth. Thus for example with b linked 
to prices (al, a2 constant and 1% real earnings growth), T/y was found 
to fall sharply at low values of y (below about £3000) but rise 
thereafter. This occurs because at low y levels, as the burden of 
income tax increases relatively little is born by few individuals with 
incomes subject to higher marginal tax rates. However as average 
income rises, more people pay higher marginal tax rates and account 
for proportionately more income tax revenue, and transfers to those with 
low incomes increase in relation to their tax payments. This rise in 
T/y only occurs at low rates of real earnings growth however, presumably 
because at higher rates of income growth fewer individuals are receiving 
14 
benefits. 
Finally it was suggested in Section 5.3 that changes in the 
relationship between b, yB and y could be important for policy. The 
simulations suggest that quantitatively these changes could be significant. 
It was shown in Section 5.3 that yB will rise faster than b if a1 is 
indexed less than b. In the case of profile B in Figure 5.5 
indexation of benefits to earnings keeps b/y constant as y rises. 
However, this causes yB/y to rise from 0.72 at £2500 to 0.76 at £4000 
(reaching 0.82 when y= 8500). Such a rise in the income level 
determining eligibility for benefits relative to average income is 
significant both because it could be alleged to increase disincentive 
effects and because it occurs simultaneously with a constant 
'benefit- 
earnings ratio', a variable commonly used to examine 
incentive effects on 
labour supply. 
5.4.5 Net Revenue 
As may be expected, indexation of thresholds can substantially 
reduce net revenue for a given value of average 
income compared to the 
non-indexed case. Thus 
for example, whereas in the absence of 
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indexation R/y rises from about 0.24 to 0.35 as average income increases 
from about £2600 to £4000 (schedule A), indexation of all thresholds 
to prices causes the R/y schedule (B) to become much less steep, 
rising from 0.29 to 0.32 (see Figure 5.6). Relative to the non- 
indexed case alternative forms of indexation do not have very different 
effects on net revenue. In addition, compared to the full earnings 
indexation of all thresholds (giving a constant R/y = 0.313) reducing 
the indexation of any threshold to be in line with prices can not 
substantially increase R/y. Only non-indexation (and to a lesser 
extent price indexation of all thresholds) creates sizeable built-in 
flexibility. 
Increasing the indexation (from prices to earnings) of 
income tax or benefits has a similar reductive effect on net revenues, 
as may be seen by the shifts from profile B to C and D in Figure 5.6. 
Within a currently relevant range of average incomes, differences in 
the indexation of benefits can be significant. With benefits linked 
to prices, as y rises from £2500 to £4000, R/y increases by almost 
4 percentage points (0.290 - 0.328: profile B). With earnings 
indexation R/y increases by less than 2 percentage points (0.305 
to 0.318: profile C). A loss of 2% of revenue (relative to average 
income) could represent a substantial revenue reduction. This would 
suggest that from the point of view of tax revenue it may be important 
for decisions on indexation of benefits to be taken in conjunction with 
decisions on income tax indexation. 
In Section 5.3 the question of whether the flexibility of 
transfers could outweigh the flexibility of tax revenues was considered. 
It can now be seen that except with indexation of all thresholds to 
earnings, effective average rates of tax must rise, even 
if only 
slightly, as average income rises. This arises 
because maximum 
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transfer payments flexibility (which reduces net revenue) occurs with, 
and partly because of, maximum income tax flexibility (which 
considerably increases revenue). Therefore, it is unlikely that 
even the most generous benefits indexation could cause the EARS of 
net revenue to decrease. 
5.4.6 Alternative Rate Structures 
So far the model has been used to examine changes in tax 
revenue for a given set of tax rates, but allowing tax thresholds to 
change. The model can also be used to examine the effects of changes 
in tax rates on total tax revenue at alternative average income levels. 
Some implications of varying the three rates are shown in Figures 5.7, 
5.8 and 5.9 for t, c and v respectively, with average income fixed at 
£3276. The parameters of the various schedules, other than the rates, 
are again the same as those used in Figure 5.1. 
A very convenient property of the relationship shown in each of 
the three figures is that, except in the case of Rv in Figure 5.9, they 
are linear. That Rt is linearly related to t, and Rc to c, is of 
course clear from the schedules used. It is not however obvious that 
RV and T are linearly related to t and c. An increase in the standard 
rate of income tax, which carries with it the implication that transfers 
to the low paid are also less generous, reduces disposable income and 
therefore total VAT payments, for any given VAT rate. However increases 
in the rate of VAT clearly have a large effect on total revenue, Rv 
(as seen in all three figures). 
Increases in the NI contributions rate can be seen in Figure 5.8 
to reduce Rv and T only slightly relative to the increase in Rc. Thus, 
as with income tax, sizeable rises in net revenue may be expected from 
increases in the National Insurance rate. 
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FIGURE 5.8 VARIATIONS IN THE NATIONAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS RATE 
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Changes in parameters other than rates of course also affect the 
revenue schedules, and can be examined using the present model. Raising 
the NI upper earnings limit to £8000 (from £5000) makes NI almost a 
directly proportional tax. Total National Insurance revenue is however 
only slightly increased. Reducing the tax threshold a1 to £1500 
substantially increases income tax revenue and slightly reduces its 
responsiveness to tax rate changes. 
Finally consider a rise in both the gross income level below which 
transfer payments are received, yB, and the tax threshold, al, to 
£2500. This increase in a1 avoids tax payments by those receiving 
sizeable transfers. The combined increase in yB and a1 obviously 
reduces net income tax revenue and increases VAT revenue. In fact 
Rt is found to fall substantially but only a small increase in Rv 
is recorded. There are of course many relevant combinations of 
parameter changes which can be simulated, but these examples serve to 
show that the final effects on tax revenue of such parameter changes 
can be large. 
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5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined how revenue from a tax system of 
direct and indirect taxes can be expected to change in the presence 
of income growth. A model of interdependent taxes was used including 
income tax, National Insurance, value added tax and a simplified system 
of income transfers to the low paid taking the form of a guaranteed 
minimum income. These components are common features of many tax 
systems but the model used specific tax forms and parameter values which 
approximated the U. K. system. Using a simulated lognormal distribution 
of incomes in conjunction with the tax functions, results were 
obtained for tax revenues for alternative values of average income. 
It was argued in Section 5.3 that revenue growth for particular 
taxes in an interdependent system will be affected, not only by the 
extent of the adjustment of thresholds for the tax concerned, but 
also by the adjustment of the thresholds of other taxes. It was shown 
that in the U. K. tax thresholds and benefit levels have tended to be 
adjusted by some form of indexation to price or nominal earnings 
changes. To enable comparisons of revenue growth under different 
indexation assumptions, three forms of indexation of thresholds and 
benefit levels were used: fixed, adjustment at the rate of growth of 
prices, and adjustment at the rate of growth of nominal earnings. 
The results obtained in Section 5.4 allow some general observations 
to be made on the effects of economic growth on revenue from the 
tax/ 
transfer system. It was shown that without any indexation of thresholds 
substantial increases in income tax revenue 
(as a proportion of 
average income), Rt/y accompanied increases 
in average income, for 
given tax rates. Conversely the total value of 
transfers fell rapidly 
as a proportion of average 
income. National Insurance and VAT revenues 
however displayed relatively little built-in flexibility being only 
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slightly regressive and progressive taxes respectively. The income tax 
flexibility dominates the flexibility of the tax system as a whole 
and therefore total tax revenue flexibility was found to be broadly 
similar to that of income tax. 
A common feature of the various tax revenue schedules was that 
indexation (to either prices or earnings) substantially reduced revenue 
flexibility. This occurred at what may be regarded as fairly modest 
rates of price and earnings growth (5% and. 7% respectively) by recent 
historical standards. Most revenue schedules also displayed a 
tendency for revenue to change rapidly at low values of y, but 
schedules 'flattened' considerably at higher y values. This would 
seem to indicate that for countries with low per capita income levels, 
given this type of tax structure, revenue flexibility is likely to 
be much greater than the flexibility of a similar structure in more 
developed countries. 
Thirdly, it appears to be difficult to generate increases in 
VAT revenue as incomes grow. While VAT revenue is sensitive to 
different forms of indexation of income tax and transfers, the 
unlikely combination of earnings indexation of income tax thresholds 
and transfer payments is required, to produce a rising VAT revenue schedule. 
A similar phenomenon occurs with transfer payments. If the benefit 
level, b, is indexed to earnings, total transfers paid can rise as a 
proportion of average income. However this only occurs if income tax 
thresholds are indexed at less than the rate of growth of earnings, and 
net transfers as a proportion of average income will, at best, remain 
constant. Further it was found that indexation at less than earnings 
growth, especially of the benefit level produces sizeable 
falls in T/y 
and NT/y. Therefore if 'poverty' relief is to 
be maintained, while the 
real burden of taxation rises, (because of, for example, the 
built-in 
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flexibility of income tax) discretionary action is required to adjust 
benefit levels or other social security variables. 
Finally total (net) revenue was found to rise relative to average 
income as incomes grew even if some tax/transfer thresholds were indexed 
to earnings. Obviously if all thresholds were indexed to earnings there 
is zero flexibility but it was found that earnings indexation of either income 
tax thresholds or transfers can still be expected to significantly 
increase net revenue as incomes rise, and especially at lower average 
income levels. For the same reason net revenue is most sensitive to 
income tax and transfers indexation, but fairly insensitive to indexation 
of VAT and National Insurance. 
These results, while derived from a model of a specific tax system, 
are useful for analyses of other tax systems. The income tax schedule 
for example was shown in chapter 4 to be very flexible and hence readily 
applied to alternative income tax structures. Social insurance taxes 
similar to the National Insurance system are used in many countries, 
(including Egypt; to be discussed in chapter 10). The model can 
incorporate if necessary a progressive social insurance tax (making 
it more like income tax) and can accommodate the additional interdependence 
where the tax base for the social insurance tax is post-income tax 
income. 
'5 
Thus this method of modelling tax revenue growth can be 
applied to various tax systems in use. It can identify in particular 
the consequences of differing interdependencies between taxes and 
indexation policies, for the flexibility of tax revenues. This is 
clearly of importance for countries experiencing structural changes 
involving a growth of the public sector which is financed from public 
revenues. 
Ida 
Fnntnntac 
1. Commodity-specific taxes, which are used in many countries in addition 
to a general expenditure tax, are not included in the present model. 
The model could however be extended to include such taxes using 
information on the distribution of consumption of particular 
commodities. 
2. It is difficult to determine the extent of variations in tax 
allowances between households of a specified type in the U. K. 
While it is likely that mortgage payment allowances, for example, 
increase with income for a given household type, modelling the 
distribution of other tax-allowable expenditure is more difficult. 
The extent of this problem is likely to vary across countries. 
3. The schedule in (5.2) refers to those who are fully contracted 
into the State pension scheme. Partial contracting out raises 
considerable difficulties, and is therefore not examined below, 
although an important feature is discussed in Creedy and Gemmell 
(1984). 
4. For details of the U. K. system see any issue of Social Trends. 
Some benefits are received in kind, rather than as a cash transfer, 
and the time period over which benefits are received varies, but 
the marginal `effective` tax rate is approximately 100% over a range 
of lower incomes. 
5. For example, the legislation requires that the NI upper earnings 
limit is approximately 7 times the lower limit, and that the 
former is about 111 times average earnings. Other values have, been 
set accordingly. 
2 
6. Thus if the mean and variance of the logarithms are p and a 
respectively, a set of values of yi (i =1... N) may 
be obtained 
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using a set of random Normal deviates, ui (i =1... N). With 
ui=(log yi - u)/Q, each value of yi is calculated using y, = exp. 
(u + aui) . 
7. Experiments with different sample sizes showed that a sample size 
of 1000 is more than adequate for present purposes, in order to 
avoid significant sampling variation. The sample arithmetic mean 
and coefficient of variation of gross income are £3276 and 0.482 
respectively. 
B. VAT revenue could of course be increased by -reducing-the numbers 
of exempt goods. In line with U. K. practice, a fixed set of 
exempt goods are used here. 
9. In fact the adjustment of the r(q) relationship produces only a 
small effect on the built-in flexibility of VAT revenue, compared 
to a non-adjusting r(q) relationship. 
10. It may be noted that this effect would hold even in the presence 
of differing savings propensities across income groups. 
11. Clearly it is the difference between the rates of growth of nominal 
incomes and prices which is important for the simulations. The 
values of each growth rate are only important for comparisons of 
indexed and non-indexed simulations. 
12. a is adjusted such that 
log a= log r_ + 0.34 log q 
q 
where r_ is the value of r at q which was found to be approximately 
q 
constant (0.452). is constant at 0.34. 
13. It can be seen in Figure 5.3 that income tax revenue prior to the 
'base year' (y = £3276) is less with price or no indexation than 
with earnings indexation. This occurs because in simulating earlier 
years with positive real earnings growth, threshold indexation at 
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less than the rate of growth of nominal earnings will raise tax 
thresholds relative to average income, y, and hence reduce revenue. 
For the same reason, with a regressive tax such as National Insurance, 
revenue at income levels below the base year is greater when 
thresholds are indexed at less than the rate of growth of nominal 
earnings. 
14. This phenomenon does not occur with net transfers, NT/y declining 
secularly as y rises. 
15. In Egypt, for example, the tax base for the General Income Tax 
is gross earned income less all other 'income' tax payments including 
social insurance. See chapter 10. 
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P ART 3 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN EGYPT, 1960-75 
In the third part of this thesis the analyses developed in 
Part 2 are applied to the Egyptian economy. It was noted in 
chapter 2 that several LDCs have experienced structural changes 
which have been heavily towards service activities. Most are in 
Latin America and have received more attention in previous 
research. In Egypt however, despite a long history of growth 
in its service sector (see chapter 6) there has been little 
attention devoted to this sector's development. There have of 
course been previous studies of structural change in Egypt (of 
which Mead (1967) is perhaps the best known) but these have 
tended to concentrate on resource shifts from agricultural to 
industrial activities. 
In chapter 6 the extent of differences in the size and 
growth of industrial and service sectors in Egypt over the 
period 1960-75 is examined and this is compared to other 
countries' recent performance using the results from chapters 
2 and 3, and to Egypt's own earlier historical experience. 
Using data on employment, chapters 6,7 and 8 then seek to 
identify underlying influences behind the structural changes 
towards services. First, regression analysis is used in chapter 7 
to 'explain' employment growth in different sectors. An alternative 
methodology, using output and productivity differences across 
sectors is then adopted. This suggests a more disaggregated 
examination is required, which is pursued 
in chapter 8. 
Some consequences of the growth in Egypt's non-market 
sector are considered in chapter 
9 using the framework of chapter 3. 
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A lack of suitable data prevents the tax models developed in 
chapters 4 and 5 being rigorously applied to Egypt. However in 
chapter 10 some aspects of tax development in Egypt are examined, 
and the results of the tax models in Part 2 are used to shed some 
light on the growth of tax revenues in Egypt. 
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CHAPTER 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The structure of, and structural changes in, the Egyptian 
economy have been of interest to economists for many years. The 
development of the cotton industry in Egypt has long been recognised 
as a source of 'unbalanced' growth and has been studied extensively 
by, for example, Issawi (1961) and Owen (1969). The growth of the 
industrial sector overall was the subject of a detailed investigation 
by Mabro and Radwan (1976), while on structural changes generally 
Mead (1967), Mabro and O'Brien (1970) and Mabro (1974) have examined 
resource shifts, involving mainly the agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors, up till the late 1960s. Using census information Mead (1967) 
was able to study the development of some services to 1960, but since 
then, despite widespread recognition of service growth, this sector, 
and the reasons for its relative growth have not been studied in detail. 
In order to study the growth, relative and absolute, of 
economic sectors it is of course necessary to decide on a measure 
of growth. In chapter 2 it was suggested that for international 
comparisons, employment often represented a better measure than output 
because of such problems as data collection and exchange rate variations. 
In addition there are well known difficulties associated with measuring 
service sector output, particularly in the non-market sector. Since 
in most countries national accounts non-marketed outputs are estimated 
from wage and salary payments it is difficult to distinguish 
'output' 
from 'input', and productivity in this sector is therefore difficult 
to measure. This is also the case in Egypt. In this study therefore, 
employment is the variable used to measure the size and growth of each 
sector and it is employment structure which it is sought to explain. 
Of course economic theory on, and empirical investigations of, 
employment structure have often 
identified output or productivity as 
15ý 
important explanatory variables and in the following chapters it is 
necessary to use data on sectoral output and productivity. For the 
service sector in particular these data must therefore be interpreted 
1 
with care. 
In the following chapters two classsifications of service and 
industrial activities are used. In this chapter, to enable comparisons 
with earlier results, agricultural, industrial and service sectors are 
defined as in chapter 2, where the industrial sector includes only 
manufacturing and the service sector is defined, using the 1968 
ISIC as transport, communications, finance, wholesale and retail 
trade and community, social and personal services. In chapters 7 and 
8, the approach adopted is to compare all 'service-producing' 
sectors (and two sub-sectors, ° commercial' and 'social' services), 
with the 'goods-producing' sector. This approach, first used by 
Fuchs (1965), while obscuring the details of trends in sub-categories, 
does enable any general and systematic differences between goods and 
service sectors, which economic theory suggests may exist, to be 
identified. Although there are some economic activities which could 
be classified in either category, (depending on the criteria used) 
in most cases activities fall clearly into one category. 
2 
In this 
study the goods sector is defined to include agriculture, manufacturing, 
mining and quarrying, electricity, public utilities, construction and 
housing. (The non-agricultural goods sector is also used for 
comparisons and is denoted, 'goods*'). The service sector includes 
'commercial services' (CS) - transport and communication services, 
financial services, wholesale and retail trade; and 'social services' 
(SS) including education, health, government administration and personal 
3 
services. 
r ,J 11 
The chapter is set out as follows. In Section 6.2 evidence on 
structural changes for 1960-75 is presented and examined. This is 
compared to international evidence on structural change and to changes 
since the early years of the twentieth century. Section 6.3 considers 
factors which economic theory and previous investigations in other 
countries have suggested are important explanations of sectoral 
differences in employment growth. Possible explanations specific 
to Egypt are also considered. Some of the variables suggested in 
Section 6.3 are tested in chapters 7 and 8. 
6.2 EMPLOYMENT EVIDENCE, 1907-75 
6.2.1 The International Position 
In chapter 2 it was argued that fairly clear patterns of 
structural change across countries could be found for agricultural, 
industrial and service sectors. While some countries deviated 
substantially from those patterns (e. g. Argentina, Brazil) there 
was nevertheless a degree of uniformity among a sample of developed 
and less developed countries. Regression results on these patterns 
were obtained excluding the Egyptian economy so that it is 
interesting to compare the structure of Egypt's employment with 
the international patterns. 
Table 6.1 shows the division of employment in Egypt between 
agricultural, industrial, service and social service sectors in 
1960 and 1970. These are compared with the sector shares which 
are predicted from the international regressions, given the share 
of employment in agriculture in Egypt in each year. Thus a country 
with an employment share in agriculture of 54% is predicted to have 
about 13% and 23% of its employment in industry and services 
11-052 
TABLE 6.1 SECTOR EMPLOYMENT SHARES, 1960 AND 1970 
Year Agriculture Industry Services 
Social 
Services 
actual 0.540 0.100 0.287 0.178 
1960 
predicted* - 0.128 0.230 0.157 
actual 0.489 0.111 0.330 0.191 
1970 
predicted* - 0.142 0.255 0.168 
* predictions are calculated using equations (i) , (ii) and (iii) 
in Table 2.1(A). 
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respectively. Social services should make up about 16% of the 23% in 
services. In Egypt however industry in 1960 took only 10% of 
employment, but services absorbed almost 29%. Social services are 
also more than predicted at almost 18%. Ten years later, in 1970, 
with a lower employment share in agriculture, Egypt's employment 
shares in other sectors are all predicted to be higher, as expected. 
Actual figures are higher for all sectors also, but again the 
service sector is much higher than predicted (33% as against 25% 
predicted) while industry continues well below predictions. 
Of course, domestic factors in particular countries, will 
almost always ensure that in an international comparison, some 
4 
countries lie below and some above the predicted pattern. 
However comparing Egypt's sector shares with the international 
sample in chapter 2, Figure 2.5 shows that Egypt's low industrial 
share is similar to those less developed countries with the 
greatest (negative) deviation from the predicted relationship. 
Egypt's service employment share is considerably above those 
LDCs which deviate most above the predicted pattern (see Appendix 
6.1). 
5 
A comparison of service, social service and industrial 
employment shares is given in Figure 6.1. This reveals the extent 
to which Egypt's total and social service sector employment shares 
(number 1 in each diagram) are in excess of other countries in the 
sample, given the size of its industrial sector. Egypt's social 
service sector in 1970 takes a similar share of employment as such 
industrialised countries as West Germany, Norway and Australia. 
This evidence would seem to suggest that the structure of 
employment in Egypt, though not unique in 
its bias away from 
industry and towards services, is especially unusual 
by international 
standards. The particularly large size of social service employment 
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by international standards is also associated with rapid growth during 
the 1960-1970 period. Chapter 3 provided evidence on the growth of 
market and non-market sector employment for an international sample 
including Egypt. (For the data used here the non-market and social 
service sectors are, of course, identical). This confirmed that, 
relative to the growth of marketed output, Egypt experienced one of 
the largest expansions in market and non-market employment, 1960-70. 
6.2.2 Historical Evidence 
Having obtained some idea of the structural balance in the 
Egyptian economy in an international context, Egypt's structural 
balance during the period 1960-75 may be examined in comparison 
with its earlier economic experience. In particular, it is of 
interest to know if the imbalance identified in 1960 and 1970 is a 
phenomenon which developed fairly quickly prior to 1960, perhaps as 
a result of the upheavals following the 1952 Revolution, or if it 
existed over a longer pe±iod of Egyptian economic history. 
Table 6.2 below shows the sectoral breakdown of employment 
for various years since 1907. Figures for 1907-1960 are from 
population censuses and those from 1960* onwards are from official 
annual employment estimates. The period 1960 to 1975 is divided 
into three sub-periods, 1960-65,1965-70 and 1970-5, corresponding 
6 
approximately to Egypt's five year economic plans. A full set of 
data for 1975-80 is not yet available. 
It can be seen that the share of employment in agriculture has 
been falling at least since 1937. Whether or not the decline began 
before this (and 1937 represents a temporary upturn), is difficult 
to ascertain, but in either case it is clear that a significant 
decline only began after 1937 . The share of services 
however appears 
to grow from 1907 and particularly after 1937, while industry's 
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share of employment is fairly steady in the first quarter of the 
century, falls in 1937, and only begins to rise after that date. 
It is interesting to compare the changes in employment shares in 
Egypt over the period, with the international patterns discussed 
in Section 6.2.1. These are shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3.7 
Figure 6.2 shows that until 1927 the share of industrial 
employment relative to agriculture is close to that predicted from 
the international sample, but after that date industry's share 
begins to fall below predicted values. The deviation appears to 
increase slowly up to 1975, (apart from a slight fall in 1965) but 
there can be no doubt that the shortfall in industrial employment 
began as early as 1947. The situation regarding the share of 
services relative to agriculture is somewhat different. The 
excessive size of the service sector in Egypt, when compared to 
the regression equation, seems to have existed as early as 1907, 
but once again, the gap increases mostly between 1937 and 1960, 
falling back slightly by 1975. The result is that the share of 
services relative to industry has increased since 1907 (see Figure 
6.3) but particularly from 1937 to 1960. 
The share of employment in social services vis 
a 
vis 
agriculture and industry is similar to that of total services. 
There are particular problems of data comparisons between the 
pre- and post-1960 periods for the social service sector, but 
assuming that it is legitimate to compare within each period it 
appears that the deviation of the Egyptian economy from the 
international industry/social services relationship, which began 
between 1927 and 1937 has increased still further between 1960 and 
1975. 
lä3 
FIGURE 6.2 INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT SHARES: 
EGYPT 1907-75 
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Examining sectoral employment growth rates, an interesting 
historical pattern emerges, both within and between sectors. Annual 
employment growth rates are shown in Table 6.3. It can be seen 
that until the 1930s services tended to grow faster than industry 
as may be deduced from the previous share data. From the 1930s, 
till around 1965, the pattern is reversed however, with industrial 
growth exceeding service sector growth and a tendency for both 
sectors to grow faster than previously. After 1965, the pattern 
changes yet again with industrial growth lagging behind service 
growth till 1970. The position after 1970 is not clear. Industrial 
growth over the whole period 1970-75 appears higher than service 
sector growth (5.1% to 4.2%). However, almost 60% of industrial 
employment growth in this period, according to official statistics, 
occurred in the first year 1970-71. For the four remaining years, 
service growth again exceeded industrial growth with an average 
annual compound rate of growth for the period of 4.4% in services 
and 2.8% in industry. Therefore, it would seem that after 1960 
industrial employment growth was only growing faster than service 
employment up to 1965. This was a continuation of a pattern 
evident since the 1930s, but after 1965 the pattern changes and 
services (in employment terms) began to grow faster than industry 
8 
in absolute as well as relative terms. 
Table 6.3 also shows the growth of social service employment. 
Interestingly, for much of the 1927-1960 period, social services 
appear to grow faster than the industrial sector. After 1960 social 
services grow at a fairly constant rate (compared to the pre-1960 
period) while industrial growth rates fluctuate. Again however 
after the relatively rapid industrial employment growth 1960-5, 
(and apart from the 1970-1 year discussed above), social service 
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growth exceeds industrial growth. 
9 
Finally, using the analysis developed in chapter 3 it is 
possible to put the growth in market and non-market sector employment 
relative to marketed output identified in Egypt in chapter 3 into 
historical context. It was shown in chapter 3 that during 1960-70 
Egypt's macroeconomic performance in terms of the (weighted) growth 
rate of non-market employment relative to marketed output, was 
among the worst in the sample. In addition it was shown that a 
low rate of- market sector productivity growth --(Ym - E-) was 
associated in Egypt with a low differential between marketed output 
growth and non-marketed employment growth (Ym - Eu). Figures 6.4 
and 6.5 show these two aspects of Egypt's macroeconomic performance 
for the period 1947-75. Unfortunately the poor quality of data, and 
the distorting effect of the Second World War make meaningful 
comparisons with years before 1947 impossible. 
It can be seen in Figure 6.4 that Egypt is on a lower 
isodifferential line during 1947-60 than that previously identified 
for 1960-70. However the 1960-70 period displays two very different 
halves. During 1960-5 Egypt becomes a fairly typical performer but 
for 1965-70, the substantial reduction in Ym puts the economy on a 
very low isodifferential line. Between 1970 and 1975 although 
(weighted) non-market employment growth is higher, simultaneously 
higher marketed output growth puts the economy in a slightly better 
position. 
Similar changes between periods are evident in Figure 6.5. 
A position fairly close to the origin in 1947-60, by international 
standards is followed by a higher value of (Ym - Eu) for 1960-5. 
However the economy's poor performance during 1965-70 is again evident 
with Egypt displaying slow market sector productivity growth and a 
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negative (Y 
m-Eu) 
differential. 
after 1970. 
Some improvement is again shown 
Thus it would seem that the poor macroeconomic performance, 
identified in Egypt for 1960-70 in chapter 3, existed prior to 1960. 
Considerable improvements made during the first five-year plan, 
1960-5 (in employment terms at least) were not maintained thereafter. 
6.3 EXPLANATIONS-- OF 
-STRUCTURAL -CHANGE 
Having examined some of the evidence of a-relative growth 
in service sector employment in Section 6.2, in this section 
possible influenceson, or explanations -off, -structural change in 
general are considered. Their relevance in understanding Egypt's 
structural change may then be investigated. Before examining some 
more general explanations however, two factors specific to the 
Egyptian economy, which may be held to explain the data discussed 
in section 6.2, are considered. 
Firstly, it may be suggested that the relative growth of 
services after 1965 was simply a return to a longer-term trend, 
when the drive towards 'industrialisation' during the First Five- 
Year Plan (1960-5) lost its momentum in subsequent years. While 
there is some evidence, as will be seen later, that factors 
causing a growth in services during previous decades did also play 
a part in the post-1965 growth, they certainly could not be said 
to explain the whole phenomenon. Both the absolute growth rates of 
service employment and those relative to industrial employment have 
fluctuated considerably since the turn of the century. Also, 
compared to the 1947-60 period, both service sectors grew in 
absolute terms much faster from 1960 than previously, as indeed 
did the industrial sector, at least for the first five years. 
10Ü 
In addition growth in some marketed services relative to the 
industrial sector occured for the first time (during the post-war 
period) only after 1965. Therefore it is unlikely that the post- 
1965 growth in services could be entirely explained as a resurgence 
of an earlier trend once the temporary emphasis of development 
effort on 'industry' had subsided from the mid-'sixties onwards. 
Secondly it is often argued that in Egypt when the public 
sector expands it has a higher propensity to absorb labour than 
the private sector, and the growth of public ownership in 
manufacturing industry is frequently stressed. 
10 
This might 
lead to the presumption that the relative growth of services 
after 1965, as industrial sector rates fell, simply reflects the 
fact that the public sector failed to absorb labour at the rate 
achieved during the early 'sixties as the pace of development 
slowed thereafter. Thus employment grew less in the predominantly 
public industrial sector but continued to grow at a similar pace 
in the predominantly private service sector. 
A sectoral breakdown of output data reveals however that 
the public sector is no more important in the goods than service 
sectors. In 1974 (one of few years where a breakdown is available) 
the public sector formed about 68% of value added in the industrial 
sector and 65% in the total service sector. If, over the 1960-75 
period as a whole, public-ownership has extended in industrial 
sectors more than in services, and it is correct to assume that the 
public sector is more prone to employ surplus labour, then the observed 
relative growth of services is less than it might otherwise have been. 
Unfortunately evidence on public ownership changes across sectors is 
not available. It is clear then that neither of these two 
explanations is adequate to explain the relative growth in 
167 
service employment, and an understanding of the relevant causal 
factors must be sought elsewhere. 
The body of literature which has emerged on the expanding 
share of services in various industrialised western economies has 
produced several hypotheses. The original arguments of Fisher 
(1939) and Clark (1940) that income elasticities and productivity 
differences between sectors are important explanations of the 
relative growth of service industries as part of the development 
process continue to have strong support. Other factors which 
economic theory suggests may cause differential sectoral employment 
growth include sectoral differences in the elasticities of substitution 
between labour and capital, and differences in input requirements 
arising from differential rates of technological progress between 
sectors or changes in relative factor prices. The effects of 
different combinations of capital and labour inputs across sectors 
may of course be evidenced in productivity differences. In the 
absence of factor substitution, different rates of wages growth 
between sectors may cause changes in labour allocation. Differences 
in wages between sectors are of course fundamental to many models 
of structural change, such as Lewis (1954), which tried to explain 
agriculture to industry shifts. 
6.3.1 Income Elasticity, of Demand 
The link between income elasticities and differential employment 
growth between sectors is well documented in the economic literature. 
11 
It need only be reiterated here that it has been observed that as 
incomes rise so does the demand for (or consumption of) goods and 
services. Empirical evidence also suggests that once a certain 
level of goods consumption has been reached, further increments in 
163 
income may be used increasingly for greater consumption of services 
so that there is a tendency for the elasticities of demand for 
services to rise relative to goods as incomes rise. 
Normally therefore higher, or a significant increase in, 
income elasticities for services may be expected to occur only in 
countries where per capita income is already relatively high and 
where a high level of goods consumption has been attained, while 
in Egypt by 1975 per capita national income was only a little over 
£100 (or approximately $250 at the exchange rates then prevailing) . 
Thus it might be expected that income elasticities will be of 
little importance in any explanation of faster service employment 
growth in Egypt. However two points can be made here. Firstly, 
in countries where per capita income is not high but where income 
distribution is very inequitable, it is possible for a minority 
with high incomes to exhibit high elasticities for services while 
a majority of those on low incomes are allowed to form only a small 
part of total market demand. Many writers have pointed to the 
heavily skewed distribution of income in Egypt, among them 
Abdel-Fadil (1975) Radware (1977) and Wilson (1975), who suggest 
that land ownership and rural incomes remain very inequitably 
distributed despite the aims and efforts of the socialist regime. 
12 
Mabro (1974) has also identified the persistence of an unequal 
income distribution in urban areas although the tendency there 
seems to be towards a more equal distribution. Secondly, it is 
of course possible that the Egyptian consumer exhibits a pattern 
of income elasticities legitimately inconsistent with that which 
has been observed in some other LDCs, and it is possible that a 
'premature' demand for modern services may arise as some LDCs 
such as Egypt attempt to emulate 'western' lifestyles. It may 
be therefore that the relative growth in service sector 
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employment in Egypt since the mid-'sixties has been due to a rise in 
the income elasticity of demand for those services, relative to 
goods. 
6.3.2 Productivity 
It has long been argued that productivity growth can be 
expected to be slower in some services relative to goods-producing 
sectors with the result that, for equal rates of output growth 
-across- sectors, services require faster- employment growth. 
Productivity growth is then argued to be closely linked to 
technological improvements which may be either exogenous or 
endogenous. Where technical progress is thought to be exogenous 
it is suggested that it is more able to affect industrial processes 
than the production techniques associated with services. On the 
other hand it is argued that technology embodied in capital has 
more effect on goods production because it is easier to ally more 
capital with labour in goods than in service production. Services, 
it is argued, often depend on 'personal' qualities and therefore 
need to be more labour intensive. Several criticisms have been 
made of these arguments not least that the causality between labour 
intensity and productivity improvements is far from clear, that 
productivity measures in many services are inadequate, and that in 
many services considerable productivity gains can be made by 
increased use of capital. 
Interestingly some of the arguments for slower service 
productivity growth may now be more persuasive in less developed 
than in developed countries. In many LDCs where governments have 
been involved in planning and/or ownership of production, the 
objective of 'industrialisation' has led many governments to 
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encourage industrial establishments to grow while ignoring or 
inhibiting service expansion. Since industrial commodities are 
often easier to export than services, goods production is encouragEd 
to help balance of payments problems. There may be various 
consequences for sectoral productivity growth rates from these 
policies. Firstly, governments may channel investment funds 
particularly towards manufacturing and related industries enabling 
faster productivity growth in--these sectors, while services are 
relatively starved of--capita. --Secondly governments may encourage 
larger scale industrial production by various policies while the 
small-scale service sector is allowed-to- remain. -Thus-greater 
application of capital is possible in industry, and resulting 
scale economies are obtained. Therefore in some LDCs, government 
policies rather than technical factors may enable greater capital- 
isation and productivity growth in industry. 
On causality, it is usually argued that, for a given level 
of, or growth in, real output, employment growth will be determined 
by the growth of, exogenously determined, productivity. These 
three variables are not however independent of each other and 
there are likely to be causal relationships among them. Higher 
rates of output growth may, for example, induce higher rates of 
productivity growth through economies of scale. 
13 
In Egypt, 
rather than employment responding to changes in output and 
productivity as is usually assumed in a mainly private enterprise 
economy, productivity falls may result from excessive employment 
growth in the public sector in an attempt to relieve unemployment. 
This effect, which has certainly occurred at some times in Egypt 
(see chapter 8) is however probably not widespread across industrial 
and service sectors, where private ownership remains substantial. 
1 7i 
Where it does occur, it is legitimate to ask why it should be that 
higher employment growth does not result instead in faster output 
growth. Numerous factors could be responsible including a lack 
of demand, or a failure to increase non-labour inputs simultaneously. 
6.3.3. Relative Factor Prices 
The role of prices in the determination of quantities is a 
fundamental principle in economics, particularly in the neoclassical 
tradition. In the labour market firms may be expected to demand 
less labour as it's price (wages) rise. Where factor substitution 
is relatively easy a rise in the price of labour relative to capital 
will induce a shift in the combination of factor inputs towards 
capital and away from labour. Where factor substitution is difficult 
a rise in the price of labour may still result in lower demand for 
labour, particularly if firms seek to minimise costs or it is 
difficult to raise sales revenue in line with input price rises. 
These effects may be relevant to structural changes in employment. 
Different rates of growth in wages across sectors (due, for example 
to differences in bargaining strength, or skill requirements) may 
lead to different rates of employment growth, as sectors experiencing 
more rapid wage increases economise more on their use of labour. 
Notice that if lower wage rises lead to lower output price increases 
in these sectors, this may increase demand for those sectors' outputs 
depending on price elasticities of demand. In addition, sectoral 
output comparisons will differ between real and nominal output 
measures. 
In Egypt the allocative role of factor prices is likely to 
be complicated by a number of factors. Since the 1950s wage rates 
have been fixed officially in some sectors but not in others, so 
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that wages may perform different allocative roles across sectors. 
In some sectors where wages are officially fixed it appears that 
earnings and even actual rates paid may differ substantially from 
these. In addition to fixing wage rates some public sector 
establishments have been given simultaneous employment targets by 
governments, especially in the early 'sixties so that in these 
instances wages are unlikely to be an important determinant of 
employment. These and other wage and price controls have existed 
in Egypt in recent years often covering- only some sectors of the 
economy for limited time--periods. It must thereforebe determined 
empirically whether wage differences are an important determinant 
of structural change in Egypt. This and other factors expected 
to affect the structural shift towards service industries are 
examined in chapter 7. 
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Footnotes 
1. These problems are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 
2. Economic activities which may be classified as 'services' but 
which are here classified as 'goods', are public utilities and 
construction. These marginal activities are always difficult 
to allocate between groups, but in Egypt, as in most countries, 
they form a small proportion of totdl employment and therefore 
do not have much effect on inter-sectoral comparisons. 
ý. The terms - 'commercial - services' and 'social services`- are- used 
for-convenience-and are not necessarily meant to indicate 
homogeneity within groups. However commercial services 
predominantly include services which are marketed as opposed 
to the social service sector which predominantly includes 
non-marketed services provided 'free' by government e. g. 
health services and defence. Using the term 'social services' 
here avoids the possible confusion of identifying some 
marketed services in a 'non-market sector'. 
4. This is defini tion ally the case when R2 < 1.0 in an O. L. S. 
regression. 
5. Among the LDCs, only Brazil in 1970 (not shown) has an excessively 
large service sector share comparable with that in Egypt. 
6. For more detail on Egypt's five-year plans see chapter 9, footnote 6. 
7. This is not to suggest that the patterns obtained from inter- 
national evidence in 1960 and 1970 were the relevant patterns as 
early as 1907. They are used here merely to indicate how Egypt 
came to diverge from the pattern in 1960/70. 
8. The one odd year where this appears not to be the case, 1970-71, 
if it is not simply a statistical phenomenon (arising perhaps 
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from changes in sector classification) then, unlike the early 
sixties, there are no obvious explanations for this sudden and 
brief acceleration in industrial employment growth. 
9. Some recent evidence on the 1970-79 period by Hansen and Radwan 
(1982) suggests that some of the service sector employment expansion, 
identified in this chapter up to 1975 has continued, particularly 
in government services. However they also suggest that higher 
demand for labour in the later 1970s has probably reduced the 
growth of private, informal services, See Hansen and Radwan 
(1982, pp. 535-541). 
10. See, for example, Mabro and Radwan (1976, p. 96f). This is not 
to suggest that Mabro and Radwan do not recognise the growth of 
the non-manufacturing public sector; indeed they identify Finance 
and some areas of the Retail Trade as prime targets of State 
'sequestration' in the early years of the new regime. However 
there is a tendency to stress the importance of the early 
'sixties employment drive on manufacturing. 
11. See Fisher (1939), Clark (1940), Chenery (1960), Maizels (1963) 
and Thirlwall (1972). 
12. After studying income and land distribution in rural Egypt 
since the revolution Radwan (1977) concludes that 'the 
distributive effects of the Egyptian agrarian reform were 
marginal' (p. 75). 
13. The effects of higher rates of output growth on rates of 
productivity growth have been well known as the 'Ver Doorn 
Law' following the work of Ver Doorn in 1949. 
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CHAPTER 
EXPLAINING SERVICE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT GROWTH 
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7,1 rNTRODUCTION 
Evidence on service and industrial employment was presented in chapter 6. 
Factors causing differences in employment growth between sectors which 
economic theory or previous empirical investigation have suggested, 
were also considered. In this chapter the roles of various explanatory 
factors in Egypt's employment growth are examined. Rigorous testing 
of hypotheses on sectoral differences in employment requires a 
reliable a priori economic model, with well specified variables and 
relationships among them, and a reliable data set. In the case of 
structural changes in employment although economic theory has 
identified several causal factors, the interaction between variables 
is often unclear. Thus, for example, while differences in technical 
progress between sectors may be hypothesised the effects of this on 
capital and labour inputs depend on many factors including the 
extent of embodiment of technical progress and its `neutrality`. 
A priori decisions on these factors are rarely possible, so that 
predicting the nature of the relationships between technical progress 
and employment is extremely difficult. These problems are in addition 
to the problems of specifying and testing the relationships between 
employment and various independent variables within a sector. Studies 
of employment functions in developed countries using regression 
techniques for example have encountered serious econometric problems, 
' 
The need for a reliable data set is of course self-evident. The 
confidence with which conclusions can be drawn from statistical 
results must ultimately depend on the confidence one has in the 
accuracy of the data set. In Egypt data on some variables which may 
be important in an explanation of employment growth are unavailable or 
unreliable. No official statistics are available for capital stock 
for example and 'price indices for capital are unreliable. Gross 
investment data are published but particularly in some service sectors 
these are also unreliable. 
2 
Thus, the results from applying a 
regression methodology to employment data in Section 7,2 must be 
treated with caution. They can offer guidance on possible causal 
factors in Egypt but cannot be expected to provide precise estimates 
or definite conclusions. 
In view of the limitations of applying econometric techniques 
to Egyptian data, in Section 7.3 and chapter 8a less rigorous 
methodology is adopted which nevertheless can provide insights into 
influences on Egypt's recent structural changes. By comparing 
sectoral differences in employment growth with productivity and 
output growth differences it is possible to confirm some of the 
results in Section 7.2 and identify other important factors. 
To examine structural changes the sector classifications 
used are as discussed in chapter 6, with a goods-producing sector 
being compared with a service-producing sector. There is no 
particular virtue in these classifications to make them superior 
to any others since, as Stigler noted in 1956, 'There exists no 
authoritative concensus on either the boundaries or the classification 
of the service industries'. 
3 
Insofar as theory has identified 
certain characteristics of 'goods' as opposed to 'services' this 
division of activities may be more useful. However the primary 
objective of this part of the study has been to include all sub- 
sectors in the examination so that the overall pattern of employment 
change can be investigated. Where appropriate individual sub-sectors 
are considered separately and in any case the non-agricultural goods 
sector (goods*) and the commercial and social service sectors are 
also examined in conjunction with the aggregate goods and service 
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,a 
sectors. 
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Before looking at causes of structural employment changes 
therefore it is helpful to summarise the evidence on employment 
change in terms of the goods and service classifications to be used. 
Employment growth rates in goods and service sectors during 1947-60 
and the three five-year periods 1960-75 are presented in Table 7.1. 
Relative employment growth can be seen from the ratios in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.1 shows that employment in all sectors grew faster 
after 1960 than during 1947-60, with the goods* sector (line 2) 
growing particularly rapidly during 1960-5. Secondly, for commercial 
services the post-1960 growth rates are a new phenomenon, pre-1960 
growth being just over 1% p. a. For social services, although 
employment growth after 1960 is higher than before, the increase 
in growth rates is less dramatic. 
The increase in the relative growth of service sectors during 
1960-75 is clearly demonstrated in Table 7.2. Using any of the 
sectoral definitions there is a systematic increase in the service 
to goods ratio from 1960-5, to 1970-5. However, apart from the 
ratio in line 3, the high ratios pertaining in 1947-60 are not 
achieved again till 1970-5, and even then the ratios are somewhat 
below the pre-1960 period. The commercial services/goods* ratio 
in line 3 appears to have risen considerably above that occuring 
prior to 1960, confirming that employment growth in commercial 
services has been particularly strong from 1960. 
These data confirm that at least some service activities have 
grown rapidly since 1960 and have shown an increasing relative 
growth since the mid-1960s. This growth has been relative to 
both 
agricultural and non-agricultural goods sectors. 
J 
I 
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TABLE 7.1 SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RATES 1947-75 
Sector 1947-60 1960-5 1965-70 1970-5 
(1) Goods (G) 0.9 4.2 2.0 1.8 
(2) Goods* (G*) 2.2 8.1 3.9 4.4 
(3) Services (S) 2.4 3.8 3.3 4.3 
Commercial 
(4) Services (CS) 1.1 3.4 2.7 3.6 
Social 
(5) Services (SS) 3.3 4.1 3.9 4.7 
s 
TABLE 7.2 RATIOS OF SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RATES 1947-75 
Ratio 1947-60 
(1) S/G 2.67 
(2) S/G* 1.09 
(3) CS/G* 0.45 
(4) SS /Gl% 1.50 
1960-5 1965-70 1970-5 
0.90 1.65 2.39 
0.47 0.87 0.98 
0.42 0.69 0.82 
0.51 1.00 1.07 
I 
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7.2 APPLYING REGRESSION TECHNIQUES 
To try to explain this relative shift of employment into 
services, in this section some of the determinants discussed in 
chapter 6 will. be considered using annual data for the period 
1960-76. It is first necessary to specify a structural employment 
model which identifies influences on employment in each sector. 
Structural changes in employment may occur because employment in 
each sector is affected by the same factors but in different ways 
or to differing extents, or because each sector is influenced by 
different factors. Thus for example income growth may affect 
employment in all sectors but to different extents because of 
differences in income elasticities while (as is shown in chapter 8) 
rural-urban migration may affect employment gro' th in one sector but 
not another. It is on the former type of factors that economic 
theory has had most to say while influences particular to specific 
sectors may often be identified from more ad hoc reasoning. In 
Section 7.2.1 below a simple model is presented which seeks to 
explain different levels of employment in different sectors from 
differences in reactions of employment to a common set of variables. 
7.2.1 A Simple Model 
If Ei is employment in sector i, Y. is the demand for sector 
i's real output and 4Ji is the real wage rate in sector i, it is 
suggested that 
Ei =fC Yi r W1) 
(7.1) 
Thus employment is affected by the demand for the sector's output via 
the production function relationship (where output supplied is 
demand-determined) , and by changes 
in the cost of the labour input. 
In addition Yi is assumed to be determined by per capita income levels, 
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i. e. 
Yi = gi(Z) (7.2) 
where z is per capita income. If, as has been argued, output demanded 
from different sectors varies with the level of income or development, 
(7.2) should capture this by differences in the gi functions across 
sectors. 
Therefore, from (7.1) and (7.2), 
Ei =f (qi (z), W. ) (7.3) 
In fact various forms of the function in (7.3) have formed the basis 
of many 'employment function' studies particularly in developed 
countries. Such studies have usually sought to explain or forecast 
employment in an industry, or number of industries, using output 
and wage variables. 
4 
Differences in the effects of technology 
across sectors are not allowed for in this model because of the 
difficulties of modelling these effects with any assurance of 
5 
accuracy. In specifying the functional forms of (7.1) to (7.3) 
economic theory offers little guidance except that in (7.2) if 
different income elasticities across sectors are hypothesised then 
these elasticities may be expected to vary through time, and a double- 
log functional form (with the implied constant elasticity) seems less 
plausible. However since the period of investigation is fairly short 
constant elasticities over the period could be the most appropriate. 
The model was tested using ordinary least squares regression 
on (7.2) and (7.3) using three functional forms of each; linear, 
semi-log and double-log. Thus in the linear form, for example, it 
is hypothesised that 
Ei =a+Y. + YWi 
and Yi =f+ 6z 
I 
(7.4) 
(7.5) 
ft 
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giving a reduced form of, 
Ei = (a + ßn) + a6z + yWi (7.6) 
Differences in the income elasticity of demand across sectors can 
be found by examining the values of 6 for each sector and differences 
in the employment-output coefficient, ß, can be derived from the 
coefficient on z in (7.6). This applies likewise to the other 
functional forms tested. It might be expected that the dependent 
variables in (7.2) and (7.3) will be affected by contemporary and/or 
earlier values of the independent variables. Current and lagged 
values of Z and W. were therefore tested. 
7.2.2 Regression Results 
Results were obtained for four sectors : goods*, services, 
commercial services and social services. Some results are presented 
in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 and a fuller set of results can be found in 
Appendix 7.1.6 
Examination of the results in Appendix 7.1 suggests that for 
almost all the combinations of lagged and contemporaneous independent 
variables tested the linear and double-log functional forms perform 
similarly, though in most cases the linear form would be the preferred 
specification on the basis of correct coefficient signs and improved 
Durbin-Watson statistics. This is the case for regressions on equation 
(7.2) and (7.3). Secondly in almost all cases variables enter the 
equations with the correct sign. In regressions on (7.2) the 
coefficients on per capita GDP, Z, are always positive and significant. 
Regressions on (7.3) produce positive coefficients on per capita GDP 
and negative signs as predicted on average wages. 
Thirdly, the results presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show those 
equations which 
i 
appeared to be most correctly specified and it can be 
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TABLE 7.3 SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS: EMPLOYMENT 
Dependent Independent Variables 
Variable Constant Z_1 Wi Wi 
1 R2 DW 
/ 
Goods* 
EG* 
t In EG* 
Services 
-269.2 35.72 
(-0.80) (10.95) 
2.45 1.65 
(1.96) (10.46) 
-3.56 0.90 1.32 
(-1.79) 
-0.40 0.89 1.15 
(-1.75) 
ES 160.9 58.02 -5.93 0.97 1.95 
(0.39) (18.25) (-2.40) 
t In ES 4.53 1.37 -0.44 0.96 1.91 
(5.50) (17.47) (-2.44) 
Commercial 
Services 
ECS 96.76 18.99 -0.99 0.96 1.56 
(0.57) (17.27) (-0.91) 
t In ECS 3.46 1.04 -0.15 0.96 1.55 
(4.85) (17.71) (-1.11) 
Social 
ESS -329.1 37.14 -2.01 0.95 1.77 
(-1.14) (15.05) (-1.42) 
t In ESS 2.70 1.53 -0.31 0.94 1.69 
(2.41) (13.57) (-1.38) 
t All variables are in log. form. 
Notes: Z_1 and Wi'-1 are respectively per capita GDP, and average 
annual wages in each sector, lagged one period. DW = Durbin- 
Watson statistic. t-statistics are in parentheses. EG* _ 
Employment in Goods*, ES = Employment in Services, etc. 
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TABLE 7.4 SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS: OUTPUT 
Independent 
Dependent Variables 
Variable Constant Z R2 DW 
-1 
Goods* 
YG* -637.3 21.70 0.91 1.14 
(-5.60) (11.86) 
t in YG* -1.33 1.91 0.91 1.09 
(-2.06) (12.19) 
Services 
YS -1215.8 33.89 0.96 1.52 
(10.51) (18.20) 
t in YS -2.91 2.34 0.97 1.81 
(-6.56) (21.72) 
Commercial 
YCS -289.2 10.36 0.87 1.13 
(--4.36) (9.70) 
fi in YCS -1.20 1.71 0.87 1.08 
(-1.65) (9.65) 
Social 
Services 
YSS -926.6 23.53 0.95 1.21 
(-10.42) (16.45) 
In YSS -5.35 2.81 0.95 1.15 
(-7.56) (16.34) 
t All variables are in log. form. 
Notes: YG* = output from goods*, YS = output from services, 
etc. See also notes to Table 7.3. 
I 
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seen that for equation (7.3) (Table 7.3), lagged values of both 
independent variables are preferred in all sectors except Commercial 
Services, (CS). However, as can be seen in Appendix 7.1 in the 
CS sector the choice, between current or lagged wages is not clear- 
cut. Regressions on equation (7.2), (Table 7.4) suggest that lagged 
values of Z are preferred for all four sectors, though in some cases 
an indeterminate Durbin-Watson statistic leaves some doubt over the 
specification of even the 'best' equations. 
Given the data base, these results are surprisingly good. 
There can be reasonable confidence in the variables specified in 
each equation, particularly the linear forms. In Table 7.3 serial 
correlation does not appear to be present in the equations with the 
possible exception of the goods* sector. The Z_1 variable is always 
significant and R2s are high. The role of real wages in employment 
determination is however unclear. Although in most sectors the 
real wage variable is not significant at the 5% level, t-statistics 
are sufficiently high and coefficient signs consistently correct, as 
to suggest that reductions in real wages may encourage increased 
employment in each sector and vice versa. 
7 
However little confidence 
can be placed in the parameter estimates in each sector so that 
differences between sectors in the responsiveness of employment to 
wage changes cannot be reliably ascertained from these results. 
Coefficient estimates for per capita income in Table 7.3 are 
more reliable than those for real wages. Coefficients on Z_1 are 
also highly significant in Table 7.4 though the somewhat poorer 
Durbin-Watson statistics may mean that an alternative specification 
of the equation is justified, which in turn could alter the income 
coefficients. Nevertheless it can be seen in Appendix 7.1 that the 
values of the inkome coefficients for each sector in Table 7.3 change 
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very little when different combinations of the independent variables 
are used, sugge. ting that these estimates are reasonably robust. 
The hypothesis of differences in income elasticities across 
sectors can now be considered. Table 7.5 shows estimates of 
elasticities from the double-log form (as reported in Table 7.3) 
and elasticity estimates from the linear form for three years 
,a 
during the period studied, 1961,1970 and 1975. At first glance 
it appears that service outputs possess a higher income elasticity 
than goods outputs, whether constant or variable elasticities are 
assumed. However in the variable elasticity case it can be seen 
that the service elasticity is declining more rapidly than that 
of goods*, giving a relative increase in goods* sector elasticity. 
When the two service sub-sectors, commercial and social services, 
are considered separately the case for higher service sector 
elasticities is shown to be limited to social services. Commercial 
service elasticities are lower than goods* although they are increasing 
slightly relative to goods* elasticities in the variable elasticity 
case. Because of the measurement problems associated with social 
service outputs the apparent higher elasticity here must also be 
treated with caution. Since this sector's output is measured from 
wage payments, the higher 'elasticity' measure actually indicates 
that the change in the social service wage bill exceeds the change 
in goods* output for a given increase in per capita incomes. To 
the extent that a rise in these social service 'costs' represent 
increased 'value' of social service output as a response to 
increased demand, social services may be considered to possess 
higher elasticities. Evidence on the growth of Egypt's social 
services (see chapters 8 and 9) would suggest that, in general, 
this is not the/ case. 
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Despite the apparently higher elasticities for service outputs 
(and social service outputs), the regressions in Table 7.3 indicate 
that the overall effect of increases in per capita income on sectoral 
employment is, in some cases, less in service sectors than in goods*. 
The income coefficient on inECS for example is 1.04 as against 
1.65 for goods* (1nEG*). This must arise because of lower values 
for the employment-output coefficient (ß in equation (7.4)) in services. 
Estimates of these coefficients, which represent the technical 
relationship between output and employment derived from the 
production function in each sector, are also presented in Table 7.5. 
The estimates from the log. regressions indicate that for a given 
increase in output within a sector more additional employment will 
be generated in the goods* sector. than in either of the service sub- 
sectors, (and therefore in total services also). However ß values 
estimated from linear regressions suggest a higher value for 
commercial services than goods*. Therefore the employment-output 
coefficient in social services would appear to be unambiguously 
lower than goods* while that for commercial services (if linear 
results are adopted) is probably higher. 
If, as has often been argued, service activities are more 
labour-intensive than goods production, a higher value of ß is 
to be expected in services, increases in output requiring more 
additional labour input than in goods sectors. The lower coefficient 
estimates for social services (and possibly commercial services) 
are therefore unexpected. The most plausible explanation probably 
lies in the output measure. If output increases estimated for the 
goods* sector represent genuine improvements in real output, 
significant employment increases may be expected. If, in social 
services, on th6 other hand, output increases represent mainly 
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average wage rises, 'output' will rise with little employment change. 
It would seem therefore that although employment in each of the 
sectors considered can be explained fairly well within the model 
used, there does not appear to be a consistent pattern of higher 
income elasticities or higher employment-output coefficients in 
service sectors than in goods* sectors. 
Finally, since the evidence in Section 7.1 suggested that 
not only is service employment increasing relative to goods 
employment but the relative rate of growth of service employment 
is increasing, it is interesting to examine the effects of changes 
in income and wages on the change in employment in each sector. It 
may be, for example, that while employment does not react to 
changes in wage rates, the rate of change of wages does affect the 
rate of employment growth. Regression results for these 
difference equations, in linear and double-log form, are given 
in Appendix 7.2.8 They suggest that, in general, changes in 
employment are not strongly influenced by changes in per capita 
incomes or wages, in any of the four sectors. Wage rate changes 
have most effect in social services but in commercial services and 
goods* sectors wage coefficients are insignificant and sometimes 
wrongly signed. Income changes similarly perform poorly and R2s 
are generally low. It seems clear that, at least for the 1960-76 
period as a whole, faster employment growth in services cannot be 
explained with reference to growth rates of income or average wages. 
7.3 DIFFERENCES IN OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY 
The evidence considered in Section 7.1 suggested that there 
were differences within the 1960-75 period in the growth rates of 
goods and service sectors. This may reflect differences within the 
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period in the factors influencing structural change. Unfortunately, 
because of the limited number of observations it is not possible 
to examine sub-periods using the regression methodology. Also, 
differences between sectors in the rates of growth of productivity 
were not examined in Section 7.2.9 In this section therefore a 
less rigourous, but nevertheless useful, methodology is used to 
help identify influences on service and goods employment growth 
and possible differences between the sub-periods previously discussed. 
By comparing differences in sectoral employment growth rates 
with sectoral differences in output and productivity growth rates it 
is possible to determine whether employment growth differentials are 
primarily associated with output growth differentials or productivity 
growth differentials. Using this method to examine relative service 
employment growth in the United States, Fuchs (1965) argued that 
if differences in employment growth could be shown to be primarily 
associated with output, rather than productivity differences, then 
demand (proxied by output) could be argued to be the main factor 
causing differential employment growth. 
10 
Various reasons were given 
in chapter 6 why causality may not operate in this way in Egypt, 
and it is also likely that in some cases changes in output in 
Egypt reflect supply factors more than demand. State control of 
the means of production in a large proportion of the economy and 
the effects of legislative control can create significant supply 
constraints on output. These may be variable across sectors. For 
example, since many more intermediate goods than services are imported 
into Egypt, foreign exchange limitations may impose greater limits on 
domestic goods output than service output, even though demand for 
those goods is higher. With these caveats in mind, the association 
of employment, /output and productivity differentials across sectors 
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may be examined. As will be shown, they do enable some tentative 
conclusions to be drawn, in this and the next chapter, on the 
influences on Egypt's relative service employment growth. 
7.3.1 Output Differences 
To estimate differences in real output between sectors two 
measures of real output are used - Gross Domestic product at 
constant 1960 prices (measure I) , and at current prices (measure II) . 
It is likely that implicit price deflators for services (and 
particularly social services) are underestimates relative to goods 
so that the constant price data probably overestimates the output 
differential in favour of services. 
11 
Conversely, current price 
data which assume both sectors' prices increase at the same rate 
NO 
probably underestimate the real growth in service output relative 
to goods. It is however likely that measure II (current prices) 
is the more accurate for this comparison. 
12 
Table 7.6 shows sector differentials in the rates of growth 
in employment and real output, using both measures, for the three 
five-year periods. Between 1960 and 1965 goods sectors, however 
defined, grew faster in employment terms that services. Variations 
in the employment differentials result mainly from slow growth in 
agriculture and a faster growth in social services. In line (1) 
of `able 7.6, considering the aggregate service sector relative 
to goods it may be seen that during 1960-5 a negative differential 
employment growth is associated with a small positive output 
differential (assuming that the true growth in real output lies 
somewhere between the two measures). During 1965-70 however when 
employment in services begins to grow faster than the goods sector, 
this positive differential becomes associated with a slower output 
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A similar phenomenon occurs in lines (2), (3) and (4) ; 
employment in the goods* sector grows faster than either definition 
of the service sector during 1960-5 and faster than commercial services 
in 1965-70. The output differential moves quite differently for 
the two service sub-sectors. The relative employment growth of 
commercial services (line 3) is associated with a sizable decrease 
in its output differential for 1965-70. This trend is reversed 
during 1970-5 when there is a large increase in the output differential 
in favour of services. Had this situation occurred over a longer 
time period it could be argued that income elasticities for commercial 
services had risen relative to goods. However since this trend occurs 
only over a five year period and is a reversal of earlier trends in 
sectoral employment/output growth, it is unlikely that income 
elasticities could be regarded as an important explanation of the 
relative growth of commercial services employment from 1965 to 1975. 
For social services, the data do suggest that the rising 
employment differential is consistently associated with a rising 
output differential (line 4). However it may be noted that the 
large rise in the employment differential, from the first to second 
periods, of 4 percentage points (-4.0 to 0.0) is associated with only 
a 1.3 percentage point rise in the output differential. The reverse 
is true for 1970-5 when a large increase in the output differential 
occurs with only a small increase in the employment differential. 
Demand for social services would appear therefore to be only a 
partial explanation, at best, of that sector's employment growth. 
However, since the majority of these services are in public ownership 
and are financed from public funds, any observed output growth in 
these services (which are of course measured by inputs) is effectively 
decided by publitc agencies on behalf of these private citizens who 
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consume them. To the extent that these services are financed by 
taxation, private consumers may be considered to be allowing their 
'social wage' to be used in the purchase of these social services 
and therefore have indirect income elasticities for them. However 
with the Egyptian budget deficit high and. increasing over the 
period, arguably the government is exhibiting income elasticities 
of demand in excess of the elasticities of the consumers it represents. 
13 
Therefore it appears that the rise in service employment growth 
relative to goods cannot be satisfactorily explained by a relative 
rise in the demand for services. The rise in social service employment, 
while possibly associated with a faster rise in social service output, 
seems to result from government expansion which is difficult to 
interpret in demand terms. In addition the goods sector probably 
suffered disproportionately from persistent supply bottlenecks, 
failure to implement plan targets and import restrictions, causing 
goods sector output to grow less than demand. 
14 
7.3.2 Productivity Differences 
To the extent that employment growth is not associated with 
output growth it will of course be associated with productivity growth 
as measured by output per man, since the rate of growth of output 
is (in discrete time) approximately equal to the sum of the rates of 
growth of employment and output per man. Output per man is however a 
rather crude measure of productivity. Differences in hours worked 
or skill types and levels may contribute to differences in output 
or labour requirements. In examining differences in productivity 
between sectors it may be important to correct for differences in 
such factors as hours worked, human capital differences and so on. 
Unfortunately there is insufficient appropriate data for Egypt to 
F 
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allow such corrections to be made. However some evidence on hours 
worked and labour quality differences is examined in Appendix 7.3. 
Though partial, this evidence does not suggest any major inaccuracies 
will arise from the use of output per man to measure inter-sectoral 
productivity differences. 
Table 7.7 shows output per man differentials using both measures 
of output. It is clear that the increase in the employment growth 
differential between 1960-5 and 1965-70 is associated with a sizeable 
fall in the relative growth in output per man in services. Whereas 
during 1960-5 productivity growth in services exceeded that in goods, 
during 1965-70 the reverse is generally true. Considering the total 
service and goods sectors for example; before 1965 a faster 
employment growth in goods of 0.4% per annum is associated with a 
productivity growth of between 1% and 1.7% slower than in services. 
After 1965 service employment growth exceeds goods by about 1.3% 
per annum, but now service productivity growth is slower than goods 
by between 1.2% and 2.8%. In other words, it could be argued from 
the data that the faster employment growth in services after 1965 was 
precipitated because of a slow productivity growth after this date. 
However such a universal conclusion would be misleading for two 
reasons. Firstly data after 1970 suggests a reversal of this trend, 
with ample evidence in Table 7.7 that between 1970 and 1975 the 
increased relative employment growth in services is no longer 
associated with relatively slower productivity growth. Secondly, 
the large productivity growth differentials arise mainly because of 
a particular decline in productivity in commercial services, the reasons 
for which will be discussed later. It is clear from line (4) that 
social services have not in general experienced such dramatic changes 
over the 1965-75 period. The increased employment differential 
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1965-70 is associated with a large fall in relative productivity 
growth, while the improvement in relative productivity growth after 
1970 is associated with only a small rise in the employment 
differential . 
The large decrease in the commercial services productivity 
during 1965-70 appears to be a specific and abnormal phenomenon. 
Examining more disaggregated data (see chapter 8) reveals that the 
'Transport and Communications' sector, although it did not form a 
substantial part of commercial service employment, was a substantial 
contributor to commercial service output, mainly from Suez canal 
revenues. The cessation of these revenues following the 1967 Arab- 
Israeli war meant a large fall in commercial service output without 
a similar employment decrease. 
If then the 1960-5 period is excluded for the moment because 
of the abnormal trends it shows, overall trends in output and 
productivity from the early 'sixties to the early 'seventies can 
be assessed. Comparing Tables 7.6 and 7.7 reveals immediately that 
different conclusions concerning the relative importance of output and 
productivity in influencing employment growth will be reached 
depending on which output measure is used. For example, comparing 
the social service and goods* sectors in line 4 of Tables 7.6 and 7.7: 
current price data (measure II) indicates that the increase in the 
employment differential from -4.0% in 1960-5 to 0.3% in 1970-5 is 
associated with a rise in the output differential from -0.3% to 
2.6% and a fall in the output per man differential from 3.6% to 2.2%, 
i. e. changes in output and productivity both have strong influences on 
employment with output effects slightly larger. The constant price 
data, (measure I) however suggests that the increase in the employment 
differential occurs almost entirely because the output differential 
199 
has risen, with productivity differentials remaining fairly constant. 
As previously noted it is likely that the current price measure (II) , 
though clearly less accurate when calculating absolute real growth 
rates, is the more accurate measure of the relative growth rates 
between sectors in Egypt over this period. 
If this is the case then the data in the two tables suggest that 
the increasing employment differential in favour of services from 
1960-5 to 1970-5 is associated primarily with a rising output 
differential. However this association is not uniform across service 
sub-sectors. The relative social service growth in line (4) occurs 
with a 1.4 percentage point decrease in the productivity differential 
(or a 0.5 percentage point increase if measure I is adopted), whereas 
in commercial services (line 3) a 0.9 percentage point increase 
is recorded (or 3.9 percentage points in measure I). These differences 
suggest that the respective roles of output and productivity in an 
explanation of relative service employment growth are variable and 
therefore an explanation (or explanations) of service sector expansion 
must be pursued at a more disaggregated level. This is the concern of 
chapter 8. Nevertheless it is interesting to note that, in general, 
output has had a more consistent influence on employment than 
productivity, though particularly in social services it would not 
seem justified to conclude that demand for these services have been 
substantially higher in later years. 
7.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Following more extensive evidence in chapter 6, it was shown 
in Section 7.1 that over the 1960-75 period there was a strong trend 
towards increasing employment in. service activities, both commercial 
and social as 
'opposed to goods-producing activities. In some services 
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this appeared to be a return to trends evident prior to 1960 but 
which had been halted in the early 'sixties, while in others the 
strong absolute and relative employment growth was a new phenomenon. 
Using a simple model in Section 7.2 in which changes in per 
capita income and average wages were hypothesised to affect 
employment, data for 1960-76 were tested using regression analysis. 
Although wages did not seem to be important in employment 
determination, per capita income effects were generally strong. 
However the hypothesis that sectoral employment differences were 
affected by differences in income elasticities across sectors did not 
find much support. 
In Section 7.3 the respective influences of output and 
productivity on employment growth were considered for three five- 
year periods, and it was argued that neither one of these factors 
was dominant overall, with relative employment growth appearing to 
be associated with changes in relative output and productivity 
growth in different periods. In addition there seemed to be 
differences across sector results. The relative growth of commercial 
service employment occurred with a very large increase in the 
relative growth of output, and a positive productivity growth 
differential which kept employment growth lower than it might 
otherwise have been. In social services on the other hand, relative 
employment growth was probably larger than relative output growth 
because of a simultaneous decrease in relative productivity growth. 
This conclusion is however slightly sensitive to the output measure 
used. 
The variability, both in time and across sectors, in the 
role of output growth was sufficiently large as to confirm that 
higher income blasticities for services relative to goods could not 
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be supported overall. Demand for some services however did appear to be 
strong. The reasons for this, and the very different rates of productivity 
growth across service sectors are considered in chapter B. 
Finally, it was noted that trends evident during 1965-70 were 
strongly influenced by selective effects of the 1967 war which had a 
large effect on commercial service sector output in particular, mainly 
as a result of the closure of the Suez canal. Because of the low labour 
intensity of services associated with the Suez canal, there was little 
effect on employment in this sector. 
m 
I 
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Footnotes 
1. An excellent survey of these problems can be found in Hazeldine (1981). 
A typical example of the econometric problems can be found in the debate 
on the effects on. employment of output and productivity. See Kaldor 
(1966), Rowthorn (1975), McCombie (1981,1982). 
2. Some problems of capital measurement in Egypt are discussed in Radwan 
(1974) and Mabro and Radware (1976, pp. 151-166). 
3. Stigler (1956, p. 47). Fuchs (1968, pp. 14-17) discusses classification 
problems in more detail. 
4. See Hazeldine (1981), Creedy and Thomas (1982, pp. 14-39). Recent 
studies in the U. K. and U. S. A. have usually included a time trend (to 
capture technology effects) and lagged values of the employment 
variable to allow "for partial adjustment of employment within a 
period (using quarterly data). 
5. The commonly-used time trend to model technology effects is highly 
unsatisfactory, not least because of the implied assumption that 
technology improvements occur in a smooth and uniform manner. Many 
empirical studies find time trends highly significant in their results 
and it is likely that it is a proxy for many factors other than 
technology. 
6. Results from semi-log regressions were in general slightly poorer 
than those of linear or log-log regressions and are not presented. 
The aggregate goods sector functions were also tested but did not 
perform well. This may be expected because trends in agricultural 
employment are obviously very different from trends in non- 
agricultural goods employment. Factors affecting agricultural 
employment are also likely to be different. 
7. The significant wage variables for service sector equations cannot be 
relied upon sinceithis occurs in neither of the two service sub-sectors. 
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8. A difference equation in logs, whereby tlnEi =f (©1nZ, Ainwi) 
is, of course, equivalent to examining the relationship between the 
proportionate growth rates of z and w1 and the rate of employment 
growth. 
9. The inclusion of productivity (as measured by output per man) and 
output variables in an employment function raises particular 
econometric difficulties because of the identity linking the three 
variables. See footnote 1. 
10. Fuchs was aware of the inter-relationship among these three variables 
but considered that, for his data, employment could be explained by 
productivity and demand. See Fuchs (1965, pp. 8-10,12). 
11. It is widely recognised that deflators used to produce constant 
s 
price GDP figures, since the 1960s at least, are underestimated so 
that in 'Industry' for example, though average money wages were 
about 100% higher in 1975 than in 1960, prices in that sector were 
apparehtly only 40% higher. This difference is large enough to 
suggest that price controls are unlikely to be an adequate explanation 
and in the service sectors the difference is even larger. 
12. Although the prices of many services probably did increase by less 
than those of many goods in this period the difference implicit in 
real GDP data clearly exaggerates this and the assumption of equal 
price rises across sectors is probably closer to the truth. For a 
discussion of price deflator problems in Egypt, see Kanovsky (1970, 
p. 219). 
13. Of course it is often the case where public goods and services are 
concerned, that if the decision was left to the individual he would 
display income elasticities below those which are in his own best 
interest or in the interest of the nation as a whole. The oft-quoted 
example of defence is particularly relevant in Egypt where the 
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continuing threat of war makes it imperative that adequate defence measures 
are taken, measures which if left to the individual are unlikely to be 
sufficient. 
4. For discussion of some of these effects in the industrial sector, see 
Mabro and Radwan (1976, pp. 49-75,194-197). 
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APPENDIX 7.1 REGRESSION RESULTS OF EMPLOYMENT MODEL: EMPLOYMENT LEVELS 
GOODS* SECTOR (G*) 
Dependent Independent Variables 
Variable Constant (ln)Z (ln)Z (ln)W (ln)W R2 D W 
-1 i i1 . . 
EG* -501.1 33.30 -1.50 0.92 0.86 
(-1.62) (13.07) (-0.82) 
1nEG* 1.25 1.63 -0.16 0.91 0.82 
(1.00) (11.90) (-0.70) 
EG* -740.3 34.13 -0.08 0.88 1.05 
(-1.88) (9.68) (-0.04) 
1nEG* 0.42 1.61 0.03 0.87 0.94 
(0.29) (9.29) (0.13) 
EG* -467.2 31.13 1.31 -1.31 0.92 0.85 
(-1.29) (2.28) (0.09) (-0.66) 
1nEG* 1.28 1.36 0.21 -0.11 0.90 0.81 
(0.91) (1.84) (0.27) (-0.45) 
EG* -269.2 35.72 -3.56 0.90 1.32 
(-0.80) (10.95) (-1.79) 
1nEG* 2.45 1.65 -0.40 0.89 1.15 
(1.96) (10.46) (-1.75) 
EG* -167.3 29.34 4.04 -3.68 0.94 1.22 
(-0.59) (2.61) (0.32) (-2.22) 
1nEG* 2.74 1.35 0.26 -0.43 0.93 1.07 
(2.49) (2.23) (0.41) (-2.15) 
YG* -599.8 20.39 0.96 0.92 
(-9.40) (20.31) 
1nYG* -1.41 1.91 0.96 0.74 
(-3.21) (18.01) 
YG* -637.3 21.70 0.91 1.14 
(-5.60) (11.86) 
1nYG* -1.33 1.91 0.91 1.09 
(-2.06) (12.19) 
I contd. 
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Independent Variables 
Dependent 
Variable Constant (ln)Z (ln)z 
-1 
(ln)Wi 
YG* -574.5 21.45 -1.48 
(-7.21) (4.07) (-0.25) 
1nYG* -1.14 1.74 0.11 
(-2.30) (3.29) (0.20) 
(ln)Wl, 
_l 
R2 D. W. 
0.96 0.98 
0.95 0.83 
Notes: All regressions shown are either linear or double-log forms, 
as indicated by the form of the dependent variable. 
EG* = employment in the goods* sector 
YG* = output from the goods* sector 
Z= per capita GDP 
W. = average annual wage in sector i 
DW= Durbin-Watson statistic 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics 
I 
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TOTAL SERVICES (S) 
Indepen dent Variables 
Dependent 2 
Variable Constant (1n) Z (1n)Z (ln) W (ln) W R D. W. 
-1 i i1 
ES 651.7 52.28 -7.28 0.96 1.02 
(1.50) (19.18) (-2.90) 
1nES 5.52 1.30 -0.58 0.96 1.03 
(5.94) (18.00) (-3.04) 
j 
ES ' 79.46 55.89 -4.76 0.96 1.56 
(0.16) (17.66) (-1.81) 
lnES 4.42 1.32 -0.38 0.96 1.47 
(4.55) (17.30) (-2.01) 
ES 485.1 27.86 26.16 -6.64 0.97 1.10 
(1.06) (2.32) (1.99) (-2.76) 
lnES 5.18 0.64 0.67 -0.52 0.97 1.10 
(5.40) (1.97) (1.99) (-2.81) 
ES 160.9 58.02 -5.93 0.97 1.95 
(0.39) (18.25) (-2.40) 
1nES 4.53 1.37 -0.44 0.96 1.91 
(5.30) (17.47) (-2.44) 
ES 240.5 18.05 38.61 -6.11 0.97 1.62 
(0.61) (1.56) (3.02) (-2.60) 
inES 4.67 0.37 1.00 -0.46 0.97 1.67 
(5.50) (1.19) (3.06) (-2.59) 
YS -1066.1 30.49 
0.98 0.86 
(-14.35) (26.08) 
1nYS -2.50 2.23 
0.98 1.01 
(-7.76) (28.53) 
YS -1215.8 33.89 
0.96 1.52 
(-10.51) (18.20) 
lnYS -2.91 2.34 
0.97 1.81 
(-6.56) (21.72) 
contd. 
I 
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Dependent 
Variable Constant (ln)Z (ln)Z_1 (ln)Wi (ln)Wi 1 R2 D. W. 
Ys -1152.7 21.57 10.59 0.98 0.86 
(-13.99) (3.96) (1.76) 
lnYS -2.77 1.30 1.00 0.99 1.08 
(-8.80) (3.90) (2.89) 
Notes. ES = employment in the service sector 
YS = output from the service sector 
Is 
I 
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COMMERCIAL SERVICES (CS) 
Dependent 
Variable Constant 
Independent Variables 
(1n) Z (1n)Z_ 1 
(ln) Wi (ln) Wi R2 D. W. 
ECS 333.1 17.82 -2.47 0.97 1.21 
(2.51) (21.11) (-2.61) 
1nECS 4.34 1.03 -0.32 0.97 1.20 
(7.08) (20.26) (-2.58) 
i 
ECS 96.76 18.99 -0.996 0.96 1.62 
(0.57) (17.27) (-0.91) 
1nECS 3.46 1.04 -0.148 0.96 1.56 
(4.85) (17.71) (-1.11) 
ECS 328.17 12.14 5.80 -2.37 0.98 1.55 
(2.09) (2.91) (1.26) (-2.40) 
1nECS 4.31 0.63 0.39 -0.30 0.97 1.54 
(6.32) (2.57) (1.48) (-2.40) 
ECS 279.9 19.30 -2.47 0.97 1.34 
(2.27) (21.86) (-2.94) 
1nECS 4.18 1.06 -0.31 0.98 1.30 
(8.06) (22.49) (-3.05) 
ECS 299.8 7.29 11.43 -2.46 0.98 0.80 
(2.79) (2.28) (3.23) (-3.36) 
1nECS 4.24 0.36 0.69 -0.31 0.98 0.85 
(8.98) (1.94) (3.46) (-3.40) 
YCS -254.6 9.49 
0.91 0.88 
(-5.35) (12.66) 
1nYCS -1.07 1.66 
0.91 0.96 
(-1.98) (12.68) 
YCS -289.2 10.36 
0.87 1.13 
(-4.36) (9.70) 
1nYCS -1.20 1.71 
0.87 1.08 
(-1.65) (9.65) 
contd. 
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Dependent 
Independent Variables 
2 
Variable Constant (ln)Z (ln)Z_1 (ln)Wi (ln)Wi 1RD. W. 
YCS -264.1 8.58 1.09 0.90 0.87 
(-4.38) (2.15) (0.25) 
1nYCS -1.05 1.41 0.25 0.90 0.92 
(-1.58) (1.99) (0.34) 
"Notes: ECS = employment in the commercial services sector 
YCS = output from the commercial services sector 
'40 
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SOCIAL SERVICES (SS) 
Dependent 
Variable Constant 
Independent Variables 
(ln)Z (ln)Z-1 (ln)Wi (ln)W. 
1 , - 
2 
R D. W. 
ESS 120.64 33.33 -3.33 0.95 0.87 
(0.42) (16.75) (-2.48) 
lnESS 4.34 1.44 -0.56 0.94 0.88 
(3.82) (15.06) (-2.55) 
ESS -171.1 36.33 -2.51 0.95 1.34 
(-0.57) (16.53) (71.94) 
lnESS 3.36 1.49 -0.41 0.95 1.27 
(3.03) (15.22) (-2.02) 
ESS -38.77 13.96 21.32 -2.95 0.96 0.90 
(-0.13) (1.57) (2.17) (-2.35) 
1nESS 3.76 0.50 0.98 -0.47 0.95 0.96 
(3.26) (1.14) (2.11) (-2.28) 
ESS -329.1 37.14 -2.01 0.95 1.77 
(-1.14) (15.05) (-1.42) 
lnESS 2.70 1.53 -0.31 0.94 1.69 
(2.41) (13.57) (-1.38) 
ESS -279.4 10.29 26.09 -2.12 
0.95 1.50 
(-0.96) (1.07) (2.45) (-1.50) 
1nESS 2.82 0.31 1.22 -0.33 0.94 1.54 
(2.43) (0.65) (2.45) (-1.42) 
YSS -811.4 20.99 
(-11.85) (19.49) 
1nYSS -4.72 2.63 
(-7.58) (17.49) 
YSS -926.6 23.53 
(-10.42) (16.45) 
lnYSS -5.35 2.81 
(-7.56) (16.34) 
0.96 0.74 
0.95 0.63 
0.95 1.21 
0.95 1.15 
contd. 
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Dependent 
Independent Variables 
Variable Constant (1n) Z (1n)Z- ý 
(ln) Wi 
YSS -888.6 12.99 9.49 
(-11.59) (2.56) (1.69) 
lnYSS -5.21 1.20 1.56 
(-7.81) (1.70) (2.08) 
Notes: ESS = employment in social services 
YSS = output from social services 
(ln)Wi, 
_l 
R2 D. W. 
0.97 0.72 
0.96 0.69 
10 
f 
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APPENDIX 7.2 REGRESSION RESULTS OF EMPLOYMENT MODEL: EMPLOYMENT CHANGES 
Dependent Independent Variables 
Variable Constant 0 (ln) Z A(in)Z i (ln) W t (1n) W R2 D W 
_1 i i1 , - . . 
AEG* 0.92 -0.06 0.19 0.11 1.88 
(1.99) (-0.12) (1.25) 
plnEG* 0.91 -0.04 0.14 0.12 1.84 
(3.46) (-0.15) (1.30) 
AEG* 1.76 -0.66 -0.03 0.16 0.79 
(3.82) (-1.42) (-0.18) 
tES 1.00 0.32 -0.29 0.35 3.05 
(4.41) (1.48) (-2.45) 
plnES 1.02 0.16 -0.18 0.35 3.06 
(8.31) (1.41) (-2.40) 
10 
iECS 0.82 0.12 0.09 0.21 1.49 
(6.16) (0.85) (1.15) 
A1nECS 0.88 0.06 0.06 0.23 1.50 
(x1.35) (0.74) (1.14) 
AECS 0.92 0.24 -0.13 0.21 1.57 
(6.68) (1.49) (-1.58) 
A1nECS 0.96 0.13 -0.09 0.25 1.61 
(12.34) (1.51) (-1.63) 
AESS 1.14 0.30 -0.41 0.42 3.11 
(3.32) (0.96) (-2.98) 
A1nESS 1.12 0.17 -0.28 0.39 3.18 
(5.58) (0.93) (-2.89) 
HESS 1.26 0.17 -0.40 0.40 3.11 
(3.46) (0.52) (-2.82) 
A1nESS 1.20 0.08 -0.28 0.39 3.17 
(5.63) (0.41) (-2.74) 
contd. 
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Notes: All regressions shown are either linear or double-log forms, 
as indicated by the form of the dependent variable. 
AEG* = increase in employment in the goods* sector between 
t-1 and t. Similarly for tES etc. 
L lnEG* = increase in the log of employment in goods* between 
t-1 and t. Similarly for AlnES etc. 
Q(ln)Z = increase in (the log of) per capita GDP between 
t-1 and t. 
A(ln)Z = increase in (the log of) per capita GDP between 
-1 t-2 and t-1. Similarly for A(In)W and 
t (ln)W 
I 
i, _1 
For further notes see notes to Appendix 7.1 
%V 
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APPENDIX 7.3 MEASURING LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
As a measure of efficiency in the use of resources, output per 
man is a rather crude indicator and cannot include the effects of 
such influences as changes in hours worked per week, changes in the 
quality of labour inputs or changes in the value of intermediate 
output. Differential changes in these variables between sectors can 
however affect rates of growth of sectoral productivity which cannot 
be identified by output per man figures. For example, a declining 
growth in output per man in services relative to goods may in fact 
represent greater efficiency in the use of resources in services if 
this is accompanied by a larger fall in hours worked per week in 
services so that output per man-hour is improving. In this appendix 
information on four potential influences on labour productivity are 
examined: hours worked, labour quality, intermediate outputs and 
methods of measurement of final output. 
(a) Labour hours 
Unfortunately insufficient data prevents an examination of 
whether or not differential changes in hours worked per week between 
1960 and 1975 in goods and services occurred simultaneously with a 
declining output per man in services relative to goods. However some 
idea of the effects of differential changes in hours worked between 
sectors can be obtained from data available on two sub-sectors of the 
goods and service aggregates, namely 'manufacturing, mining and 
quarrying' and 'transport, communications and storage'. Indices 
for 
output per man (P) and output per man-hour 
(PH) are presented in 
Table A7.8 along with an index for manufacturing industry 
(including 
firms employing 10 or more person$º calculated by Mabro and Radwan 
(1976), 
for comparison. 'The PH measure is 
based on reported data on 'hours 
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paid for' per week which may not be identical with hours worked per 
week. It is assumed here that any difference between the two is 
similar across sectors. 
The effects of using PH as a measure of productivity are most 
clearly seen by looking at the change in the indices for both sectors 
from 1960 to 1964. In Industry PH grows more than twice as fast as 
output/man (reaching 122.4 and 109.9 in 1964 respectively) , but in 
Transport, Communications and Storage both indices increase at 
approximately the same rate till 1964. Thus a comparison of 
productivity between the two sectors will yield different results 
depending upon which measure is used. After the mid-'sixties however 
the trends in, and indeed magnitudes of, the relative growth of 
pröductivity between industry and transport communications and 
storage, using P and PH are very similar. Figure A7.1 shows the 
trends over the 1960-73 period of the industry/transport, 
communications and storage ratio for P and PH and it is clear that 
both measures follow a similar path. A X2 test of homogeneity for 
the two distributions (1960-73) proves insignificant, i. e. the 
hypothesis of homogeneity is accepted. 
If the evidence for these two sectors could be generalised 
to the aggregate goods and service sectors it would imply that 
using output per man as a measure of productivity is inaccurate 
within each sector but is fairly accurate for comparisons between 
sectors. It is impossible to know (with present data) whether 
such a generalisation is possible or not but the evidence here 
tends to confirm rather than reject the validity of the output 
per man differentials discussed in Section 7.3 as a measure of 
relative sectoral productivity growth. 
I 
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TABLE A7.8 INDICES OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (1960 = 100) 
INDUSTRY 
(P) (PH) 
TRANSPORT, 
COMMUNICATIONS 
AND STORAGE 
(P) (PH) 
MANUFACTURING 
(MABRO & 
RADWAN) 
(P) (PH) 
1960 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1961 107.2 99.1 103.5 103.7 
1962 107.2 111.7 115.0 117.4 
1963 106.5 118.6 120.0 122.6 
1964 109.9 122.4 131.2 131.3 100.0 100.0 
1965 109.6 101.3 130.6 108.5 
1966 110.0 103.7 133.3 112.7 
1967 110.2 110.2 130.7 125.6 85.2 72.1 
1968 102.2 100.2 72.3 65.6 
1969 110.7 110.7 72.3 63.3 
1970 113.4 101.1 77.5 64.4 79.0 71.0 
1971 108.3 97.1 82.1 69.4 
1972 107.6 97.7 90.3 79.0 
1973 100.2 86.1 83.0 70.1 
1974 119.1 - 86.9 - 
1975 124.1 - 119.9 - 
Source: I. L. O. Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Geneva (various issues) 
and Mabro and Radwan (1976) 
I 
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FIGURE A7.1 RATIOS OF OUTPUT PER MAN AND OUTPUT PER MAN HOUR 
IN INDUSTRY AND SERVICES 
1.7 
1.6 
1.5 
U) 
0 
-I 4) 
«d 
1.4 
0 
1.3 
a) 
a 
4) 
a 
0 1.2 
1.1 
1.0 
0.9 
Note: P (I/T) Ratio of output per man in Industry to output per 
man in Transport and Communications 
per man hour in Industry to output 
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 
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(b) Labour Quality 
Possible differential changes in the quality of labour between 
sectors are more difficult to estimate due mainly to the conceptual 
inadequacy of various statistical indicators. Education levels are 
often assumed to give some idea of 'general' quality but may not be 
a sufficient measure of particular skill levels. The number of years 
technical training received by an engineer for example may provide 
more information on his skill level than the number of degrees or 
school certificates held by clerical workers would provide on theirs. 
Nevertheless in some LDCs where illiteracy is still common in the 
labour force, education which brings basic literacy can have a 
significant impact on productivity. Available information on 
labour force education levels in agriculture, manufacturing and 
social services is presented in Table A7.9. Figures are derived 
from the 1960 Population Census and the 1966 Sample Census of 
Population. For this reason the 1966 figures may not be accurate 
and indeed the suggestion in column (5) that the proportion of the 
total labour force in services fell by almost 3 percentage points 
from 16.1% to 13.3%, over the six years, contradicts other official 
employment estimates. 
What is interesting however is that the fall in the share of 
the labour force in services with university degrees is more than 
the reported fall in total labour force, while in agriculture and 
manufacturing, the share of employees with university degrees and 
intermediate certificates or below, is increasing faster than total 
labour force. Thus, agriculture and manufacturing have increased 
their share of the more educated labour between 1960 and 1966 (and 
lowered its share of illiterates in the case of manufacturing) partly 
at the expense of social services, 
in which the share of the more 
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educated labour is tending to diminish (although the share of 
illiterates in these services is also falling). This may imply 
a rise in the quality of the agricultural and manufacturing labour 
force rel&tive to that in social services during this period, which 
arguably, would result in a tendency towards relatively higher 
productivity growth in these goods-producing sectors. The period 
covered by the education data, however, almost exactly coincides 
with the first period in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 in which social service 
output per man growth exceeded that in goods. 
Without a breakdown of labour force data by sector and 
education level after 1966, it is not possible to determine whether 
changes in the qualitative aspect of each sector's labour force help 
to explain the relative decline in social service output per man. 
If the trend of the early 'sixties did continue, it may help to 
explain this post-1965 decline, but it is perhaps more likely that, 
with goods sector employment growth proceeding much slower after 
1965, the trend towards a higher proportion of educated labour in the 
goods sector diminished. In either case, the extent of the shift in 
labour quality between sectors is unlikely to explain the whole of 
the change in output per man differentials after 1965. 
(c) Intermediate Outputs 
The effect of differential growth rates of intermediate output 
between sectors can be to obscure the true relative growth rates of 
output and output per man. Associated with the process of 
development in LDCs a-growth in intermediate output of goods and 
service industries may be expected as an evolving industrial 
structure and import substitution policies lead to vertical 
integration in many industries. A priori it is not possible to say 
i 
whether intermediate goods or services are 
likely to grow fastest, 
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but in the early stages of development, when the demand for intermediate 
goods and services arises mostly from within the goods producing 
sector, it is perhaps most likely that intermediate goods demand 
will tend to grow faster than the demand for intermediate services. 
However, this will vary from country to country depending for example, 
on the type of industrial structure which is being encouraged. If 
intermediate demands have risen faster in the goods sector in Egypt 
this will move the differentials in output, and output per man 
presented in Tables 7.7 and 7.8, more in favour of the goods sector. 
To have any effect on the explanation of the relative employment 
growth in services, however, it would be necessary to show that this 
excess of goods sector intermediate output growth (if it exists) is 
either accelerating or decelerating over the period. Unfortunately 
no evidence is available on this. Hanafi and Mongi (1975) have 
estimated that the share of intermediate production in total 
manufacturing output rose from 29% in 1960 to 43% in 1965, but 
there are no equivalent estimates thereafter, or for the service 
sector. 
(d) Measuring Final Output 
It has been noted in previous chapters that an important 
source of error when comparing output of the social service sector 
with that of the goods sector arises from the concept of 
'output'. 
In 1974,68% of GDP in 'social services' was produced under public 
ownership, while the remaining 32% was in private hands, most of 
this in the form of personal services. Thus, for the majority of 
social services such as education, health, government administration 
etc. GDP does not measure `real' outputs, 
but inputs (of which, the 
largest share is/wages). Normally, to allow comparisons 
between goods 
2.3 
and these social service outputs it is assumed that, 
in services, real 
outputs vary in proportion to inputs (GDP) so that, for example, a 
10% 
rise in social service GDP represents, or will produce, a 10% rise 
in °real' outputs from that sector. GDP data for these services as 
for goods, excludes inputs of raw materials and intermediate 
goods and services from other sectors and, although in the goods 
sector real output can be fairly accurately measured by the value added 
to these inputs, in some social services real output may vary with 
these raw materials and intermediate inputs. For example, the 
real output of health services may be influenced more by a rise in the 
number of beds than by a rise in the average wages or even numbers of 
health service employees, yet the former which represents an intermediate 
input is excluded from GDP, while the latter in this case is included. 
If the share of GDP in gross production (inputs plus value added) 
remains constant over time, then taking GDP or gross production to 
estimate the growth of real output in social services will not affect 
estimates of changes in output or output per man. However, in 
Egypt between 1960 and 1975 there was a very clear downward trend in 
the share of GDP in gross production for social services, while the 
goods sector share remained fairly constant. 
If GDP is considered a more accurate indicator of real output 
than gross production in social services, then the comparisons in 
Tables 7.6 and 7.7 can be accepted more readily. Conversely, if gross 
production more accurately represents real output (and it would seem in 
some cases that it does) , the trend in the GDP/Gross production ratio 
implies that output and output per man growth in social services is 
higher relative to goods than previously shown. However, the decline 
I 
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in the GDP/GP ratio in social services is fairly uniform from 1960, 
so that the output and productivity differentials before and after 
1965 should be similarly altered, and so would not significantly 
affect the trend in these differentials over the whole 15 year period. 
Therefore despite the inadequacy of output per man as a 
measure of productivity, it appears that conclusions regarding the 
relative importance of output and productivity growth differentials 
would not be significantly changed if other factors affecting 
productivity differentials such as differential changes in hours 
worked or labour quality could be systematically included. It 
should be emphasised, however, that it is not suggested that the 
cause of the relative decline in productivity in some services 
can be attributed to labour. A fall in output per man need not be the 
fault of the labour employed, but results rather from changes in any 
of the factors combined in production. As Mabro and Radwan (1976) 
have rightly observed - 'Partial measures of productivity growth 
are concerned with the relation between output growth and variations 
in the quantity of a specific input. Thej attribute changes in output, 
but not the cause of these changes, to the factors of production 
singled out. The cause in most cases, is to be sought elsewhere', 
(p. 145) . 
I 
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CHAPTER$ 
DEMAND, PRODUCTIVITY AND THE GROWTH OF SERVICES: 
FURTHER RESULTS 
226 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is clear from the results of chapter 7 that in trying to 
understand the reasons for the recent relative expansion of service 
employment in Egypt, aggregate explanations are not valid. Regression 
analysis could not support the suggestion that income elasticities 
or relative factor prices could explain service employment growth. 
Likewise an examination of the association of employment growth 
differences between sectors with differences in output and 
productivity growth showed that this association was variable 
over time, and sensitive to the sector categories considered. 
For 1960-75 services do not appear to be consistently experiencing 
more rapid rises in output or slower productivity growth, which 
Id 
could help explain the relative employment growth. 
It is also apparent that for some services at least causality 
can not be presumed to run from output and/or productivity to employment. 
In this chapter therefore the relative employment growth of particular 
service sectors is considered in more detail. The association of 
employment, output and productivity growth differentials is again 
used. It should be stressed however that in most cases these 
differentials cannot in themselves 'explain' service employment 
growth, but rather they facilitate identification of other 
influences. A list of potential influences on employment growth, 
for example, can be narrowed down by reference to information on 
output or productivity growth. 
The evidence in this chapter is therefore to some extent 
'impressionistic' and cannot always be backed by conclusive statistical 
data. Nevertheless it is possible in many cases to be reasonably 
conclusive on the factors causing Egypt's service sectors to grow. 
I 
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The growth of commercial services employment is considered in 
Section 8: 2, and social services employment in Section 8.3. Some 
conclusions are then drawn in Section 8.4. 
8.2 COMMERCIAL SERVICES 
The Commercial Services sector is composed of two sub-sectors 
for which separate data are available: Finance and Internal Trade 
(of which, in employment terms, wholesale and retail trade constituted 
96% in 1960) and Transport and Communications (of which, in employment 
terms, road and rail transport constituted 67% in 1960). 
Data for employment, output and productivity growth in these 
sectors are presented in Tables 8.1A and B and it is clear that the 
trends in'these variables over the 1960-75 period are quite different 
across sectors. As in chapter 7 two measures of real output and 
productivity are used - Gross Domestic Product at constant 1960 prices 
(measure I) , and at current prices (measure II) . Both the 
Transport and Communications, and Finance and Trade sectors show 
increases in employment growth relative to both goods sectors from 
1960-5 to 1970-5. However, whereas in Finance and Trade this is a 
smooth increase over the three periods, in Transport and Communications 
a large increase in relative rates of employment growth occurs in 
1965-70 which decreases again in 1970-5 though relative employment 
growth remains considerably above that of the first five years. 
Also, compared to the goods sector, employment growth in Transport 
and Communications is higher in all three periods, but for Finance 
and Trade this only occurs in 1970-5. 
Differences in output and productivity growth trends are also 
evident in Tables 8.1A and B. For Transport and Communications the 
figures suggest that both output and productivity growth was much 
slower than in goods 
(or goods*) during 1965-70, having grown 
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TABLE 8.1A EMPLOYMENT (E) , OUTPUT (Y) AND PRODUCTIVITY (P) DIFFERENTIALS 
IN TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS (T&C) AND GOODS SECTORS, 1960-75 
1960-5 1965-70 1970-75 
E YI YII E YI YII EY Y 
I II 
(1) (T&C) - Goods 0.7 5.2 5.0 2.6 -8.5 -10.7 1.3 9.1 -0.9 
(2) (T&C) - Goods* -3.2 2.8 4.0 0.7 -9.6 -10.8 -1.3 7.6 -0.4 
rI rII YI YII IE PI PIT 
(3) (T&C) - Goods 0.7 4.3 4.2 2.6 -11.0 -13.2 1.3 7.5 -2.2 
(4) (T&C) - Goods* -3.2 5.7 7.0 0.7 -10.3 -11.5 -1.3 8.6 0.8 
TABLE 8.1B EMPLOYMENT (E) , OUTPUT (Y) AND PRODUCTIVITY (P) DIFFERENTIALS 
IN FINANCE AND TRADE (F&I) AND GOODS SECTORS, 1960-75 
1960-65 
E YI YII 
1965-70 
E YI YII 
1970-75 
E YI YII 
(1) (F&I) - Goods -1.4 -2.7 -3.2 -0.1 1.0 0.4 2.0 7.1 6.3 
(2) (F&I) - Goods* -5.3 -5.1 -4.2 -2.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.6 5.6 6.8 
IF vVvv If `ý yI ' II `. yI `II - I" II 
(3) (F&I) - Goods 
(4) (F&I) - Goods* 
-1.4 
-5.3 
-1.2 -1.6 
0.2 1.2 
-0.1 
-2.0 
1.2 0.5 
1.9 2.2 
2.0 
-0.6 
4.8 4.1 
5.9 7.1 
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substantially faster for the previous five years. 1970-5 sees 
a return towards the earlier position of output and productivity growing 
faster relative to goods* (though less markedly when agriculture is 
included), but somewhat less than the differentials were during 
1960-5. For Finance and Trade however Table 8.1 shows that the 
acceleration in employment growth relative to the goods* (and 
goods) sectors is associated unambiguously with increasing output 
and productivity differentials, employment growth differentials 
increasing less than output growth differentials because of the 
advances in relative productivity growth in Finance and Trade. 
8.2.1 Transport and Communications 
The rapid decline of output and output per man in Transport 
and Communications during 1965-70 is almost entirely due to the 
cessation of the flow of revenues from the Suez Canal as a result 
of the June 1967 war with Israel, when the loss of the Sinai 
peninsula forced the prolonged closure of the canal. The size 
of the Suez Canal 'industry' was very small in employment terms 
(in 1965 it constituted under 4% of Transport and Communications 
sector employment) , but it contributed about 
50% of total value 
added in the Transport and Communications sector 
in 1965. The 
effect of the war therefore was to drastically reduce value added 
but with little effect on employment growth in the Transport and 
Communications sector as a whole. Thus, the apparent fall in 
output per man can hardly have been the cause of the relative 
employment growth in this service sector since productivity 
fell 
in a different part of the sector from that which contributed most 
to employment growth. 
Output and productivity differentials recovered during the 
1 
1970-5 period but if, as previously suggested, measure 
II is the more 
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accurate, this still represents a fall over the first half of the 
1960s. Thus, although output growth has declined relative to 
goods since 1965, relative employment growth increased with an 
even larger fall in relative productivity growth. It would seem, 
therefore, that the Transport and Communications sector partially 
recovered after the 1967 war, despite the continuing loss of canal 
revenues, because of the growth of internal transportation and 
communications facilities. However, relative output growth is 
still slow compared to the early 'sixties and this would seem to 
be the result of at least three factors. 
Firstly, the continued loss of canal revenues, plus the 
effects of the 1973 war, served to reduce the growth in output, 
but without similar effects on the sector's employment. 
Secondly, the growth in employment in the Transport and 
Communications sector has undoubtedly been affected by the 
expansion of Egypt's urban 'informal' sector over the period, 
encouraged by the lack of job opportunities in the non-agricultural 
goods sector. 
I 
This growth of the informal sector will be 
discussed in more detail later, but it is sufficient to point 
out here that in the transport sector particularly, the expansion 
of employment through informal activities may have added little 
to output so helping to explain the slow productivity growth. 
Mongi and Hanafi, who by living with these problems may possess 
greater insight, point to the importance of disguised unemployment 
in the form of 'followers' - 'people who accompany transportation 
wagons, helping in loading and unloading' (Hanafi and Mongi (1975, 
p. 299)). In an economic sense, these people are superfluous to 
needs, but are able to maintain their jobs because of public sector 
2 
employment policy. 
2 3i 
Thirdly, a lack of adequate capital replacement and modernisation 
in the Transport and Communications sector has probably hindered output 
growth. Losses of road and rail equipment such as buses and carriages 
through wars, internal violence and general wear and tear have often 
not been made good because of higher priorities (rightly or wrongly) 
for limited government finance, or foreign exchange constraints 
prohibiting importation of the necessary, equipment. 
These three factors would explain why employment continued to 
grow in Transport and Communications despite limited output growth, 
exceeding that of goods sector employment because of the growth of 
'informal' activities, particularly in the 1970s, which beset the 
Transport and Communications sector (both public and private) more 
than goods. 
8.2.2 Finance and Trade 
AV 
It was noted earlier that in contrast to Transport and 
Communications, relative employment growth in Finance and Trade 
after 1965 was associated with faster productivity and particularly, 
output growth. This has occurred for various reasons. Firstly, the 
trade sector, along with agriculture, was one of the least affected 
sectors by the 1967 war so that output growth fell less during 1965-70 
than was the case in the goods-producing sectors. This was partly a 
direct consequence of the relative output growth in agriculture, since 
wholesale and retail trade acts as much as an outlet for agricultural 
as for industrial commodities. However, during the 1970s when almost 
all sectors experienced faster rates of output growth, the Finance 
and Trade sector also experienced a relative output growth compared 
with the goods sectors, suggesting that the overall post-1965 growth 
in this sector is more than a phenomenon created by the war. 
I 
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The trade sector has experienced a growing demand for consumer 
goods to which it has been more able to respond. A rapidly growing 
population and the expansion of agricultural output, and imports, to 
meet their needs, 'have increased output and employment in retail 
trade, while the growing demand in Egypt over the period, noted by 
various commentators, for western luxury consumer goods, has also 
had an expansionary effect on retail trade. The main streets of 
Cairo and Alexandria increasingly house retail outlets selling 
modern manufactured consumer goods, often imported, for the 
increasing numbers of middle-income consumers in Egypt. This 
increase in employment may, therefore, actually have been caused 
by output growth. 
Thirdly, increases in informal activities have taken place 
perhaps mostly in the retail trade sector, so increasing employment 
disproportionately. This would not have the effect of reducing 
productivity to the extent that it did in Transport and Communications 
because the majority of informal activities in this sector are 
private, often self-employed, and those which can be captured by 
statistics are likely to be more profit orientated. For example, 
a casual worker employed to unload. wagons in the public transport 
sector will be paid regardless of output, whereas for the private 
trader, his income is dependent on his sales. There is, of course, 
a growing number of publicly-owned department stores in the retail 
trade which, it is sometimes argued, suffer from overmanning as do 
other public services. It is quite possible however, that where 
these department stores substitute for small private traders, they 
may still be more efficient, with greater potential for increasing 
value added by aiming at Egypt's growing middle-classes. 
/ 
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Finally, the relative increase in Finance and Trade Sector 
employment would seem to be co-existent with rising output and 
productivity growth partly because of the increasing contribution, 
in terms of value added, of banking and insurance services. In 1965 
banking and insurance formed only 5% of Finance and Trade employment 
but contributed 12% to value added in the sector. These services 
have developed since 1965 under government policy and, being fairly 
capital-intensive (relative to the rest of Finance and Trade sector) , 
have added more to output than employment, increasing the rate of 
output growth associated with employment growth in the Finance and 
Trade Sector as a whole. The expansion in financial services is 
almost certainly related to Egypt's increasing openness to western 
banking interests, and to the demise of Beirut as the middle-east's Is 
major financial centre. 
8.2.3 Informal Services 
So far it has been argued that the growth in 'informal' 
activities in Egypt since the raid-'sixties is partly responsible 
for the increase in the relative growth in employment in commercial 
services and this can represent either productive employment or 
disguised unemployment. Since the I. L. O. (1972) report on Kenya 
much has been written on the informal sector both in general terms 
and with reference to specific countries. Some discussion of its 
role and composition in Egypt is however relevant here. By its 
nature the informal sector is difficult to define and indeed any 
definition is likely to be only a partial explanation but, within 
the service sector, this group of economic activities tends to be 
carried out by individuals who would otherwise be unemployed, but 
who attempt to maintain themselves and their families by such 
'informal' or casual, often self-employed activities as street 
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vending, show cleaning and other 'waiting-on' services. Egypt's 
tourist industry provides many of them with jobs as guides (frequently 
self-appointed) , porters, hotel attendants and many other such 
activities. 
Mabro (1974) has suggested that this phenomenon was evident 
in Egypt's service sector before 1960, and there can be little doubt 
that it has also played an important part in the expansion of trade 
and transport services since then. However, the development of some 
informal services certainly results from an effective demand for 
them and not simply as a product of excess labour supply. Bauer and 
Yamey for example have observed that transport and trade services 
may grow in this way in LDCs because of lack of storage space for 
poor producers and consumers, such that 
'they may require the services of small-scale traders to 
collect small lots of farm produce at frequent intervals. 
Among large sections of the population there may have to 
be a number of traders catering for their needs by 
dealing in small quantities' . (Bauer and Yamey 
(1957, p. 39)). 
In Egypt the informal sector has arisen firstly, because 
population growth in urban and rural areas has exceeded the growth 
in modern sector employment opportunities, and secondly, because 
many rural-urban migrants do not have the appropriate skills for the 
modern sector and create informal jobs for themselves. 
It seems that these two factors intensified from the mid-'sixties 
- an increasing gap between population growth and modern sector 
jobs, 
and an increased migration problem. Some evidence of 
this can be 
found in the data in Table 8.2 which show changes in employment and 
urban population between 1960,1966 and 
1976 (the population census 
years). The average annual increases 
in employment in the goods* 
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sector (which is almost entirely 'modern' and urban) were substantially 
lower in the second period, while over the same periods the urban 
population increase rose slightly from an annual average of about 
161,000 to 166,000. Transport and Communications employment increases 
also show a slowdown but in Finance and Trade where the private 
informal sector is more strongly represented, annual employment 
increases were about 35% higher in 1966-76 than they had been 
during 1960-6. 
Of course not all of the urban population increase represents 
increases in the labour force. Abdel-Fadil (1975) has estimated 
net migration into the Cairo governate during 1960-5 to be around 
274,000 most of whom will be members of the labour force. Although 
the remainder of Cairo's population growth will be mostly a natural 
increase, Egypt's population has been growing rapidly since the 
Second World War, causing a very large number of entrants into the 
labour force over this period resulting from earlier increases in 
population. 
4 
Between 1966 and 1976, the rate of growth of Cairo's labour 
force (and that of the other urban governates) may have been 
declining but absolute numbers of new entrants were still rising. 
It is inevitable then, with the goods* sector failing to expand 
adequately that much of the excess labour supply would find ways 
into the informal sector and it does seem that employment statistics 
in commercial services have captured some of this increase. 
8.2.4 Summary 
In summary, the increase in Commercial Services employment 
relative to goods results from various factors but perhaps principally 
from the growth in informal services in this sector. In Finance and 
f 
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Trade the simultaneous relative growth in output may reflect a 
large response to rising demand within this sector because it did 
not suffer from the same supply constraints as the goods sector. 
A growing population, and rising propensity for more expensive 
consumer goods have encouraged a considerable expansion in retail 
trade, much of it private and 'informal'. 
In Transport and Communications the rising employment differential 
appears to result not only from a growth in private informal services, 
but also from disguised unemployment in the public sector. In the 
public sector much of the employment growth is the consequence of 
government social policy and has caused a relative decline in 
productivity and efficiency over the period. The 1967 war had a 
considerable though temporary, detrimental effect on output and 
productivity in this sector. 
Thus the relative decline in productivity in Transport and 
Communications could hardly be said to have caused the sector's 
employment growth. Relative output growth in Finance and Trade 
however, though probably partly representing a relative growth in 
demand (which encouraged employment growth), is more accurately to 
be seen as a supply factor. Finance and Trade suffered from fewer 
supply constraints than particularly the non-agricultural goods 
sector, so that it has been more able to meet increases in demand. 
8.3 SOCIAL SERVICES 
Because of limited disaggregation of available employment data, 
this sector includes a proportion of private 'personal' services such 
as restaurants, tailors etc., (which would be more appropriately 
classifidd with commercial services), and social services 
(education, 
health, recreatfion, administration etc. ) 87% of which, in employment 
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terms, were publicly-owned in 1960. This data deficiency makes it 
difficult to assess trends in each of these two services over the 
whole 1960-75 period. However it can be ascertained that the 
contribution of private services (which are mostly personal) to 
value added in the total social service sector fell from 42% in 
1960 to 33% in 1965, but only a further 1 percentage point to 32% 
5 
over the nine years to 1974. Employment data show a similar 
pattern to that of value added between 1960 and 1965 and if this 
continued even approximately after 1965 then the share of private 
in total social services probably fell very little after that date. 
In terms of actual numbers employed this implies that the fairly 
static employment levels in private social services between 1960 
and 1965 began to increase at a rate not much less than that of 
public social services after 1965, i. e. the relative growth of 
social service employment was both a private and a public phenomenon. 
Indeed it does seem that the static employment level and declining 
share of service employment experienced by private social services 
during 1960-5 was peculiar to this period while both prior and 
subsequent to it, employment was growing faster than in the goods 
sector. Mead (1967) notes the large employment increase between 
1947 and 1960 in 'Personal Services not elsewhere Classified' 
(corresponding to the 'personal services' category here) which he 
considers to be 'a clear case of the spread of agriculture under- 
employment into the services', (Mead, 1967, p. 153)), i. e. the 
informal sector. 
Turning to the causes of social service growth evident in 
available employment statistics, Table 8.3 presents estimates of 
employment, output and output per man growth differentials between 
social serviced and both goods sectors. It would, of course, 
be 
false to think that changes in relative output or productivity 
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TABLE 8.2 AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASES IN EMPLOYMENT AND URBAN 
POPULATION 1960-66 AND 1966-76 (THOUSANDS) 
URBAN GOODS* 
POPULATION. EMPLOYMENT 
COMMERCIAL SERVICE 
EMPLOYMENT 
T&C F&I TOTAL 
' 
(1) Annual Average 1960-66 
(2) Annual Average 1966-76 
(3) Ratio(2) : (1) 
161.7 
166.2 
1.03 
71.4 
65.3 
14.9 
11.4 
19.5 
26.4 
34.3 
37.8 
0.91 0.74 1.35 1.10 
.ý 
TABLE 8.3 EMPLOYMENT, OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS 
IN GOODS AND SOCIAL SERVICE (SS) SECTORS 
1960-5 1965-70 1970-5 
E YI y E YI YIZ E YT YII 
(1) SS - Goods -0.1 1.9 0.7 1.9 2.7 1.1 2.9 5.6 2.1 
(2) SS - Goods* -4.0 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 1.6 1.0 -0.3 4.1 2.6 
E P P E P P E P P 
II I I II II I 
(3) SS - Goods -0.1 1.9 0.8 1.9 0.8 -0.8 2.9 2.5 -0.8 
(4) SS - Goods* -4.0 3.3 3.6 0.0 1.5 0.9 -0.3 3.6 2.2 
I 
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could explain employment growth in this sector because of the way in 
which GDP is calculated for public social services. Rising GDP in 
Government Administration for example is particularly difficult to 
interpret. However, the figures do provide some insights into the 
underlying influences on social service employment growth. 
It is apparent from the table that the relative employment 
growth is primarily associated with a relative decline in productivity 
6 
in 1965-70 and a relative rise in output in 1970-5. For example, 
in line (1), the 2 percentage point rise in the employment differential 
(from -0.1% to 1.9%) between 1960-65 and 1965-70 is associated with 
only a 0.4 percentage point rise in output, but a 1.6 percentage 
point fall in output per man. A further 1 percentage point rise 
s 
in the employment differential in 1970-75 occurs with a1 percentage 
point rise in the output differential (from 1.1% to 2.1%) with the 
productivity differential remaining constant at -0.8%. 
7 
This association of relative employment growth with a relative 
productivity decline may help to explain the nature of the employment 
growth experienced by social services. Firstly, as previously noted 
the sharp decline in the private sector's share of total social 
services during 1960-65 had been much reduced, if not halted after 
1965 which represented a rise in enumerated employment in this sector. 
Since this private sector, producing mostly personal services, is 
less productive than the public social service sector (in terms of 
GDP per head) , this would serve to reduce productivity growth 
experienced by the social service sector as a whole. 
8 
Secondly, it is likely that much of the employment increase 
in the public sector was in the form of low-wage employment (and 
therefore lower GDP-creating employment because of the way in 
which GDP is cdlculated in this sector), which would reduce the 
240 
rate of productivity growth relative to employment. Between 1960 
and 1965 employment in Government Administration grew faster than any 
other public social service sub-sector (with the exception of 'cultural 
and recreational services' which are negligible in size), followed 
by health services. While the growth in health services is a valuable 
achievement in a country with poor health facilities and rapid 
population growth, it is very unlikely/that the growth in employment 
in Egypt's already large bureacuracy was matched by a similar growth 
in real output, and there is no evidence that such an expansion in 
employment was necessary. Hanafi and Mongi (1975) point out that 
this increase in employment, amounting to an average of 21% per annum 
over the five year period, was associated with an average increase 
in total. real wages in the sector of only 12% per annum. This cannot 
be entirely explained by a failure of money wages to keep pace with 
inflation, but they suggest, 'may be due to either employing a 
considerable number of unskilled labour or to the increase of young 
workers with relatively moderate start wages, or due to both reasons 
together'. (p. 286). Without more detailed information on the 
development of employment in Government Administration, we cannot 
be sure that this is the cause, nor whether this trend continued 
after 1965. The relative decline in social service productivity to 
1970 would certainly be consistent with this. By the same 
reasoning, however, the rise in output and (possibly) productivity 
differentials after 1970 is not consistent with low-wage employment 
expansion. Two factors may account for this rise after 1970. Either 
a larger expansion in high-wage employment which gives the appearance 
of faster productivity growth may have occurred after 1970, or if 
the share of Government Administration in total social service output 
fell, to be replaced, say, by private services, then the influence of 
wages in Government Administration would be less evident in social 
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service output and productivity movements. In fact, as will be shown, 
there is evidence that both these factors are likely to have operated 
during the early 1970s. Firstly, however, causes of the expansion 
of Egypt's public social services sector, will be considered. 
8.3.1 Public Social Services 
The causes of expansion in this sector can perhaps best be 
summarised in three categories - public employment policies, policies 
towards education and urbanisation/migration effects. 
The cornerstone of the government's employment policy in the 
early 'sixties was to reduce hours worked per man in the public 
sectors of the economy and increase their employment levels so that 
hopefully costs Would remain steady but unemployment would fall. 
This was the reasoning behind the employment drive begun in 1961 
causing manufacturing industry and government administration 
particularly to increase their labour forces significantly after 
that date. Unfortunately, opportunities to reduce hours worked per 
man by banning overtime had little effect in Government Administration 
where there is little use of overtime, and in manufacturing, as M&LLu 
and Radwan discovered, unofficial ways to compensate workers for 
lost earnings were discovered, until eventually, rigidities created 
9 
by the ban were sufficient to force the government to remove it. 
At the same time, legislation preventing the sacking of employees 
meant that new employees absorbed into the public bureacuracy, most 
of whom (if not all) were not needed, became a permanent burden 
on public finance. The aim of this arm of policy was to solve much 
of the mass unemployment problem and thus resulted in increased 
absorption of unskilled, low-wage labour. Government Administration 
was particularly susceptible to this type of employment creation. 
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The government's policy towards education has also had a 
significant impact on the growth in the bureaucracy. Moroe Berger, 
writing in 1954, observed: 
'It has been easier for underdeveloped areas to expand their 
education facilities, especially in liberal arts and law, 
than to expand the economic opportunities for those who use 
those facilities. The resultant pressure for government 
jobs has swelled the ranks of the civil service far beyond 
the point of real need. This is true in Egypt. Secular 
education has, in fact, been identified, since its 
introduction by Muhammad Ali in the early nineteenth 
century, with government posts'. (Berger (1954, p. 68)). 
The government has been committed since the 1961/2 Socialist Laws 
to employ all graduates, should they wish it, in the public sector 
and the rapid growth in the number of graduates seeking jobs as a 
result of the expansion in the education facilities in Egypt, 
particularly since the early 1960s, has meant an increasing flow 
into the civil service. After 1965 the scarcity of goods* sector 
jobs, both private and public seems to have led to an even greater 
proportion of graduates being employed in government administration. 
It appears also that one area of education policy designed to reduce the 
flow of graduates has, in fact, had the opposite effect. Legislation 
requires that school leavers may enter university only in the academic 
year immediately following their school-leaving examinations, otherwise 
they must re-sit these examinations again regardless of previous 
success. This was designed to dissuade many who would not normally 
go directly from school to university from entering at all but in 
fact, has tended to make some students apply directly to university 
even if they and not sure which kind of employment they will eventually 
want. 
10 
" 
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In many cases a civil service job may be the easiest option for 
a graduate. Berger (1954) found after surveying 249 senior officials 
in the civil service, that the majority had entered because of a lack 
of other job opportunities, and that the younger civil servants 
interviewed in particular had considered other careers more seriously. 
This occurred despite the fact that nearly 80% of those interviewed 
found only a 'low' level of satisfaction from the job. Therefore it 
would seem that most graduates who enter the civil service do so, not 
necessarily because they are attracted by the work, but because there 
are few other opportunities for them, and those 'other opportunities' 
as shown earlier, were less from the mid-'sixties onwards. 
Figures for the number of students graduating from universities 
over the 1960-75 period provide some insights into the pattern of 
Government Administration employment growth. These are presented in 
Figure 8.1. Government Administration tends to employ graduates 
from the Humanities Faculty rather than the Science Faculty since the 
latter have less difficulty in obtaining jobs in other sectors of the 
economy. Figure 8.1 indicates that science graduates have increased 
at a fairly steady rate over the period, while humanities graduates 
increased particularly rapidly between 1962 and 1967, and after 
1972. The period from 1967 to 1972 on the other hand, experienced 
a relatively static annual level of humanities graduates. It 
is 
interesting to note that the available data on employment in Government 
Administration from 1960-5 show that absorption increased considerably 
from 1963, that is, the years when graduates in humanities also 
increased most rapidly. Some of the employment increase is of course, 
due to the employment drive. From the graduates figures then, 
it could 
be expected, ceteris paribus, that the proportion of graduates among 
new. employees in government administration would 
be greater during 
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1962-67 and 1972-5 and less during 1967-72. Since graduates have 
a much higher average wage in government employment this will tend 
to increase the average wage for the sector as a whole during the 
former two periods, and reduce it in the latter. With output data 
for government administration reflecting data on total wages very 
closely, this may help to explain why the employment growth in the 
social service sector was associated with a relative productivity 
and output rise during the early 'seventies. 
One of the effects of urbanisation of the type experienced in 
Egypt has been to increase the supply of unskilled labour and swell 
the numbers of unemployed and semi-employed. Some of this, as well 
as the more educated labour, has been absorbed by the public service 
sector. The growth in this type of labour can only be interpreted 
as a social welfare policy since these individuals, frequently 
illiterate, who abound in public buildings occasionally running 
errands or delivering messages, add virtually nothing to real output. 
Finally, there is some evidence that Health and Education 
Services which are almost entirely publicly-owned, have contributed 
to the relative employment growth in social services over the 1960-75 
period. Employment data are incomplete but it is known that the 
numbers of 'Physicians, Dentists and Pharmacists' for example grew 
faster after 1965 than before, causing the decline in the population 
per physician ratio to proceed after 1965 at a pace almost twice as 
fast as the 1960-5 rate. 
In education, trends are not so clear-cut. Total teaching staff 
increased by an average of about 6% per annum during 1960-5 but only 
by 3% per annum thereafter. This decline is much less than the 
decline in employment growth in the goods sector. However, teaching 
If 
staff formed only about 55% of total education sector employment in 
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1960 with teaching staff growing slightly slower than other categories 
during the 1960-5 period. Thus, growth rates in teaching staff both 
before and after 1965 may not give an accurate picture of the growth 
in education employment overall. 
8.3.2 Private Services 
Earlier it was argued that the association of faster employment 
growth in the social service sector after 1970 with faster output 
and productivity growth, could occur if the share of the public 
social service sector was falling in favour of a larger private 
sector, and if This private sector was experiencing faster output 
and productivity growth. 
It was also noted earlier that the share of the public sector 
in social service value added fell from 42% in 1960 to 33% in 1965, 
but probably only about a further 1% to 32% by 1974. Thus the 
influences of public sector output and productivity trends on the 
social service sector as a whole would be very much less in 1965-75 
than they were during 1960-5. This is confirmed by comparing 
various government social service expenditures (which obviously 
must be closely related to public social service GDP) to the 
total social service sector GDP, which suggests an increasing share 
of the public sector in social service output 1960-5, but a 
considerable reversal in the trend after 1965.11 This, of course, 
does not confirm that faster output and productivity growth after 
1970 was due to a greater influence of an expanding private sector, 
unless the private sector also experienced rising output and 
productivity growth. Some evidence on this can be obtained by 
pooling data from different employment and output sources in Table 8.4. 
The 1965-76 period is not strictly comparable with the earlier period 
but the results are in line with what would be expected and confirm 
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TABLE 8.4 OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH (%) 
IN PRIVATE SOCIAL SERVICES 
Period Employment Growth Output Growth Productivity Growth 
1960-5 0.1 
%V 
2.8 2.7 
1965-76 2.4* 7.3t 4.8 
t 1976 dataare obtained by multiplying the proportion of value 
added produced privately in 1974 (0.318) in social services, to 
total social service GDP in 1976. 
* Figures for public social services in 1976 were calculated from 
Survey of Employment in Government and Public Services in February 
1977 by the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration. 
This was subtracted from annual data on employment in (total) 
social services in December 1976. 
I 
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the suggestion that after 1965 the relative decline of private 
'social' service employment was reversed and in particular, rates of 
output and productivity growth were much larger in the later period. 
8.3.3 Summary 
In summary therefore, it would seem that the relative growth 
in social service employment is principally of three types. Firstly, 
education and employment policy have particularly increased the 
numbers of graduates entering the civil service as well as the 
numbers of unskilled workers absorbed into the sector generally, 
with the consequent large rise in employment which seems unlikely 
to have been accompanied by a similar rise in real output. Secondly 
increased health and education facilities made available by public 
investment, have probably aided this relative employment growth in 
social services, though the extent of their influence is difficult 
to assess. 
Thirdly, the growth of private services included in the social 
services data because of limited disaggregation, seems to be of two 
types: (a) increases in informal services, resulting from rising 
urban unemployment and underemployment, and (b) increases in more 
formal private services such as those serving the tourist industry. 
The rising output and productivity in these sectors, particularly 
during the 1970s, are likely to be more 'real' than those of the 
public sector. 
8.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined further some of the evidence of 
increasing employment in Egypt's service sectors relative to 
employment in goods-producing sectors. Using the relationship 
i 
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between employment, output and productivity in each sector it 
was possible to identify possible sources of employment expansion. 
Considering commercial and social services separately, it 
was argued that in both categories there was evidence of a relative 
growth in private 'informal' activities and public sector expansion 
from the mid-'sixties. (The growth in private 'social' services 
was however mainly because limited data disaggregation did not 
allow these services to be classified with commercial services, 
which would have been more appropriate . 
In the commercial services sector, transport and communication 
services appear to have grown in association with declining 
productivity growth mainly because of disguised unemployment in 
the public sector and the disproportionate effects of the 1967 war. 
Slower productivity growth could hardly therefore be interpreted as 
causing faster employment growth in this case. Finance and trade 
on the other hand experienced rising output and productivity growth, 
relative to goods sectors over the period, which probably stems from 
the growing urban demand for agricultural and luxury goods which 
has boosted wholesale and retail trade services. These have been 
mostly private, though the public sector has probably also benefitted 
here. 
The employment growth experienced by social services has also 
been a private and public phenomenon. Public services, as expected, 
are by far the largest in this sector and it was shown that 
Administration and Health. services have been among the fastest 
growing. The available evidence suggests that, at least in 
Administration, much of this increase represents disguised 
unemployment arising from excessive graduate employment under 
Egypt's education policies, and sizable increases in low-wage 
z5) 0 
labour as part of social welfare policy. Part of the expansion has 
however, undoubtedly been a consequence of the governments social 
goals of expanding health and education facilities to the majority 
of the population. It was shown in chapter 3 that expansion of these 
services, which together form a large part of the non-market sector, 
can have adverse consequences for the economy's macroeconomic 
performance. This aspect of Egypt's service expansion is examined 
in chapter 9. 
I 
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1. A large proportion of the informal sector cannot, of course, be 
included in official statistics, but it seems certain that a 
large part of the employment growth in this sector is in the 
form of 'casual' or informal activities. 
2. Some of these people may be more appropriately classed as 
'semi-formal' since, although they may not be officially- 
recognised employees of the public sector, they are often 
paid on an ad hoc basis from public funds. 
3. This is not to suggest that informal activities all fall 
within a 'service' category. Evidence from Kenya and 
elsewhere has shown that small scale manufacturing also takes 
place in the'informal sector. This is also true for Egypt, 
as a recent study by Mead (1982) has shown. 
4. According to a study by the Cairo Demographic Centre (1972) , 
51% of Cairo's labour force in 1968 had been born outside the 
city. 
S. The public/private breakdown of GDP data 1960-5 and 1974 are 
from different sources and therefore may not be strictly 
comparable. 1960-5 data are from Hanafi and Mongi (1975, 
Appendix 2) and 1974 data are from National Bank of Egypt, 
Economic Bulletin, 1975(4), p. 378. 
6. This is not necessarily the case using constant price data, but 
as previously discussed, current price data is probably more 
accurate. 
7. The smaller rise in the employment differential during 1970-75 in 
line (2) arises mainly because of the effects of a large rise in 
construction employment during 1975. 
I 
2ä2 
8. -This may of course represent increased efficiency in the use 
of resources if employment in commercially viable personal 
services grows at the expense of disguised unemployment in 
some public social services. 
9. See Mabro and Radwan (1976, p. 137). 
10.1 am grateful to Dr. Hassan Abde1-Aziz of the I. N. P. in Cairo 
for this point. r 
11. Alternative measures of social service sector expenditure 
(including or excluding local and investment expenditures) 
all suggest a rise relative to GDP from 1960-5 but subsequent 
falls to 1970 and 1975. 
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yCHAPTER9 
THE ROLE OF THE NON-MARKET SECTOR IN 
EGYPT'S ECONOMIC GROWTH 
I 
I 
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9.1 INTRODUCTION 
It was noted in chapter 3 that, following the work of Johnston 
(1975), Bacon and Eltis (1976) suggested that an excessive relative 
growth in the non-market sector of the British economy was responsible 
for the low rates of growth, persistent balance of payments deficits 
and rapid inflation in Britain since the mid-nineteen-sixties. In 
this chapter the marketed/non-marketed distinction is applied to the 
Egyptian economy in an attempt to explain similar problems which have 
been readily identifiable in Egypt for some years. First however some 
effects of interaction between the market and non-market sectors on 
productivity growth are considered. In Section 9.3 these interactions 
are examined in the context of the Egyptian economy over the period 1960- 
s 
76 and a relative rise in the non-market sector is identified. The 
effects on output, employment and prices are considered in Section 
9.4 and 9.5. Section 9.6 discusses some of the causes of non-market 
growth in Egypt and some conclusions are drawn in Section 9.7. 
9.2 THE NON-MARKET SECTOR AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
The market sector was defined in chapter 3 as the aggregate of 
all sectors producing outputs which are sold 'in the market place'. 
This includes all industrial and non-industrial goods whether produced 
under private or public ownership, and all services which are sold such 
as banking, insurance and distribution. The non-market sector includes 
all outputs not sold in the market place, that is, provided 'free' by 
government. 
An increase in the relative size of the non-market sector, 
caused for example by a transfer of workers from the market to the 
non-market secto5, will result in greater demands for market sector 
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goods and services by those who play no direct part in their production. 
The result is excess demand for market sector outputs. 
1 
This may be met 
by increased productivity in the market sector but the faster the 
relative growth of the non-market-sector the higher will be the 
required rate of productivity growth to maintain equilibrium between 
supply and demand at constant prices. 
2 
This can be shown by taking the identity, (3.4), derived in 
chapter 3: 
SC =C+I+G+B 
mmmm 
where Ym is marketed output, Cm and Im are purchases of marketed 
output by firms and workers for consumption and investment respectively, 
Gm is government purchases of marketed output, and B is the balance of 
payment current account surplus. Differentiating (3.4) with respect 
to time and dividing throughout by Ym, gives 
m=«tcrn+ 
$tIm+ltcm+ ötB (9.1) 
where at' ßt' 't and öt are the respective instantaneous shares of 
Cm, Im, Gm and B in marketed output, Ym, at time t,. and dotted 
variables represent proportionate rates of change. However if 
Pm is productivity or output per man in the market sector and Nm 
is market sector employment, then, 
Y=PN (9.2) 
mmm 
Differentiating logarithmically with respect to time gives, 
Y=P+N (9.3) 
mmm 
Combining (6) and (8) the increase in productivity required to meet the 
demand for marketed output at constant prices will be 
Pm = atCm + ßtlm + YtGm + 
dtB - Nm (9.4) 
I 
25G 
Now assume there is a transfer of workers from the market to the 
non-market sector. Further assume that this results in a fall in 
Cm in proportion to the decline in market sector employment, while 
similarly, marketed output absorbed by the non-market sector, Gm, 
rises in proportion to the increase in employment. Thus, the 
departure of any worker from the market sector does not lead to 
an increase in the average consumption of those workers in the 
i 
market sector. This implies that the following condition must hold 
Cm = Nm = -QtNg = -QtGm (9.5) 
where Qt = Ng/Nm = Gm/Cm, at time t, and Ng = non-market employment 
This allows substitution of Nm and Cm in (9.4) to give- (omitting 
time subscripts), 
P (y G+ ßIm + 6B (9.6) 
Furthermore, if it is desired to maintain an existing equilibrium on 
the balance of payments, that is 6=0, B=0, the required rate of 
growth of market sector productivity becomes 
Pm = (Y -a (a -1 )) Gm + ßIm (9.7) 
Clearly the required growth in productivity will increase as 
the process of transfer continues, that is as a±0. At the beginning 
of the process (when y=0, a= O) 
Pm =m (9.8) 
As a tends to zero, Pm must rise to a maximum of 
Pm = (a + '' Gm + ßIm (9.9) 
However as a; 0, a so that Pm similarly tends to infinity. If 
actual productivity growth falls short of Pm, then as Nm -- 0, Ym will 
3 
also tend to zero. 
I 
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A simple numerical example can illustrate the magnitudes involved. 
Assume a transfer of employment from the market to the non-market sector, 
no increase in market sector investment (Im = 0), and that the balance 
of payment remains in equilibrium (SB = 0). Letting a=0.5 and. 
y=0.4, substitution into (9.7) gives 
P= (y -Y (a- 1)G 0.85G 
_mam 
(9.10) 
so that for each 1% rise in non-market employment, a 0.85% rise in 
productivity in the market sector is required if all other magnitudes 
are to remain constant. Given zero investment growth and no overall 
increase in demand for marketed outputs it would be surprising if such 
a productivity increase was consistently achieved. 
The effect of growth in the non-market sector in excess of that 
of marketed output must therefore be to reduce the share of other 
components of demand. Dividing the identity (3.4) by Ym gives, 
c+ im+gm+bm=1 
m 
(9.11) 
where lower case letters stand for their respective upper case ratios. 
Clearly if the faster growth in Gm is not accompanied by a rise in 
productivity in the market sector sufficient for Ym to grow 
commensurately with Gm, then gm must rise. This in turn must affect 
the shares of market sector consumption and/or investment, and/or net 
exports. The decomposition in equation (9.11) is considered in 
Section 9.3 using Egyptian data for the years 1960 to 1976. 
9.3 THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY 
It was shown in chapter 6 that a problem of structural imbalance 
has existed in the Egyptian economy for some time. In particular, an 
excessive growth in employment in service sectors, especially 
government services, between 1937 and 1960 has been emphasised by, 
i 
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among others, Mead (1967). 
4 
The continuation of this trend during 
and since the 1960s suggests the likelihood of a rising value of 
gm in equation (9.11). 
Estimates of the relevant variables for the Egyptian economy 
between 1960 and 1976 are given in Table 9.1, with movements in the 
four variables shown in Figure 9.1. Before considering the data, 
some explanation of the calculation of the variables is necessary. 
In the absence of full published national accounts for Egypt, G 
m 
has been estimated from a sectoral breakdown of public expenditure 
(which, in Egypt, includes many market sector activities). This 
includes spending on wages, direct purchases of market sector goods 
and services, transfers and debt service. Ideally saving out of 
wages should be excluded from Gm. However unfortunately published 
statistics do not provide a sectoral breakdown of public expenditure 
between wages and non-wage payments which prevents even the 
application of an average savings propensity to the data. 
Im is Gross Fixed Investment by the market sector. To assess 
the economic implications of changes in investment it would be 
preferable to use net investment. However, again, separate data on 
cxlre- 
capital consumption is not available. Changes in stocks have also 
been omitted from Table 9.1 because data are only available for 
years after 1965, which means that, in effect, they are absorbed 
into C which is calculated as a residual. Separate inclusion of 
m 
stock changes after 1965 would therefore have exaggerated any 
downward trend in cm from 1960 (stock changes were positive in all 
years but one, during 1965-76) so that it was considered preferable 
to use slightly inflated but consistent figures for Cm. There is, 
of course, an opposite effect on Cm over the whole period as a 
result of the iflclusion in Gm of the non-consumed part of non- 
market sector wages. 
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FIGURE 9.1 
THE ALLOCATION OF MARKETED OUTPUT 
BETWEEN SECTORS 1960-76 
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Finally GM, Im and B are necessarily at market prices whereas 
i 
data on Ym can only be obtained at factor costs. It would be 
preferable to have all values at factor costs to avoid inaccuracies 
arising from changes in the average indirect tax rate. Unfortunately, 
this information is not available so that a further source of 
underestimation of Cm is created which will be increasing if the 
average indirect tax rate is increasing. 
Doubtless, application of alternative assumptions to the data 
calculations would yield different values for the four variables. 
However the figures in Table 9.1 are not intended to establish 
absolute values for the sector shares but rather to show changes 
in the variables over the period. Calculation of cm, for example, 
excluding stock change effects after 1965, does not significantly 
alter the overall picture in Figure 9.1. 
Considering the changes in the sector shares in Figure 9.1, 
it can be seen firstly, that changes in g are primarily reflected 
in inverse movements in cm. Secondly, it is clear that there is an 
upward trend in gm between 1960 and 1972, followed by a sudden 
fall and subsequent rise to 1976.5 From 1965 to 1972 cm tends to 
be less restricted by changes in gm as a gradual decline in the 
share of market sector investment allows market sector consumption 
a higher share. Thus, for example, between 1966 and 1968 a decline 
in im in conjunction with a reduced value of gm, allows a large rise 
in market sector consumption. Finally, the value of bm (which is 
negative throughout the period) falls most sharply when cm and im 
rise simultaneously. 
To understand cause and effect between these ratios it is of 
course necessary to establish which ratio (or ratios) is the prime 
mover. In their study of the U. K. Bacon and Eltis consider 
262 
the allocation of the proportion of marketed output consumed outside 
the market sector (Ym 
Cm 
= em) between gm, im and bm. However 
Y 
m 
this does not imply that market sector workers take their share 
of Ym first and the remainder is available for government, 
investment and exports. Indeed it is possible that changes in 
em may be affected by changes in gm via its effects on market 
sector consumption. 
In the context of the Egyptian economy it can be argued 
that gm and to some extent im are the prime movers. Just as most 
macro models consider government expenditure as exogenous, so 
changes in gm result from exogenous fiscal policy decisions rather 
than from changes in the other endogenous variables. This is 
particularly apparent when increased government expenditure is 
financed by increases in taxation with the result that personal 
consumption falls. Causation in this case obviously runs from 
government expenditure to personal consumption and not vice versa. 
In a traditional Keynesian 'demand-deficient' economy government 
expenditure may rise in response to stagnant personal consumption 
and investment. But this is not relevant in the context of a 
growing economy, with high rates of population growth and inflation. 
Investment in the market sector is to some extent subject to the 
same exogenous factors in Egypt as government expenditure. Much 
investment is carried out by public sector firms as an integral part 
of government development planning. Thus the rise in im in the 
early 1960s and subsequent gradual decline to 1972 reflects the 
movements of fiscal allocation of market sector investment funds - 
the intensive development effort of Egypt's First Five-Year Plan 
(1960-5) and the effective planlessness of the following seven 
6 
years. 
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Figure 9.1 reveals how drastic was the effect on cm of the 
rise in the share of government non-market expenditures between 
1960 and 1966, cm falling from 57% in -1960 to 42' 
during 1961-3, was there any significant increase 
faster rate of growth of marketed output kept g m 
and allowed market sector consumption to expand. 
in 1966. Only 
in c when a m 
fairly constant 
This took place 
at the expense of the balance of payments as imports rose without 
a compensating rise in exports. It would seem that tighter import 
controls after 1963 meant that when g continued to rise, market 
sector consumption and investment could no longer maintain their 
previous levels by absorbing imports. 
7 
Thus real consumption by the 
market sector increased negligibly during the period and must have 
fallen considerably in per capita terms. It is not surprising then 
that government attempts to restrict consumption to provide 
investment funds failed, since market sector consumption was 
already under pressure from an unchecked growth in the non-market 
sector. Had this non-market expansion been restricted a larger 
share of domestic output could have been devoted to investment. 
After a reduction in gm and im between 1966 and 1968 due to 
the war, which enabled cm to rise, gm continued its upward trend 
to 1972. This again curtailed market sector consumption though 
less so than during 1960-6 because of a decline in im and a slight 
fall in bm. Mabro and Radwan suggest that import controls were 
eased after 1967 and this may have helped to reduce the fall in 
cm as imports increasingly supplemented domestic goods and 
8 
services. 
From 1972-4 a sharp fall in gm together with a greater 
liberalisation of import contols in 1973, allowed a rapid rise 
in cm, which was however reversed from 1974 when post-war 
reconstruction and rearmament raised im and gm. 
Some interesting conclusions emerge from this analysis. 
Firstly, the growth in the claims on marketed output by the non- 
market sector over the 1960-76 period as a whole is undeniable, 
with the result that it became increasingly difficult for the 
market sector to supply the needs of the rest of the economy. 
As Table 9.2 below shows, the per capita marketed output available 
for consumption by the market sector rose in real terms by a mere 
0.2% per annum. Real wages in the market sector did of course 
rise, so that effective demand was greater than available supply. 
This caused inflation and the shortages of consumer goods which have 
been common in Egypt in recent years. What seems most likely is 
that those employed in the market sector who could most easily 
achieve wage rises maintained and even increased their consumption 
levels while the lower classes, with less job security and poorer 
barganing positions, actually suffered reductions in their 
consumption. 
9 
The pressure on these groups has obviously varied 
but was probably greatest during the First Five-Year Plan, when 
cm fell most sharply. Indeed in 1967 an Economic Intelligence 
Unit Report commented, 
"Pressure on the fixed income groups that constitute 
the bulk of the urban populace (about 40% of the 10 
country's population) must be becoming intolerable". 
it is important to stress that this does not suggest that 
a rise in government spending on activities such as health or 
education is necessarily wrong or wasteful. These activities 
contribute greatly to the development effort in the long-run, 
but if they are allowed in the short-run to grow faster than the 
rate of growth of marketed output the result must be a reduction 
in the share available to tither sectors. As Bacon and Eltis have 
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so 
pointed out, if investment and the balance of payments are not to 
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TABLE 9.2 THE GROWTH OF REAL CONSUMPTION IN THE MARKET SECTOR 
1960-76 
(i) Marketed Output (at 
constant 1960 prices) (Ym) 
(ii) Market Sector Consumption (Cm 
(iii) Population dependent on the 
Market Sector (000s)* 
(iv) Per Capita Market Sector 
Consumption [(ii) (iii) 
Average Annual 
1960 1976 Compound Rate of 
Change 
1052.7 2165.0 4.4 
602.1 874.7 2.4 
21233 29728 2.0 
28.36 29.42 0.2 
* Estimated as Total Population x 
Market Sector Employment 
Total Employment 
Source: Table 9. land C. A. P. M. S., Statistical Yearbook of the UAR, 
Cairo. Various issues. 
I 
rs #It 
DO 
suffer, an increase in gm must be accompanied by a similar decline 
in C. This need not mean a reduction in the standard of living 
of market sector workers if that sector can achieve a satisfactory 
rate of output growth. 
11 
In Egypt however this has meant a 
negligible increase in living standards. As Figure 9.1 shows, 
over the period as a whole the fall in cm largely compensated 
for the growth in gm, though its failure to do so during the 
late 'sixties and early 'seventies resulted in investment in 
the market sector suffering and a steadily worsening balance of 
payments. The suggestion here is that it is the projected 
growth of marketed output which is crucial when deciding the allowable 
magnitude of non-market sector growth. Given the failure of 
Egyptian planners to achieve a faster rate of growth in Ym (for 
whatever reasons), they could only achieve the realised increase 
in Gm by allowing adverse effects on other sectors. The rise in 
the balance of payments deficit, the squeezing of market sector 
investment and the restriction of many market sector workers' 
living standards must therefore be blamed partly on this expansion. 
It is however the effects of changes in these variables on 
prices and output growth (via effects on employment and 
productivity) which are likely to be most serious for any 
economy and in Egypt closer examination reveals that both have 
been adversely affected by the increasing share of marketed 
output absorbed by the non-market sector. 
9.4 OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY 
Normally an increase in gm relative to cm such as Egypt 
experienced between 1960 and 1976 would be expected to be 
accompanied byIa shift in employment from the market to the 
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non-market sector. When this occurs, as seen in Section 9.2, it 
raises the required rate of productivity growth if living standards 
are to. grow equally. across different sectors of workers. Although 
the. enumeration of the labour force in Egypt carries little 
assurance of accuracy (particularly its sectoral divisionsl2), 
some idea of changes in employment may be obtained using similar 
definitions to those used to estimate market sector output. 
Table 9.3 presents two estimates of market and non-market sector 
employment growth. The first set of estimates (1) covers the 
period 1960-76 and assumes the non-market sector to be equivalent 
to the 'Social Development Services' sector. A second set of 
estimates (2) is presented for 1960-5, providing more accurate 
estimates of the market and non-market sectors, from a breakdown 
of data available only for those years. 
As expected in a developing country, both market and non- 
market sectors are experiencing increases in employment. Using 
definition (1) in Table 9.3, non-market sector employment is 
estimated to be growing at about 11A faster than that of the 
market sector. Comparing this with the estimate for 1960-5 using 
definition (2) suggests that definition (1) may put a downward 
bias on non-market sector employment gtowth for the whole 1960-76 
period since it clearly does so for the first five years. However 
in the absence of more accurate data for later years this cannot 
be confirmed. 
It was shown in Section 9.2 that, in the context of a constant 
total labour force, a transfer of resources from the market to the 
non-market sector will reduce the growth of marketed output unless 
productivity in the market sector can rise substantially. Table 9.3 
indicates that 3, n Egypt both market and non-market sectors have 
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TABLE 9.3 EMPLOYMENT IN THE MARKET AND NON-MARKET SECTORS 
1960-76 
Employment (in thousands) Average Annual 
Rates of Growth ($) 
1960 1965 1976 1960-76 1960-5 
Market Sector (1) 4939.2 6067.4 7556.3 2.7 4.2 
Non-Market Sector (1) 1066.8 1306.5 2071.9 4.2 4.2 
Market Sector* (2) 5546.2 6668.4 n. a. n. a. 3.8 
Non-Market Sectort (2) 459.8 705.5 n. a. n. a. 8.9 
n. a. = not available 
* Defined as employment in Agriculture, Industry, Construction and 
Electricity, Public Utilities, Housing, Transport and Communications, 
Finance and Trade, Personal Services, and privately-owned Health, 
Education, Social, Cultural and Security Services. 
# Defined as employment in publicly-owned Education, Health, Social, 
Cultural and Security Services, and Government Administration. 
Source: M. Hanafi and M. Mongi, Labour absorption in the Egyptian 
Economy, Institute of National Planning, Cairo, 
and C. A. P. M. S., Statistical Yearbook of the U. A. R., Cairo, 
various issues. 
I 
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experienced increases in employment such that a relative transfer 
of labour from the market to the non-market sector has occurred. 
The extent to which this has reduced Ym can be gauged by considering 
the possible effects of reducing the growth in Gm so that it increases 
commensurately with Cm and comparing this with Egypt's actual 
experience over the period. Results are shown in Table 9.4. 
On the assumption that this equalisation of G and C would 
mm 
likewise equalise employment growth rates across sectors, both 
market and non-market employment would now grow at 3% per annum. 
13 
If the standard of living of market sector workers is assumed to 
rise by 5% over the period (that is, at 0.3% per annum) instead of 
the actual fall of 5%, this will lead to a growth in Cm and Gm 
of 3.3% per annum. Thus by 1976, Cm and Gm could have risen to 
a total of L. E. 1552.4 million instead of L. E. 1797.0 million. 
Allowing the net reduction of L. E. 244.6 million in Cm and Gm to 
be allocated to market sector investment, this might be expected 
to raise productivity. This relationship has been examined for 
Egypt using data on market sector productivity growth (PRm) and 
investment growth (Im) for the 1960-76 period. An ordinary least 
squares regression produced the following result: 
PR = 0.83 + 0.18 I mm 
(1.28) (6.88) 
R2 = 0.78; D. W. = 1.53; Figures in parenthesis are t-values. 
The coefficient on Im is highly significant suggesting that a 10% 
growth in investment could be expected to add about 2% to 
productivity growth. Thus, as Table 9.4 shows, the result of 
reallocating demand is to allow market sector investment to grow 
at over 11% per annum (instead of the previous 9%), producing a 
(9.12) 
productivity rite of 2.8% per annum (instead of the 1.9% actually 
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TABLE 9.4 ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INCREASES IN MARKET SECTOR SUPPLY 
AND DEMANDS, 1960-76 
(In Million Egyptian Pounds; at constant Average Annual Rates of 
1960 prices) Growth (%) 1960-76 
1960 1976 
Actual Actual Projected Actual Projected 
Y 10 52.7 2165.0 2593.9 4.6 5.8 
m 
C 602.1 874.7 1012.1 2.4 3.3 
m 
G 321.6 922.3 540.3 6.8 3.3 
m 
I 159.4 634.3 878.9 9.1 11.2 
m 
B -29.8 -2'66.3 162.6 -14.7 12.4 
(in Thousands) 
N 1066.8 2071.9 1706.9 4.2 3.0 
g 
N 4939.2 7556.3 7921.3 2.7 3.0 
m 
PR 213.1 286.5 331.5 1.9 2.8 
m 
Source: Table 9.1 and C. A. P. M. S., Statistical Yearbook of the U. A. R., 
Cairo, (various issues). 
I 
271 
achieved). Together with the 3% rise in employment this would 
increase Y at an annual rate of 5.8% - more than 1% above the m 
rate achieved during 1960-76. 
The beneficial results of such a policy are clear. The 
reduced growth in the standard of living of non-market sector 
employees to 0.3% per annum would allow a similar rise in the 
standard of living of the numerically much larger category of 
market sector employees who have actually suffered a fall in 
their real consumption. 
14 
The balance of payments is also 
able to move into comfortable surplus. Alternatively fewer 
exports could have been sacrificed for higher domestic 
consumption growth. 
9.5 EFFECTS ON INFLATION 
In addition to reducing output growth, the increasing 
demands on marketed output by those not directly concerned in 
its current supply will put upward pressure on prices. If 
productivity increases fail to maintain supply sufficient to 
meet demand this must be accomplished by increases in the price 
of marketed outputs. Johnston suggests that 
"a given percentage excess demand (supply) in the 
current period leads to an equal percentage rise 
(fall) in price in the forthcoming period. "15 
Thus Pt+l 
= 
Et 
Pt Ptgt 
where p and q are the price and quantity of marketed output 
(9.13) 
respectively and E is the level of excess demand (supply) . Allowing 
for the many exogenous factors which influence p, such as rising 
import prices, an excess demand coefficient less than unity is 
more likely. 
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Thus Pt+l 
=aEt where 0<a<1 (9.14) 
Pt Ptgt 
The question then arises - how is excess demand measured? 
There are of course numerous problems associated with the measurement 
of excess demand and particularly in a less developed economy. The 
unemployment rate, frequently used to measure excess demand in 
developed countries, is a largely meaningless statistic in most 
less developed countries and hence of little use for our purpose. 
It has been shown however that excess demand will arise as a result 
of a growth in demand by the market and non-market sectors for 
marketed output in excess of its supply. Thus a partial indicator 
of this structurally-caused excess demand will be the market sector 
consumption ratio cm. As the amount of goods and services available 
to market sector employees is squeezed (either due to increasing 
government purchases, investment or exports) then, without a similar 
cut in wages, the result must be increased competition for available 
supplies, and thereby rises in prices. Prices may also be bid up 
indirectly as market sector employees, faced with a decline in the 
growth of their living standards, seek larger money wage rises which 
are then passed on in price increases. 
Changes in the rate of growth of marketed output may also 
reflect changes in the pressure of demand. If in the absence of 
fluctuations in demand, supply grows at a constant rate, then 
deviations in output'from this trend rate of growth may be seen as 
a measure of the influence of demand to raise or lower output growth. 
Unless supply is infinitely elastic with respect to changes in 
demand, a growth in demand above the trend rate of output growth 
will be associated with rises in prices. In fact in Egypt, as in 
many LDCs, there are several factors which tend to make supply 
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inelastic. The foreign exchange shortages associated with balance 
of payments deficits and import controls have resulted in shortages 
of imported input goods causing supply bottlenecks of varying degrees 
of severity throughout the 'sixties and 'seventies. Shortages of 
particular types of labour, despite widespread underemployment and 
a slow growth in agricultural productivity, have similarly reduced 
the capacity of the economy as a whole to grow commensurately with 
demand. 
16 
The influence of these two demand variables on prices has 
been tested for the period 1961-76. A negative sign is to be 
expected on the coefficient of cm as a falling market sector 
consumption ratio puts upward pressure on prices and vice versa. 
Conversely, a positive relationship is predicted between fluctuations 
in demand for marketed output and price changes. Performing an 
ordinary least squares regression gives the predicted signs and 
significant coefficients on the relevant variables. Results are 
shown in equation (9.15). 
p= 15.11 - 0.26 cm + 0.49 0m+9.05 D (9.15) 
(3.69) (3.09) (5.42) (4.00) 
R2 = 0.81; D. W. = 1.20. Figures in parenthesis are t-values. 
p is the annual percentage change in wholesale prices, 
17 
cm is as 
previously defined, and 01 is the deviation of annual growth rates 
in marketed output from a constant trend rate of growth, lagged one 
period. 
18 
D is a dummy variable for the 1973 war which created a 
large, exogenous influence on prices. (1973 takes a value of unity; 
all other years, zero). 
Both variables are significant and suggest that, on average, 
a4 percentage point fall in cm or a2 percentage point rise in 
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0 
wl will produce a1 percentage point rise 
in the rate of inflation. 
The important point as far as a marketed/non-marketed analysis is 
concerned is that if the non-market sector expands at the expense 
of market'sector consumption it is likely to add an upward impetus 
to prices. Indeed in Egypt's case it is clear that the fall in 
cm, particularly during the mid-sixties and mid-seventies, is 
partly to blame for the simultaneous surges in inflation. 
19 
9.6 COMPOSITION OF THE Na -MARKET SECTOR 
These results inevitably lead to the question: could the rise 
in gm have been avoided? The answer would seem to be that in part 
it could. The rates of growth of the various components of 
government non-market expenditure for the years when gm increased 
most rapidly are shown in Table 9.5. Defence expenditure 
represented both the largest share and fastest growing of non- 
market expenditures and given the existing military situation 
during this time it would be unrealistic to expect any reduction 
in this item. However, it is also true that other areas of 
expenditure grew far in excess of marketed output growth. General 
Public Services grew particularly rapidly between 1960-6 (exceeding 
even defence expenditure increases), and 1974-6. The other main 
expenditure categories - Education and Non-Market Investment - 
also persistently exceeded marketed output growth (except 1960-6 
in the case of Investment). Indeed the only category which 
regularly grew more slowly than marketed output was Local 
Authority Expenditure. It is not suggested here that these 
expenditures were unnecessarily high or wasteful in themselves; 
no doubt they involved many important and valuable projects. 
However it is also the case that with the relatively low rates of 
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TABLE 9.5 GROWTH OF NON-MARKET EXPENDITURES 1960-76 
(at constant 1960 prices) 
Share of total 
Average Annual Rates of Growth ($) 
Expenditure 
in 1960 1960-76 1960-6 1968-72 1974-6 
Current Expenditures: 
General Public Services 21.8 5.0 19.2 0.9 22.0 
,s 
Defence 23.7 7.0 17.5 5.7 13.4 
Including 
Emergency Fund - 10.5 - 22.0 38.7 
Education 13.9 6.4 9.4 6.9 12.8 
Health 2.7 10.1 15.0 15.4 -8.3 
Community & Social 1.0 10.1 22.3 -15.9 150 
Local Government 11.2 2.6 -2.0 0.7 24.3 
Investment Expenditures 18.7 6.8 -2.6 13.0 77 
Total 100 6.8 10.6 12.8 32.0 
Marketed Output - 4.6 5.1 5.8 9.0 
Source: Arab Republic of Egypt, Economic Management in a Period of 
Transition, May 1978, vol. 6, World Bank. 
11 
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marketed output growth achieved, these expenditures took place with 
the consequences for the rest of the economy which have already 
been identified. Thus a marketed/non-marketed distinction seeks 
only to highlight the alternatives open to planners and policy-makers. 
The expansion of education facilities for example has been a 
laudable goal of Egyptian planners, but the increased short-term 
demands which it makes on marketed output and the high levels of 
disguised unemployment among Egypt's educated may make a stronger 
case for channelling some of that expenditure into sectors which 
raise current supplies of marketed output. Similarly the growth 
in expenditure on government services which allows high graduate 
underemployment in Public Administration could almost certainly 
benefit the economy more if it was used in the market sector. 
9.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has attempted to show some of the consequences 
of changes in the composition of demand for market sector goods 
and services. In Section 9.2 it was shown that increases in the 
relative size of the non-market sector raise the required rate of 
productivity growth if marketed output is not to be retarded and 
inflationary pressures avoided. Section 9.3 investigated the 
effects of growing public expenditure on* non-marketed outputs in 
the Egyptian economy since 1960 and it was suggested that this 
was at least partly to blame for a worsening balance of payments, 
reductions in market sector consumption and insufficient market 
sector investment over the period. Furthermore, it was shown 
in Sections 9.4 and 9.5 that this expansion of the non-market 
sector has reduced output growth and added to inflationary pressures. 
I 
Disaggregating non-market expenditures in Section 9.6 indicated that 
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increasing defence expenditure, the item usually blamed for the 
rising government budget deficit, did indeed contribute substantially 
to the relative growth of the non-market sector. However most 
other expenditures grew in excess of marketed output, of which the 
most significant were education and government administration 
expenditures . 
The effects of non-market sector growth considered in this 
chapter are short-run; no predictions are made for the long-run. 
The history of growth in many developed countries is of a rising 
contribution of such non-marketed outputs as education and health 
facilities, and many would argue that they are an important source 
of rises in productivity throughout an economy. If however the non- 
market sector grows rapidly in the short-term its demands on 
marketed outputs are likely to exceed greatly its contribution to 
their supply. This has been the case in Egypt, at least during 
1960-76. If the resulting problems are to be avoided in the 
future, Egyptian planners must initially attempt to equalise the 
rates of growth of Gm and Ym until a sufficiently high rate of 
growth of marketed output can be achieved to allow an increasing 
share to be purchased by the non-market sector without this putting 
excessive pressure on other sectors. If instead present trends are 
allowed to continue the outcome must be slower growth than would 
otherwise occur, increasing foreign indebtedness, greater social 
unrest and further inflationary pressures. 
I 
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Footnotes 
1. c. f. J. Johnston (1975, p. 289). 
2. The required productivity increase will also be influenced by the 
way in which the market. to non-market transfer is financed. 
Taxation financed expenditure for example can be expected to 
produce different effects on demand from expenditure financed 
by government borrowing from the bank or non-bank sectors. 
3. This result is similar to that obtained by Baumol (1967). In 
his model, Baumol assumes labour transfer from a 'progressive' 
to a 'non-progressive' sector occurs as a consequence of 
differential rates of productivity growth between the sectors. 
In this model however it is the rate of productivity growth 
necessary to maintain output at constant prices, given a 
labour transfer, which is being sought. 
4. See D. C. Mead (1967, pp. 131-155). 
5. Notice that the full extent of the rise in non-market demands 
on market sector outputs cannot be seen in an increasing share 
of the non-market sector in total GDP since non-market sector 
GDP (estimated from wages and salaries in that sector) is 
only one part of the non-market sector's demands on Ym. 
6. Disagreement and indecision towards the end of the First 
Five-Year Plan concerning the form and content of the new 
plan meant the late introduction in 1966 of a plan to run to 
1972. As far as investment was concerned this involved little 
more than the completion of projects begun during 1960-5. 
In practice however the period 1965-72 lacked any consistent 
or comprehensive planning with annual draft plans rarely being 
fully applied, due in part to the 1967 war with Israel. A 
ten-year plan was announced in 1972. 
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7. See Mabro and Radwan (1967, p. 72). 
8. ibid. pp. 73-4. 
9. Although officially wages and prices rise by government decrees, 
in practice actual wage rises achieved may depend on the type of 
work and the degree of power or influence particular groups of 
workers have. 
10. Economic Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review, March 1967,7. 
11. A rise in the ratio of household saving to personal disposable 
income in the U. K. and Greece has been put forward by Bacon and 
Karayinnis-Bacon as one explanation of a falling value of cm in 
both countries. It is difficult to establish if this has been 
important in Egypt, since data is not available on household 
saving, but a crude ratio of total saving to total disposable 
income shows no tendency to rise when cm is falling. Only if 
household saving increased significantly at the expense of 
corporate saving, would such an explanation be plausible in 
this case. 
12. There are, for example, at least four different estimates of 
employment in manufacturing industry in 1960. See Mabro 
and Radwan (1976, p. 139). 
13. This is the weighted average of actual rates achieved using 
definition (1) in Table 3, namely 4.2% for non-market employment 
and 2.7% for market sector employment. Since total demand is 
not reduced, there is no reason to believe that the overall 
rate of employment growth will fall. 
14. While the share of marketed output available to market sector 
employees grew by only 2.4% annually, employment grew at 2.7% 
per annum, 1960-76. 
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15. J. Johnston (1975, p. 292). 
16. Perhaps the strongest evidence for this is the rise in the economy's 
balance of payments deficit. Net imports increased from -0.2% 
of GDP in 1960 to 16.4% in 1976. 
17. The composition of the wholesale price index in Egypt is 
considered, by some commentators, to be a more accurate 
calculation of how prices actually change than the 'cost 
of living' index, and has therefore been preferred here. 
See M. M. El Kammash (1968), pp. 154 ff. 
18. The constant trend value of marketed output growth is found 
by solving 
Yt _ YO (1 + r) 
t 
for r, (t =1... 16) 
mm 
to give r= ca -1 where ß= In (1 + r) 
19. The cm ratio fell by 16 percentage points 1963-6 and 28 percentage 
points 1974-6, while the inflation rate rose from 1.1% to 7.4% 
and 7.5% to 12.4% over the same periods. 
I 
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CHAPTER10 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAX REVENUES 
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10.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Parts 1 and 2 it was argued that structural changes in many 
countries in recent years have involved a relative growth in service 
sectors. The public sector has shared in this growth with consequent 
rapid increases in government expenditure on its non-marketed 
activities. Given the importance of taxation in funding such 
expenditure increases chapters 4 and 5 sought to provide a method 
of modelling tax revenue growth which could identify the path of tax 
revenues as incomes increase. The model presented was based on the 
U. K. tax system though it was argued that most of its components 
could be adapted to other tax systems in use. 
For Egypt, the evidence of the previous chapters in Part 3 
indicated that the country has experienced particularly rapid 
structural change towards services and especially government non- 
marketed services in recent years. It is therefore of interest to 
examine in Egypt's case how tax revenues have grown during this 
process and how they can be expected to grow in the future. 
Unfortunately insufficiently detailed information is presently 
available on the composition and structure of the Egyptian tax 
system to allow construction of a model for Egypt similar to that 
used in Part 2. However for analytical purposes there are similar- 
ities between the U. K. and Egyptian tax systems which allow the tax 
model in Part 2 to be used to shed some light on the growth of 
Egyptian tax revenues. 
Before considering the revenue flexibility of the Egyptian tax 
system in Section 10.3, it is necessary to describe the relevant 
features of the tax system. Section 10.2 therefore outlines the 
main features 
6f the tax structure (10.2.1), and examines some 
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evidence of revenue growth since 1960 (10.2.2). The chapter is 
summarised and some conclusions drawn in Section 10.4. 
10.2 THE EGYPTIAN TAX SYSTEM 
10.2.1 The Tax Structure 
Detailed information on the tax system in Egypt is difficult 
to obtain. Data on the structure of individual taxes, changes in 
rates, thresholds and exemptions are not regularly published. 
Fortunately however the main components of the tax system and their 
operation have not changed significantly since the early studies of 
Hansen and Marzouk (1965) and Lotz (1966). 
1 
The main changes since 
these studies have been the introduction in 1965 of an indirect tax 
system of 'price differences' for some commodities and a 1976 State 
draft plan to restructure the tax system (including a 'general' 
sales tax) 
2 
but this has not yet been implemented. In this section 
the main features of the present tax system will be outlined. 
3 
The Egyptian system of taxation is essentially composed of 
personal income and wealth taxation, corporate taxation, social 
insurance taxation, commodity taxes and subsidies and various othe 
minor taxes including an inheritance tax and stamp duties. Although 
these types of taxes are common to many systems, in Egypt their 
operation is relatively complicated. 
Income Taxation 
The personal income tax system uses a number of specific taxes 
the base for which varies according to the income source. Thus there 
are separate taxes for income from land rent, business profits, wages 
and salaries, 'daily-paid wages and income from non-commerical 
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professional activities. While most earned incomes are subject to 
progressive tax rates, unearned incomes (interest, dividends etc. ) 
tend to be taxed regressively, However in addition to these 
specific taxes, incomes from all sources are subject to a 'General 
Income Tax' which is steeply progressive. A more detailed des- 
cription of these taxes is given in Appendix 10.1 which gives some 
indication of variations in exemptions and rate structure across 
taxes. The system was further complicated with the introduction in 
1960 of a 'Defence Tax' which applies to all income sources except 
daily-paid wages. This tax was introduced at a flat rate-of 7% for 
all incomes except wages and salaries for which rates ranged from 
1-4%. Rates have been changed at various times since then. Figure 
110 
10.1 shows the rate progression of wages and salaries, and professional 
income taxation, and the general income tax schedule. These are the 
main taxes affecting personal disposable income, apart from the 
defense tax which, in general, shifts each schedule upwards uniformly. 
4 
It can also be seen in Figure 10.1 that the rate structure of the 
general income tax (GIT), at least for incomes below £E 10,000, is 
similar to the specific personal income taxes, rising from 8% to 25%. 
Although tax rates rise steeply for incomes above £10,000 this 
section is of little relevance in practice since there are negligible 
numbers of income earners in this range, (see Section 10.3.1) . In fact 
since the tax base for the GIT is gross income less all specific taxes 
and a £E 1500 tax threshold operates, lower income earners pay no 
general taxation. Indeed, because of high levels of income tax 
allowances relative to average incomes the majority of earners pay 
little or no income tax at all. 
Social InsurancJe Tax 
A social insurance tax has operated in Egypt since the mid 1950s. 
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Separate schemes were introduced for government and non-government 
employees. In each scheme, both employer and employee pay con- 
tributions. When the schemes were introduced, in the public sector 
employee contributions were 10% of earnings and the government also 
contributed 10%. 
6 
In the private sector contributions of 5% were 
each paid by employee and employer. By 1966 extensions of the private 
sector scheme led to increased contributions of 10% for employees 
and 23% for employers. Those outside these two schemes could still 
benefit from a non-contributory pension scheme set up in 1950. 
This scheme included old-age, disability and orphan pensions. 
7 
An 
important difference between the Egyptian and U. K. social insurance 
IV schemes is that, unlike the U. K., social insurance contributions in 
Egypt are tax allowable in specific and general income tax assessment. 
The coverage of the Egyptian social insurance scheme is therefore 
wide by the standards of most less developed countries. The whole 
population is, at least in principle, covered by a pension scheme 
which though not guaranteeing subsistence is considered by Abdel-Fadil 
to be 'appreciable when compared with minimum wages', (Abdel-Fadil, 
(1980, p. 117)). Though estimates vary, it would seem that about one 
quarter of the total labour force (or about half the non-agricultural 
labour force) were covered by the government's insurance schemes in 
1964.8 This proportion may well have risen subsequently. Similar data 
on the proportion of private sector employees covered by the sector's 
pension scheme are not available. By 1971 the number of participants 
in different social insurance schemes had risen to almost 3 million 
out of a total labour force of about 8.5 million. 
The benefits which are received under the Egyptian social 
insurance scheme differ from the U. K. system, (approximated by the 
'guaranteed minimum income' in chapter 5) in two important respects. 
287 
Firstly unlike the U. K. National Insurance, Egyptian social insurance 
schemes are intended to be self-financing. Therefore whereas in the 
U. K. National Insurance is more accurately to be seen as a sup- 
plementary income tax, in Egypt it is more obviously a compulsory 
savings scheme, where contributions made during employment are 
directly related to payments received in retirement, illness etc. 
Secondly apart from the limited payments made under the non-contributory 
pension scheme discussed above, the amount of benefits received is 
generally conditional on the amount of contributions made. 
9 
Thus 
whereas in the U. K. the social security benefit level represents a 
minimum income (approximately) of all employed, unemployed, retired 
etc., in Egypt this applies only to insurance scheme participants. 
N9 
While most non-insured retired men can expect a state pension, non- 
insured unemployed and retired women are not covered. Similarly 
low-wage employees not in an insurance scheme can not expect dis- 
posable income to be 'topped-up' to a social security minimum as 
in the U. K. 
Pensions which are paid under the social security legislation 
consist of a basic sum, allowances for dependants and a family 
bonus. Pensions from contributory schemes are based on the length 
of time insured and on average earnings at the end of employment. 
Indirect Taxes 
Indirect taxes take three main forms in Egypt: selective customs 
duties mainly on imports, various excise taxes on particular comm- 
odities and, since 1965, 'price differences' whereby the 
difference 
between officially-fixed ex-factory and wholesale prices of some 
commodities is paid to the government. 
Since the end of the 1950s 
when cotton export taxes were abolished, export 
taxes as a whole 
i 
have not been important sources of revenue. 
Of the various import 
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duties levied, tobacco is by far the most important revenue source 
contributing about 50% of customs duty revenue, the main other sources 
of revenue being imported tea, coffee, motor cars and consumer durables. 
Effective tax rates on imports are however more widespread than import 
duties themselves. This is achieved through the system of specific 
excise or 'consumption' duties which are applied to a wide range of 
goods. As well as many domestic goods such as sugar and kerosene 
bearing excise duties, many luxury items, most of which are imported 
bear similar duties (e. g. artificial silk, alcohol, beer, wines and 
other spirits). Although excise taxes apply to many goods consumed 
particularly by low income earners, the simultaneous widespread use 
of subsidies on many of these 'low-wage' goods counteracts these so 
that effectively the major impact of excise taxes is on luxuries. 
10 
Since their introduction in 1965, price differences have been 
applied to a wide range of commodities. Abdel-Fadil (1980) suggests 
that as much as 80% of price difference tax revenue in 1970 was raised 
from basic wage-goods (including tea, sugar, cigarettes, clothes, 
shoes, soap, margarine etc. ), with only 4% from consumer durables 
(fridges, air-conditioning, T. V. sets, washing machines, cars etc. ) 
and the remaining 16% from intermediate goods. Although these price 
differences are selective they affect goods which constitute about 
70% of average family expenditure. 
11 
The rate of duty for customs 
and excise taxes and price differences is of course variable across 
commodities, but fairly typical examples would be the 33% excise 
duty on soft drinks (100% when produced from imported concentrates) 
and a price difference on plastonil shoes which in 1966 was equivalent 
to about 22% of the retail price. 
12 
I 
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10.2.2. Tax Revenues 
Having examined the composition of the Egyptian tax system this 
section presents evidence on the revenue raised by the various taxes 
discussed above during the period 1960-78. Data on the shares of 
different taxes in total tax revenue are presented in Table 10.1 and 
tax revenues as a percentage of GDP are given, in Table 10.2.13 
It is often suggested that indirect taxes are a much more 
important revenue source than direct taxes in developing countries, 
which is in contrast to the situation in most developed countries. 
It can be seen in Table 10.1 that while this is true for Egypt, it 
occurs primarily because of the importance- of international trade 
taxes. For most of the period considered these taxes accounted for 
between 45% and 55% of all tax revenue. Their share is reduced 
in the late 'sixties and early 'seventies partly because of the 
introduction of the price differences and partly because balance of 
payments improvements in this period reduced import duties. The 
return to shares of around 45% for trade taxes in the mid-'seventies 
reflects the balance of payments deficits in these years. 
For domestic commodity taxes it is interesting to note that, 
except for a few years after 1968, revenue from these taxes was 
less than that from income and profit taxes. Goods and service 
taxes produced only 10% of tax revenue in 1960 and although this rose 
to around 30% with the introduction of price differences, by 1978 
they accounted for only 18%. Income and Profit taxes on the other 
hand increased fairly steadily from 18% in 1960 to 29% in 1978. 
Within each of these categories however there are differences 
between taxes. Within the domestic commodity taxes, excise duties 
fluctuate in importance from as high as 18% in 1964 to only 7.6% in 
I 
1978. This is perhaps to be expected from taxes whose coverage and 
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degree are changed at discre e intervals. Price differences however 
exhibit a steady decline in their share of revenue from the first 
year a break down is available in 1970, to 1978. Despite this 
price differences are an important revenue source, providing almost 
a quarter of total tax revenue in 1970 and still producing more revenue 
than excise duties by 1978. Changes in price differences can also 
yield increased revenue in a less visible manner than excise duty 
changes. Within direct taxes it is clear from Table 10.1 that 
business and personal tax revenues have opposite trends. While the 
share of business income tax rises steadily from 11% in 1960 to 27% in. 1978, 
personal income tax revenue falls from 6.7% to 2.6% over the same period. 
Finally, property taxes, mainly building and land rents, have not 
been a significant resointe source since the early 'sixties, and declined 
particularly in the 'seventies. This has arisen because of nationalisation 
which affected much property income and because in many cases the tax 
base has remained fairly fixed in nominal terms. 
14 
Before considering the ratios of taxes to GDP as shown in Table 
10.1, it is important to stress that these ratios, frequently used to 
describe the 'flexibility' of various taxes, may not give meaningful 
representations of flexibility (and especially built-in flexibility). 
To assess the automatic revenue change of a particular tax consequent 
on a change in income it is important to use an income definition 
most appropriate to the tax in question. Thus for example the 
built- 
in flexibility of a personal income tax should be assessed with 
reference to personal incomes. If instead flexibility 
is assessed 
with reference to some aggregate income definition, such as 
GDP, 
then the extent of flexibility of the personal income tax will vary 
according to the source of the GDP increase. A rise 
in GDP due to 
I 
increased corporate profits for example will clearly have 
different 
19 
292 
effects from a rise in real wages. Such a definition of flexibility 
is therefore of limited value. This issue may be expected to be important 
in many developing countries where changes in balance of payments 
deficits can significantly affect total tax/GDP ratios via effects on 
import taxes, for a given change in GDP. Where the same GDP change 
occurs instead as a result of personal income changes, total tax/GDP 
ratios may change very little. / 
The flexibility of Egyptian taxes is therefore discussed with 
reference to the relevant income definition in Section 10.3.2. The 
tax/GDP ratios in Table 10.2 do however provide interesting information 
on the 'burden' of taxation. Firstly it can be seen from the table 
that the share of total tax revenue in GDP has risen steadily from 
around 13% in the early 'sixties to 26% by 1978. The early 'seventies 
ra. 
witness a brief tempo)ýy decline in the tax share possible reasons for 
which are examined in Section 10.3. 
Secondly personal income tax maintains a fairly constant share of 
GDP (around 1%) while business income taxes rise as a proportion of 
GDP mainly from 1960 to 1967 and after 1974, remaining stable around 
4% in the intervening period. 
15 
Thirdly, international trade taxes 
fluctuate over the period, displaying no clear trend, though the ratio 
is noticeably lower in the late `sixties and early 'seventies when 
trade deficits improved, and higher again from 1976. The variability 
in this ratio bears out the discussion on flexibility above, with changes in 
the ratio responding to the balance of payments deficits rather than GDP 
changes per se. Finally commodity tax revenue increases as a percentage 
of GDP up to 1970 mainly because of the introduction of price differences. 
However the declining importance of price differences in revenue terms 
as noted earlier causes the ratio to decline thereafter, the price 
I 
difference/GDP ratio reaching almost half its 1970 value by 1978. 
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10.3 MODELLING THE TAX SYSTEM 
The evidence in Section 10.2 may be summarised as indicating that 
the Egyptian tax system simultaneously exhibits important similarities 
to, and differences from, the tax/transfer system examined in chapter 
S. Although direct taxes are a relatively less important revenue 
source in Egypt than that implied in the model in chapter 5, and are 
administered in a more complex way, nevertheless the final outcome is 
to produce a rate structure which could be fairly accurately modelled 
by the method described in chapters 4 and 5. The greatest difference 
between the Egyptian system and the earlier model is perhaps that the 
latter uses a general sales tax and no commodity-specific taxes while 
the reverse holds for Egypt. Some of these issues on tax structure 
are examined in Section 10.3.2 which considers the usefulness of the 
model in Part 2 to explain revenue growth in Egypt. However the 
applicability of the model is dependent, not only on the tax functions 
used, but also on the form of the income distribution to be used. In 
the next section therefore the applicability of the lognormal distrib- 
ution to Egypt's earnings structure is considered. 
10.3.1 Income Distribution 
It need hardly be reiterated here that data on the distribution 
of incomes is particularly scarce or partial in developing countries 
and Egypt is no exception. That part of the population engaged in 
agricultural (especially the non-monetised part) and urban informal 
activities are rarely included in income statistics. It is therefore 
impossible to obtain a comprehensive picture of income distribution. 
However for the/purposes of constructing and applying a tax revenue 
2~ 9ý 
model this is not a serious limitation since the relevant income dis- 
tribution sought is that of potential tax payers and these are almost 
exclusively employed in urban, formal activities. For this category 
a reasonably reliable source of information is available in Egypt in 
the annual survey of employees, wages and working hours. 
16 
This 
evidence has been discussed by Abdel-Fadil (1980) and others and may 
be readily assessed with reference to the lognormality assumption. 
Evidence on the distribution of earnings of all employees in 
r 
r 
organised industry and services (excluding the Civil Service) is shown 
in Figures 10.2 and 10.3. Figure- 10.2 shows the distribution of gross 
annual earnings for all wage earners by income group for 1965 and 1970. 
It can be seen that although the 1970 distributionkAs shifted to the 
right of the 1965 distribution, both exhibit the same pattern and are 
fairly strongly skewed to the right. Median income has been cal- 
culated at £E149 p . a. 
in 1965 and £E160 p. a. in 1970, at constant 
prices. 
17 
This at least provides grounds for suspecting that the 
distribution may be approximately lognormal. Figure 10.3 gives the 
associated cumulative frequency ogives for each year and the Lorenz 
curve for 1965. (The 1970 curve is almost identical on the scale shown). 
The ogives also appear broadly similar to those associated with a 
lognormal distribution of incomes. 
As can be seen from the ogives in Figure 10.3 there are insuff- 
icient data points to produce meaningful results from standard tests 
for lognormality. 
18 
However two simple tests can be applied. Firstly, 
if an income distribution is perfectly described by the lognormal dis- 
tribution then the associated Lorenz curve will be symmetrical about 
an axis (AB in Figure 10.3) which intersects the Lorenz curve where income 
reaches its mean value. Thus the tangent at E will be parallel 
to 
i 
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CD. It is clear from Figure 10.3 that the Lorenz curve, while not 
perfectly symmetrical, does exhibit a high degree of symmetry. 
The second test makes use of the properties of the normal dis- 
tribution in which the distance between the median and the lowest 
decile, (quintile, quartile etc. ) will be the same as the distance 
between the median and the highest decile (quintile, quartile etc. ) 
If income is lognormally distributed this property will apply to the 
logarithm of income, and the ratios of median/lowest decile and 
r' highest decile/median will be equal. 
19 
Table 10.3 presents estimates 
of the relevant distances and ratios involving the median and the 
highest and lowest 10%, 20% and 30% of income earners, for 1965 and 
1970. It is clear from the table that the distances between the 
median and the highest and lowest percentiles are far from equal, 
rejecting the assumption of normality. The distance from the median 
of the highest 30% for example is more than three times that of the 
lowest 30%, in both years. However, the assumption of normality of 
logarithms seems much more acceptable, with the ratios of the various 
highest and lowest percentiles being fairly close, particularly in 
1970. The more the extremes of the distribution are emphasised the 
less this is true: the ratios for the highest and lowest decile can 
be seen to differ more than the highest and lowest quintile for example. 
Although these tests are not precise it does seem that a tax model 
incorporating a lognormal income distribution can be used appropriately 
to examine tax revenue growth in Egypt. That is, the distortions 
arising from the use of a lognormal distribution of incomes should be 
sufficiently small to allow valid conclusionson the Egyptian tax 
system to be drawn, ceteris paribus, from the tax model. 
I 
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10.3.2 Revenue Growth 
This section will consider the ability of the tax model developed 
i 
in Part 2 to interpret tax revenue growth in Egypt. It is therefore 
necessary to establish where the tax model results in chapter 5 are 
applicable to Egypt and where they are not. In cases where the 
Egyptian tax structure is sufficiently different from that modelled 
earlier so that the model's general properties cannot be assumed for 
the Egyptian case, possible modifications of the model are suggested. 
Where appropriate the model's properties will be used to help explain 
actual tax flexibility in Egypt. Each of the taxes discussed in 
Section 10.2.1 will be examined in turn. 
Income Taxation 
It is helpful at this point to recall some of the important 
features and properties of the personal income tax in the tax model 
in Part 2. Income tax was payable on all gross incomes above an 
exemption level al. A range of incomes was allowed for (between a1 
and a2) which were taxed at a 'standard' rate (optional). Above a2 a 
structure of higher marginal tax rates were described by a non-linear 
function. This produced an effective average rate schedule, Rt/y, 
measuring built-in flexibility which was sigmoid in shape and increased 
particularly steep ,I at low average income levels relative to the tax 
thresholds. It was shown that with positive real earnings growth, 
while indexation of the tax thresholds to nominal incomes removed all 
built-in flexibility, indexation to prices allowed substantial increases 
in Rt/y though obviously much less than when thresholds are not indexed 
at all (depending on the rate of price increase). Though it was not 
shown in Chapter 5 threshold indexation at more than the rate of 
nominal income 
increase would obviously cause the effective average tax 
3Ui 
rate to decline as average income rises. 
Considering the earlier discussion of the Egyptian income tax 
structure it would seem that this part of the model can be readily 
applied to Egypt. The rate structure in Figure 10.1 is very similar 
to that shown in Figure 4.1 for the U. K. Three main differences 
between the two systems do need to be taken into account but these 
would not significantly affect conclusions on built-in flexibility. 
Firstly unlike the U. K., Egypt uses a 'two stage' system of specific 
then general income taxation. Theoretically these need separate 
modelling. However the negligible propo-rtion of the population liable 
to pay general income taxation means that it does not significantly 
affect revenues. 
Secondly, the interdependencies between these two income taxes 
and the social insurance tax are different from those in the earlier 
model. In the model income tax and N. I. are both based on gross incomes. 
However in Egypt the social insurance tax base is gross income, the 
specific income tax base is gross income minus social insurance 
premiums and the general income tax base is gross income minus all 
specific income taxes and social insurance premiums paid. Thus, in 
the model the order of calculation of Rc and Rt did not matter, but for 
Egypt it would be necessary to calculate Rc first, then R St. 
(specific 
. 
income taxes) based on y- C(y) and then Rg. t. 
(general income tax) 
based on y- C(y) - ST (y) , where ST(y) 
is specific income tax pay- 
ments. Clearly if there is significant built-in flexibility in the 
social insurance tax, the flexibility of the income taxes may be 
different from that derived in the model and will be sensitive to 
changes in the structure of social insurance. In fact the social 
insurance tax is an almost proportional tax in Egypt so that 
(as 
r 
in the model) its built-in flexibility will be very small. 
The 
302 
distribution of post-social insurance premium income will therefore 
be very similar to that of gross incomes and the flexibility of 
specific income taxes will be affected very little. 
Thirdly, as can be seen in Figure 10.1 it would be preferable 
to model the structure of wages and salaries tax separately from 
that of professional incomes. A 'standard' rate would appear to be 
most appropriate for the latter but not for the former. 
20 
It seems therefore, despite these three caveats that the results 
from the model on income tax flexibility can be broadly applied to 
Egypt. In the absence of any indexation of its thresholds, income tax 
revenue would be expected to be small in relation to average income but 
rising steeply as indicated by the sigmoid schedule in Chapter 4. 
Figure 10.4 presents evidence on the effective average income tax 
rate, Rt/y in Egypt over the 1960-76 period and it can be seen that 
although total income taxes (i. e. including profits taxes) show steep 
rises in the mid-'sixties, the effective average rate of personal 
income taxes is remarkably constant. 
21 
The main discernlible trends 
are a slight fall to 1963, a slight rise to 1970 and subsequent decline 
again to 1975. 
The reasons for the Egyptian income tax system's failure to 
demonstrate any sizeable flexibility may be summarised as 
regular discretionary action by government, and problems of tax 
evasion, which had the effect of restricting or reducing Rt/y. The 
decline in Rt/y to 1963 (for both business and personal taxes) would 
seem to be the result primarily of two factors. Firstly the national- 
isations and state sequestrations in 1961 and 1962 cut the highest 
incomes substantially, particularly those employed in the Civil Service. 
General upper earnings limits were imposed and, at least in the short- 
term, were effective in reducing the concentration of 
incomes. 
22 
Since 
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this was achieved by reducing top incomes rather than increasing 
lowest incomes (though increased benefits were also paid) it reduced 
income tax revenue. In addition government controlled companies are 
exempt from profits tax so that nationalisation reduced the tax base 
for business taxation. 
The rise in Rt/y to 1970 can be only partly explained by changes 
1 
in the parameters of the tax model. The increase in Rt/y is mainly 
due to business tax increases though some rise for personal taxes is 
also evident. Undoubtedly the rise in profit of the Suez Canal Authority 
contributed substantially to the rise in business taxes. Rt/y can be 
seen to fall back sharply in 1968 following the canal's closure. 
23 
The structural changes occurring in the economy at this time would 
Ij 
also create additional business taxes. The increase in the importance 
of industrial and commercial activities in the economy as a whole would 
give rise to increased business taxes (and some personal taxes depend- 
ing on profits distribution) because these sectors were the ones subject 
to company taxation. 
The rise in personal income taxes can be seen to be very slight 
except in 1966 to 1967. This reflects the relatively large increase 
in the 'defense' component of income tax rates (from 7% to 10.5%) in 
January 1966 which predictably increased revenue. Also, according to 
Lotz (1966), revenue increased after 1966 because of collection of tax 
arrears from the early 'sixties. The general failure of personal 
income tax revenues to rise relative to y however both during 1963-70 
and after 1970, is attributable mainly to the persistent discretionary 
increases in exemptions from income tax which had the effect, in terms 
of the model, of increasing thresholds as fast, and sometimes faster, 
than incomes. Ikram (1980) suggests that although thresholds were 
often not regularly and explicitly increased, nevertheless persistent 
305 
increases in the non-taxable minimum income made an increasing number 
of incomes tax-exempt. Increased coverage of, and rate changes in, 
the social insurance schemes have contributed to increased income tax 
exemptions. It also seems likely that tax evasion increased again in 
the 1970s after the abolition of the Tax Evasion Office in 1972. It 
had probably not been very effective, but the absence of any disin- 
centive to understate tax liability and the increased incentive to do 
so from rapid money wages rises in the early 'seventies can be expected 
to have combined to increase tax evasion. In fact, draft plans in 1976 to 
restructure the tax system and the reopening of the tax evasion office 
in the lateý'seventies (with financial incentives to tax collectors to 
reduce evasion) were directly linked to government concern over revenue 
I'd 
loss through evasion. 
In summary therefore it would seem that a combination of dis- 
cretionary actions by the authorities outside the parameters of the 
tax model, and threshold increases as suggested by the model have 
prevented the Egyptian income tax system from demonstrating a sig- 
nificant degree of revenue growth despite its inherent built-in 
flexibility. Undoubtedly if tax evasion can be controlled, tax 
authorities in Egypt could benefit from income tax revenue increases 
as incomes rise in general, simply bý avoiding discretionary changes 
in rates and thresholds. The desire to increase revenues 
during the 
period (for example to raise revenue for the 1967 war), 
have been 
thwarted by simultaneous exemption increases. 
Social Insurance Taxation and Benefits 
Since data are not available on the value of social 
insurance 
revenue or total benefit payments it is not possible to assess actual 
insurance reven&ie or expenditure on benefits. However certain 
features 
3aö 
of the system may be examined. Firstly it was stressed earlier that 
although coverage of Egypt's social insurance legislation was fairly 
wide in comparison to other LDCs, it nevertheless remains partial, 
covering essentially government, industrial and commercial employees. 
The rural/ agricultural population is particularly poorly covered. 
For an assessment of the distributional implications of the system 
these considerations are clearly critical. However in assessing 
the revenue implications only those paying premiums and/or receiving benefits 
are relevant. So long as the distribution of income earners considered 
is also the distribution of (potential) tax payers/benefit recipients 
the tax model can be usefully applied. In fact, at least since the 
early 1960s most income earners included within the income distribution 
statistics discussed in section 10.3.1 will participate in the social 
insurance scheme. 
The first point that can be made about the social insurance tax 
is that it is almost exactly proportional with no upper or lower 
thresholds as in the N. T. tax in the model in Chapter 5, and a common 
marginal tax rate for all employees within each scheme. 
24 
Thus it may 
be expected that revenues from the social insurance tax will not rise 
significantly as average income rises. It will of course rise 
to the 
extent that more employees join the scheme, which may 
happen con- 
currently with increases in income. However there 
is unlikely to be 
any inherent built--, in flexibility within this tax structure, and 
therefore the results of the earlier model should be 
broadly applic- 
able in this respect. The main difference 
is likely to be that the 
regressivity apparent in the U. K. N. I. system 
(due to the upper limit, 
yu) does not operate in Egypt and therefore similarly 
the slight 
decline in R/y observed as 
y rises in that system will not apply 
to 
t 
Egypt. 
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On the benefits or transfer payments received differences in the 
Egyptian system would cer 
Firstly there is unlikely 
who both pay income taxes 
benefits system is fairly 
unemployed (plus disabled 
income tax payments given 
tainly dictate some changes to the model. 
to be a significant number of individuals 
and receive transfer payments. The Egyptian 
well restricted to pensioners and certain 
etc. ) who are unlikely to be liable for 
high exemption levels. Figure 10.5 shows 
two approximations likely to be more appropriate than that used in the 
previous model. Figure 10.5(a) shows the relationship between gross 
and net incomes (at lower income levels) . The approximation used in 
Chapter 5 is shown by the 100% marginal tax rates faced by all earners 
operate in Egypt is given by the line b0ABC. Here incomes above yB 
0 
below y who receive benefits of b. An alternative, more likely to B1 i 
pay income tax and those below receive transfers. Those between A 
and B, although they receive smaller transfers than those below A, do 
not face 100% effective marginal tax rates. This schedule also reflects 
the fact that in Egypt probably only the lowest income earners (within 
the group of income earners considered) face 100% tax rates. Those 
receiving unemployment benefit would be in this group, while many pen- 
sioners can increase their gross incomes without losing any, or an 
25 
equivalent amount of, transfer payment. An alternative relationship 
between gross and net income for Egypt is shown in Figure 10.5(b) where 
income earners between yB and YB neither pay income tax nor receive 
01 
benefits. Those below YB are shown as receiving a fixed net income bo, 
0 
though clearly a system more like that in Figure 10.5(a) could operate 
here. It seems likely that in Egypt a (possibly large) proportion of 
income earners pay no income taxation (though some may pay social 
insurance premiyms) and do not receive any transfers. Only those on 
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relatively low incomes, such as retired government employees receive 
transfer payments. 
26 
Without more information it is impossible to be certain on which 
system may provide the most suitable approximation of Egyptian transfer 
payments. It may be noted however that for a given average income tax 
rate (determining the slope of BC) the 'Egyptian' systems must be less 
generous than that used in the previous model. The results on net 
transfers flexibility in chapter 5 were that indexation of the benefit 
level, b, to nominal earnings could maintain the effective average 
transfer, NT/y, as average income rose, but lesser indexation must 
necessaril reduce NT 
27 
Y /Y. This occurred because, in terms of Figure 
10.5(a), if b1 increases commensurately with y, the triangle oDbl will 
likewise increase in proportion to y. Examining Figure 10.5 it can be 
seen that the same situation could pertain under the two alternative 
'Egyptian' cases. In Figure 10.5(b) indexation of b0 to y will 
increase the triangle OEb 
0 
in proportion. In Figure 10.5(a) the out- 
come of indexing b0 to y will depend on how the whole structure of 
transfers is adjusted. For example if bo rises with y but the section 
of the relationship given by ABC does not similarly shift such that 
100% effective tax rates operate over a wider range of gross incomes 
the benefit system would clearly become more generous relative to 
average income. However if all benefit thresholds adjust such that 
the whole line b0 ABC shifts in proportion to y (and not just the 
section b A) then transfer payments could be expected to rise in 0 
proportion to y. It would seem therefore that, as in the model in 
chapter 5, it is less likely that transfer payments will increase 
relative to average income than vice versa as a result of their 
built-in flexibility. In inflationary periods particularly, the 
degree of indexation of benefit levels will obviously be crucial to 
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their flexibility. 
Finally in each of the cases considered above the assumption of 
a fixed population of income earners has been maintained, it should 
be remembered however that with taxation and transfers covering 
mainly government and industrial employment, and in the presence 
of structural changes towards these sectors, the proportion of the 
population eligible for transfer payments may be increasing. In 
particular rises in per capita incomes may be associated with 
increased migration of the poor from rural to urban areas which can 
then cause the proportion of the population receiving even a fixed 
level of benefits to rise rather than fall as incomes increase. 
Thus the 'benefit burden', NT/y, could rise because of increased 
Ii 
coverage. 
Indirect Taxes 
in Section 10.2 it was shown that international trade taxes are 
an important source of tax revenue and some comments on their flex- 
ibility were made. The model in chapter 5 however did not attempt to 
examine this type of tax and cannot therefore be used to examine the 
flexibility of these taxes. This section will be confined to con- 
sideration of domestic commodity taxation. 
Egypt, as noted earlier, does not yet use a general sales tax 
similar to the VAT used in the tax model. However the model results 
do provide useful information on the built-in flexibility properties 
such a tax may be expected to possess. The results for VAT revenue 
in chapter 5 may be summarised as indicating that the effective 
average rate of VAT, Rv%y, is relatively fixed as y rises. It 
is 
sensitive to different indexations of income and social insurance 
taxes, but even At its most flexible, Rv/y only varied by about 
2 
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percentage points over a wide range of average incomes (see Figure 5.4). 
This relative constancy in Rv/y is to be expected from a tax which has 
limited progressivity. 
The methodology used in the model can however be used to examine 
the flexibility of existing commodity taxes in Egypt. As shown in Section 
10.2 these consist of consumption/excise duties usually fixed in nominal 
terms and price differences which for analytical purposes are similar 
to the excise duties, The method used in chapter 5 to analyse VAT 
revenues was to examine the consumption pattern between VAT-rated and 
non-VAT-rated goods across expenditures, obtain a functional form to 
describe that pattern and combine this with the rate of tax. It was 
suggested that where specific duties also operated they could be 
incorporated in the model by similarly describing the consumption 
pattern of the commodities in question and combining this with the tax 
'rates' on these commodities. 
This exercise, though requiring more information, can in principle 
be applied to the Egyptian commodity tax system. First it is necessary 
to obtain separate information on the consumption of commodities bear- 
ing different excise/price differences across expenditure groups (i. e. 
separate r(q) schedules for each commodity). These may be combined 
with the effective indirect tax 'rates' on these commodities to yield 
total indirect tax revenues. 
28 
The built-in flexibility of this 
revenue may then be examined for a given set of excise 'rates' and 
consumption patterns, Changes in these 'rates' may also be examined 
(as with changes in the VAT rate). The extent of built-in flex- 
ibility will therefore be determined mainly by the degree of dispersion 
of consumption of each commodity across income /expenditure groups, 
and which commqdities bear the highest tax 'rates'. it was suggested 
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in Section 10.2 that it is likely that some commodities bearing 
specific duties are most heavily consumed by those on lower incomes, 
while for others the reverse probably holds. Subsidies, which may be 
treated as negative tax rates, are mostly on goods consumed mainly 
by those on low incomes. 
Some evidence on commodity consumption patterns and indirect 
tax progressivity in Egypt has been collected by Abdel-Fadil (1980). 
His evidence, which he recognises to be partial and tentative was 
obtained by allocating tax revenue from a set of commodities, to 
households (grouped by expenditure class) according to their consumption 
of these commodities. This suggested that overall the Egyptian indirect 
tax structure (in the late 1960s) was slightly regressive with the 
exclusion of subsidies, but approximately neutral when subsidies were 
included. 29 
If these results are even approximately correct they lend 
support to the view that the flexibility of indirect taxes in Egypt 
is likely to be small, similar to that found for VAT in the tax model. 
It may also be recalled that simulating radically different consumption 
patterns in chapter 5 did not produce significant differences in VAT 
revenue flexibility. This would suggest that unless indirect taxes 
can be structured in a highly progressive or regressive manner they 
cannot be made to be strongly progressive or regressive, since 
revenue is relatively insensitive to commodity consumption patterns. 
They are therefore unlikely to exhibit much flexibility. 
Finally in the tax model the inclusion of a transfer system had 
the effect of reducing VAT revenue because the incomes of the low 
paid were increased, relative to upper incomes, and they also con- 
sumed proportionately more non-VAT goods. If, in Egypt, the 
low paid 
spend a higher proportion of their incomes on taxed 
(or most heavily 
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taxed) commodities, a transfer system will have the effect cf 
raising indirect tax revenue above what it would otherwise be. This 
does not mean, of course, that it will necessarily be more flexible. 
10.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has presented some evidence on the growth of 
/ 
various tax revenues in Egypt during the 1960-76 period. It has also 
attempted to show how the tax model developed in Part 2 could be 
applied to the Egyptian tax system, how it might be modified for 
this purpose and, with the limited information available, what 
built-in flexibility the Egyptian system is likely to exhibit. 
It was shown that international trade taxes are an important 
tax revenue source and are outS"id' the terms of the tax model 
considered. These revenues tend to fluctuate according to exchange 
rate and balance of payments movements. They cannot be expected 
therefore to exhibit much stability with respect to income. Apart 
from trade taxes, direct taxes (on income and profits) were a more 
important revenue source than indirect taxes, accounting for almost 
30% of total tax revenue by 1978. It was argued that personal 
income taxes in Egypt should exhibit similar built-in flexibility to 
that shown in the tax model in Part 2. However persistent exemption 
increases, in some cases by more than average incomes were increasing, 
and tax evasion problems meant that actual flexibility was negligable 
for most of the period. For the transfer payments system and 
commodity taxes in Egypt, the tax model obviously needs most adjust- 
ment. Nevertheless it was argued that the models results of 
limited 
flexibility and the likelihood of constant or decreasing effective 
average rates for these components probably also applied 
to Egypt. 
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It would however be necessary, with more information, to modify the 
model formally, before these suggestions could be confirmed. 
Tax authorities in Egypt in recent years have become increasing- 
ly aware of the need to raise tax revenues to finance expanding non- 
market government expenditures. When these increases could be 
attributed mainly to rises in defenve expenditures they could rely 
on fairly generous funding from other 'Arab states, Saudi Arabia in 
particular. This is no longer the case and the tax authorities have 
sought ways to increase revenue. The introduction of an ad valorum 
sales tax as proposed could raise substantial amounts of revenue 
especially in an inflationary climate if prices rise faster than 
incomes. It has been shown that tax rate changes in this type of 
tax can significantly raise revenue though, general increases in 
incomes cannot be relied upon to automatically increase tax revenue. 
General-revision of the income tax structure and the eradica- 
tion of much of the existing tax evasion could be expected to increase 
revenue. Revenue from an income tax structure similar to that in the 
model in chapter 5 responds considerably to discretionary increases in 
tax rates and general increases in nominal incomes. A reliable and 
sensible indexation policy is however required if income tax revenue 
growth is to be predictable. 
Finally if Egypt continues to expand the coverage and quality of 
its transfer payments system the burden of financing it could sig- 
nificantly increase. At present the government seems to 
be attempt- 
ing to create a social insurance scheme which, when 
fully operational, 
will be self-financing. This will probably require 
further increases 
in contribution rates. However there are also clear opportunities 
for extending the coverage of taxation. Agricultural 
incomes and 
property in general for example are either subject 
to minimal levels 
of taxation or taxed regressively at present. 
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Footnotes 
1. Subsequent studies of taxation in Egypt have often had to rely 
on the information in these two studies. See, for example Abdel- 
Fadil (1980, pp. 71-88). 
2. See National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, 1977, no. 2, p. 132. 
3. More detailed discussion may be found in I. L. O. (1962), Hansen and 
Marzouk (1965), Lotz (1966), E1-Sheikh (1968) and Abdel-Fadil (1980). 
4. One effect of the defence tax is of course that the higher rate 
applicable to professional incomes compared to other wages and 
salaries, raises the rates of taxation for higher professional 
incomes (above about £E2000 in Figure 10.1) above the tax rates for 
similar non-professional earnings. An additional complication 
arises for income from some sources, whereby if total income from 
that source is less than twice the relevant exemption level, only 
half the tax liability (as calculated from the rate structure) is 
payable). See Appendix 10.1. 
5. El-Sheikh (1968) estimates that income tax allowances are about 
4-5 times per capita national income. Lotz (1966) calculates that 
an average unskilled worker (earning about £E100 per annum in the 
early 1960s) would pay no tax, while an average skilled worker 
would be liable to pay tax of £E1.38 on an annual income of 
£E320. 
See Lotz (1966, pp. 130-131). 
6. Government contributions were raised to 1211% in 1961. 
7. An orphan, both of whose parents were dead, or whose 
father was 
dead and mother remarried, was eligible for a pension. 
8. For more details see I. L. O. (1962), Lotz (1966, pp. 
138-139) and 
Abdel-Fadil (1980, pp. 118-119). The government's social 
insurance 
scheme includes health, old age, accidents and unemployment 
insurance. 
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9. The length of employment (or years of contributions) is often used 
in relatively new schemes, where employees have not been able to 
accumulate sufficient contributions. 
10. Goods which are subsidised include wheat (and flour), maize, edible 
oil, sugar and kerosene. 
11. See Lotz (1966, p. 150). 
12. See Abdel-Fadil (1980, p. 81). 
13. Absolute values of tax revenues are given in Appendix 10.2. 
14. Land and buildings taxes for example are based on the 'annual rental 
value' of the property which may only be reassessed every ten years. 
See Latz (1966, p. 132-134). 
15. In 1967 the business income tax/GDP ratio (not shown in Table 10.2) 
reached 4.2%. 
16. See C. A. P. M. S., Statistics of Employment, Wages and Working Hours. 
17. Abdel-'Fadil (1980, p. 54) . Mean real income in both years is about 
£E200. 
18. See Aitchison and Brown (1957, pp. 28-36). 
19. See Atkinson (1975, pp. 77-8). 
20. This would also require separate distributions for the incomes of 
professional and non-professional workers. 
21. y is measured here as average annual wages rather than GDP, 
because it represents the more appropriate base for income taxes. 
22. For more detail on the redistribution during this period see Hansen 
and Marzouk (1965, p. 267) and Mabro (1974, pp. 222-225). 
23. Reductions in canal tax revenues contributed to the constancy in 
the business Rt/y ratio after 1968. After 1975 however renewed 
canal revenues and profits from oil exploitation enabled 
business 
profits to rise relative to average income. See Ikram 
(1980, p. 320) . 
i 
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24. Insofar as rates have varied at times between schemes (e. g. public 
and private sector), revenue may vary to the extent that the shares 
of these sectors in the total labour force paying contributions 
varies. 
25. Notice that if 100% effective rates are inappropriate the line AC 
can instead be continued to the vertical axis to model this. 
26. For discussion of the properties of these alternative systems see 
Creedy (1982a) . 
27. The flexibility of total transfers is of course not relevant here 
because in Egypt transfer recipients do not in general pay income 
taxes. 
28. For a givein set of commodity prices, excise taxes/price differences 
1.4 
can be translated into a percentage tax 'rate'. 
29. See Abdel-Fadil (1980, pp. 82-87). 
I 
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APPENDIX 10.1 
TAXATION OF PERSONAL INCOMES, 1963 
Specific Income Taxes Generuf Income Tax 
(Taxes at source) (Surtax levied on person) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Source Tax base ry Exemptions Tax rate(s) Tax base Exemptions Tax rates 
Land (cultivable) Rent or annual rental value Land distributed 14 per cent 
as fixed by commissions under Land Re +7 per cent (defence tax) 
minus CE 4 if total tax less form Acts = 21 per cent 
than LE 20 (plus 11-1S percent municipal tax) 
Buildings (in spe- Rent or annual rental value Buildings with 10-40 per cent (according to rent per 
cified cities) as fixed by commissions an annual rental room) 
minus 20 per cent for ex- value of las than +5 percent (defence tax) 
penses CE 18 per = 15-45 per cent 
tax payer 
Interest, divi- Interest, dividends, owner Mainly to avoid 17 percent 
dends and other shares, fees of board of double taxation +7 per cent (defence tax) 
income from directors and shareholders, = 24 per cent 
"movable" capi- etc. 
tal 
Commercial and Net profits of all business Income under 17 per cent 
industrial profits transactions minus rent of LE 150-250 (dc- +7 per cent (defence tax) 
premises, "normal" depre- pending on fa- = 24 per cent 
ciations, other taxes paid, mily). Incomes - 
certain donations, appro- within twice this 
priations to provident and size free of half 
pension funds, interest and the tax 
dividends taxed at source 
Wages, salaries, Total amount of income 
I 
Incomes under 2-22%(according to size of income 
pensions, and an- niintes, for Government of- LE 150 (single) + 1-4 %(defence tax) 
nuitics ficials, pension contribu- LE 250 (with fa- = 3-26 % 
tions; for all others, 7.5 per mily). Incomes 
cent within twice this 
size free of half 
the tax 
Wages paid daily 
I 
Total wage Daily wages less 1 30-60 pt: I per cent 
(workmen) than 30 piasters 
I 
over 60 pt: 2 per cent 
Income from Total net income As for wages, 11-22 per cent (according to size of 
non-commercial salaries and an- income) 
professions nuities +7 per cent (defence tax) 
18-29 per cent 
Source: Hansen and Marzouk (1965, p. 258). 
Total income of 
an individual 
from all sources 
as assessed for 
the payment of 
the specific tax- 
es at source 
minus interest 
on loans pay- 
able by taxpay- 
er; premiums 
for pensions, 
etc.; all other 
specific taxes; 
certain dona- 
tions;, EE 50 for 
wife and each 
child up to LE 
200, if taxpay- 
er's income is 
Icss than CE 
2 000. 
Incomes lea 8-90 per cent 
than, CE t 000 (according to 
plus the de- size of in- 
ductions al- come). 
lowed for dc- 
pcndcnts_ 
I 
319 
OD 
N 
O 
to 
r-I 
E-+ 
zw 
a 
N 
rd 
9 
0 
41 
w 
0 
r-A 
r4 
Co 
r- 
rn 
i 
rn 
N 
rn 
N 
N 
O 
N 
r-1 
Co 
r-1 
' -I 
N 
r4 
O 
r-{ 
M d' 
CO M 
00 0 
NN 
U1 Lfl 
NH 
L( Lf1 
MN 
'-1 '--1 
ON 
co aD 
MM 
Co 
0 Ol 
rr co 
HN 
u) t! 1 
OO 
d' r 
Co H 
le le 
N Co 
aD r- i 
N 
MN 
cM r 
N 
Or 
('M H 
ul N 
N r-[ 
a) 
N 
N 
v 
N 
aý 
cý H 
(j (d 
41 4J 
9 
M lzr m 
o Co r-+ cM Ln 
111 L(1 
M LO b 
Lfl NN 
NN 
M CV 
le Ul ßl 
l0 N 
N Ve n 
r1 '--I 
r1 N ßl 
l0 o u1 
d' NN 
r-I --1 
M 
Or l0 
MON 
r-1 '--1 
-4 LO LO 
rn l0 N 
rn 
co o co 
o r- -4 
M co LO 
N c' r 
ao o Co 
ö 
. -+ MN . -1 
cr) '-I H 
U) 
Ei 
4J 
., 4 ua 
0 
N H 
a cn rd 
b " 0 
,1 U) 4 
v 
v w a 
0 U 
H 
Lr) 
N 
N 
N 
1-1 
M 
r-1 
N 
co 
N 
co 
CD 
r-I 
N 
N 
r-I 
0 
00 
rn 
+-) 
Q) 
a 
0 
a 
rn N r-1 
O to Ui 
ui 0 
r{ N 
lfl r- I ll1 
MO Ui 
00 o- co 
NH 
l1 ý1 O 
ßl N r-1 
NNO 
H C) M 
CO l0 H 
. --4 H 
r-1 N Cn 
LO H 
HH 
Ui 
N 
H 
M 
Lfl 1[ 
t1' 
Ol 11 
CO t1 
r-1 
00 11 
H 
m 
U) N 
X -4 
(o 4J 
H 
N 
N 
U U 
4-4 
w 
N Q 
U) Q) 
Uý 4) 
Z7 -. 1 U 
X 
W 
U) b 
0 
8 
CO N 
Ol r-1 
Ql r-4 
co Q 
N 
M Co 
If 
d' V) 
N co 
M in 
N 
NN 
QD 
O1 M 
r--1 
ßl d' 
M Q1 
(I 
r-1 
M c! ' 
O 
N ýp 
N to 
NN 
r-4 
M Ill 
d' Ol 
cr rI 
. --1 
co ý' 
c4 
Ol N 
N 
O d' 
00 N 
ul 
v 
x 
h a, W x W rd 
v o N b -1 b N rý 
b U) v o . -4 .ý .J 4J i 
(0 o 
s4 a a, 
4J 
CD Co 
rn 
H 
U 
O 
320 
PART4 
CONCLUSIONS 
This part of the thesis draws together the aspects of 
structural change and public sector growth during development 
which have been explored in Parts 2 and 3. In chapter 11 the 
arguments and evidence from earlier chapters are summarised 
and some general conclusions and observations are offered. 
W 
It should already be clear that the processes causing 
structural changes toward services and their consequences, are 
not fully understood by economists. Further work is required 
in various areas, and chapter 12 considers possible directions 
for future research. 
I 
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CHAPTER11 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
3 22 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has been concerned primarily with three related 
aspects of the growth of service sectors during development. It was 
desired firstly to examine the extent of uniformity across countries in 
patterns of structural change involving service sectors. Secondly, since 
the growth of publicly-owned, non-marketed services has been prominent 
in many countries this study has attempted to examine and compare some 
of the likely effects of such an expansion. This growth in non-marketed 
services has caused problems of government finance in several countries 
in recent years, as tax revenues have proved less easy to raise than 
government expenditure. This thesis has therefore examined the built- 
in fjexibility properties of various widely used taxes in order to 
assess the prospects for tax revenue growth. Finally a case study of 
the Egyptian economy from 1960 to the mid-1970s was undertaken which 
examined the three aspects of service growth during development discussed 
above, and sought to explain the rapid growth in service sector 
employment observed in Egypt over this period. 
The results and conclusions of this study will be summarised in 
this chapter in three sections. Section 11.2 summarises the evidence 
on structural change towards services identified internationally 
(in chapter 2) and in Egypt (chapters 6-8). Section 11.3 examines 
the role of a market/non-market distinction in analysing countries' 
overall macroeconomic performance, and particularly that of Egypt. 
Finally in Section 11.4 the results of the tax models considered in 
chapters 4 and 5, and their application to Egypt (chapter 10) are 
summarised and some conclusions drawn. 
I 
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11.2 STRUCTURAL CHANGE TOWARDS SERVICES 
11.2.1 International Evidence 
Chapter 2 examined the hypotheses that there were uniform 
I, 
patterns of structural change across developed and less developed 
countries. Previous studies had suggested that while industrial and 
agricultural sector shares of employment tend to rise and fall 
respectively, in similar patterns across countries as per capita 
income increases this is less true for service sectors. Recent 
evidence has also identified a decline in industrial sectors in many 
developed countries accompanied by a rise in services, including 
government services. If this phenomenon is widely experienced among 
developed countries it implies that the forms of equations previously 
used to test for cross-section patterns of structural change involving 
services may mistakenly fail to identify common patterns across 
countries. Chapter 2 proposed alternative functional forms which 
could capture the effects of 'de-industrialisation' in developed 
countries. If the pattern of service and industrial employment shares 
rising together in the early stages of development but the service 
share increasing at the expense of the industrial share in later 
stages of development is a general one, the proposed functional forms 
could be expected to provide a good fit to the data. 
Evidence from an international sample for 1960 and 1970 provided 
strong support for the view that uniform patterns of the sort described 
above exist for the sectoral employment shares. Two caveats to this 
general conclusion however also seemed warranted. Firstly tests 
for 
w 
uniform patterns performed on 1960 and 1970 data separately and 
these indicated that there was more divergence from the predicted 
patterns in 1970 than in 1960. it would appear therefore 
that factors 
I 
324 
affecting employment shares which are specific to particular countries 
were more prominent in 1970 than 1960. The reasons for this have 
not been investigated in detail though two possibilities suggest 
themselves. Although the greater divergence in 1970 than 1960 appears 
to occur both for developed and developing countries the reasons are 
probably different for each group. 
Firstly in developing countries, some have experienced considerable 
i increases in 'informal' urban services (mainly those countries with 
high population growth and migration rates) while others have not. 
' Substantial increases in 'informal' activities in these countries 
began during the 1960s and this may partly account for the divergence 
among developing countries. 
Secondly, for developed countries the phenomenon of de-industrialisation 
was not as widespread by 1970 as it has subsequently become. 
l 
Thus 
the 1970 evidence may represent a 'snapshot' of a transition period 
in which some countries' industrial sectors are still expanding while 
others have already begun to decline. In cross-section evidence a 
temporary divergence between developed countries in their patterns of 
structural change would therefore be observed. 
A second caveat to the general conclusion of uniform cross- 
country patterns concerns the particularly large values of, and 
increases in, the service employment share in some Latin American 
countries, mainly Brazil, Peru, Mexico and Argentina. The evidence of 
large increases in the social service employment shares in chapter 2, 
and from Berry (1978) points to the possibility that in these 'middle- 
income' countries early expansion of government services has occurred. 
This seems to be partly in response to an excess supply of educated 
manpower which the government then employs. 
I 
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The results in chapter 2 suggest some further properties to the 
cross-country patterns. Firstly service employment appears to expand 
relative to industry in the early and late stages of development with 
industrial employment expanding most in the 'middle' phase. Secondly 
within the service sector, social services follow a similar pattern - 
expanding relative to other services in the early and late stages of 
development. It seems likely that this important 'early' role for 
social services, while it is true for LDCs today, was probably less true 
for the developed countries in the early stages of their development. 
It is often the post-colonial legacy of large government bureaucracies 
and government objectives of universal education for their populations 
in many LDCs today which accounts for their relatively large share of 
employment in social services. Theses factors were not generally 
present in developed countries' early development. 
Finally the evidence in chapter 2 was mainly concerned with cross- 
section patterns and although some evidence of changes within countries 
over time was considered, time-series patterns were not 
rigorously investigated. The limited time-series evidence that was 
examined was generally consistent with the cross-section evidence but 
it must be stressed that predictions of structural changes over time, 
based on cross-country evidence must be made with caution. The 
2 
evidence considered in chapter 2, in common with previous studies, 
suggests that while broad indications of long-run changes through time 
may be obtained from cross-section evidence, these international patterns 
do shift over time. Until longer-term time-series data are available 
for LDCs it would therefore be unwise to predict that as they develop 
they will necessarily follow the cross-section patterns observed. 
Indeed the growth of some services (such as 'informal' services) are 
peculiar to LDC7s and it is still unclear how their share 
in employment 
will change as per capita incomes rise. 
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11.2.2 Egyptian Evidence 
Evidence on sector employment shares in Egypt was examined in 
chapter 6. This indicated that the service sector's employment share 
during the period under investigation (1960-75)'was substantially 
above that predicted from the international sample, and had been since 
at least the 1930s. In addition during 1960-75 the share of services 
in employment appeared to be increasing relative to industrial and 
agricultural employment. This relative growth in services was 
occuring both in social and some commercial services. Within the 
social service category, Government Administration and Education 
services displayed especially rapid employment growth. Although 
Defence services are excluded from employment data, government 
expenditure data examined in chapter 9 suggested that these services 
also expanded rapidly over the period, as would be expected given the 
military situation at the time. 
Chapter 7 examined the role of income elasticity differences, 
wage rate differences and productivity growth differences between 
sectors as explanations of relative service employment growth. Due 
to data and methodological limitations conclusions on these explanations 
must be tentative but it did seem that income elasticity differences 
between sectors were unlikely to explain the observed employment 
differences. There was some evidence (though it could not be 
considered strong) that employment in different sectors did respond 
to changes in wage rates, but differential responses across sectors 
could not be confirmed. The evidence of Berger (1954) also 
suggested that at least in government administration services relative 
wage rates were not a strong influence on the decision to seek employment 
in that sector. 
I 
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Differences in the rates of productivity growth across Sectors 
were considered in chapter 8. These appeared to be variable both 
across service sub-sectors and across different time periods and 
there was certainly no general evidence of slower productivity growth 
in services. Examining sectoral differences in productivity growth 
did however provide clues to some of the influences on relative service 
employment growth. Two factors were identified in particular. Firstly 
government education and employment policies have resulted in distortions 
in the skill composition of the labour force with an excess supply of 
f educated manpower, especially university graduates from Arts faculties. 
To prevent unemployment the government regularly absorbed this surplus 
into its public service sector. 
Secondly, high rates of *population growth and rural to urban 
migration swelled the number of urban job seekers during the 1960s and 
1970s. 
3 
At the same time indecision in the implementation of Egypt's 
five-year plans and a lack. of direction in the publicly-owned 
manufacturing sector caused the demand for labour to grow particularly 
slowly in a large part of the goods-producing sector after 1965. Much of 
the surplus urban labour therefore found its way into privately-owned 
informal services. However it would be wrong to regard the growth of 
informal services as entirely supply-determined, due to inadequate growth 
in other sectors of the economy. Undoubtedly the growth in the low 
income urban population, mainly resulting from migration (during this 
and earlier periods) has created an increasing demand for some informal 
services, especially in the retailing and transport sectors. 
Finally, given the factors responsible for Egypt's relative 
growth in service employment, what are the prospects of this continuing? 
It may be noted that the surplus of urban job seekers has been 
partially reduved in the early 1980s by the increase in international 
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migration of labour from Egypt to other Middle Eastern states. The 
rapid development efforts of various Gulf states in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s has, according to Hansen and Radwan (1982) removed some 
surplus labour and even created shortages of some types of labour. 
However workers who have left Egypt have largely been educated and 
skilled and this has removed from the Egyptian labour market those 
workers, such as engineers, who were already in fairly short supply. 
In addition the large amounts of unskilled labour available to the 
informal services sector have probably not been significantly affected. 
j Nevertheless some of Egypt's surplus educated manpower which in the 
1960s and early 1970s ended up in government services, has been 
removed by the labour demands of other countries. Should this foreign 
labour demand slacken (and it already seems in the 1980s that it. may be), 
then with high population growth rates and rural-urban migration 
continuing, urban surplus labour will no doubt grow once again. In 
the absence of government policy changes, private services could be 
expected to continue their relative growth. 
There are however signs that government policy changes could 
reduce both public and private service employment growth. Firstly 
the guarantee of a public sector job to graduates was removed in 1978 
which, even if jobs are in practice often offered to graduates, may 
encourage graduates to make greater efforts to find jobs elsewhere. 
Secondly Hansen and Radwan (1982) have argued that the government 
has recently allowed public sector real wage rates to fall which may 
discourage employment growth in government services. However, the 
evidence discussed in Part 3 indicates that fairly large real wage 
falls may be necessary before significant disincentive effects operate. 
Given uncertainties surrounding international factors and future 
government pol}cies towards the labour market 
it is difficult to 
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predict future structural changes. However it does seem that it 
will be difficult to reverse the processes which caused a relative 
growth in service employment during 1960-75, and structural change 
towards services can probably be expected to continue in the short-term. 
11.3 NON-MARKET SECTOR GROWTH 
Building on the work of Johnston.. (1975) and Bacon and Eltis 
%v 
(1976) chapter 3 suggested a framework in which differences in the 
rates of growth of market and non-market sector employment could be 
compared across countries. In particular it was desired to examine 
the extent to which different countries' macroeconomic performance 
varied with expansion of the non-market sector. The macroeconomic 
variables considered were per capita consumption growth, investment 
growth and the balance of payments. 
It was shown in chapter 3 that, ex post, the faster the rate 
of total employment growth relative to marketed output growth the 
slower must be combined growth in per capita consumption, investment 
and the balance of payments surplus. Two particular effects of growth 
in non-market sector employment may however be identified. Firstly, 
while growth in employment in the market sector may be expected, via 
the production function relationship, to raise marketed output, growth 
in non-market sector employment creates demand for marketed output, but 
does not directly contribute to their current supply. Multiplier 
effects may indeed encourage faster marketed output growth but, as 
Johnston has argued, it is likely that some excess demand for marketed 
output will be created, requiring market sector productivity to rise, 
or causing inflation. 
I 
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Secondly, Bacon and Eltis have argued that if non-market sector 
growth is financed by taxation, unless tax payers are willing to accept 
reductions in disposable income, the effect may be to generate inflationary 
pressures. If wage earners are taxed and succeed in raising money wages 
to maintain real consumption, investment and the balance of payment can 
be expected to suffer. 
It was therefore of particular interest to examine in chapter 3 
non-market employment growth relative to marketed output growth which 
might be expected to particularly adversely affect macroeconomic 
performance. Empirical evidence from a sample of 27 developed and 
less developed countries (considering growth rates over the period 
1960-1970) suggested that many LDCs in particular experienced high rates 
of growth ofmarketed output, total and non-market employment. It did 
not seem to be the case however that either developed or less developed 
countries as a group experienced greater constraints in aggregate on LiiC 
macroeconomic variables considered. This constraint appeared to be 
greatest for the United States, the U. K. and Egypt, all countries in 
which previous studies had suggested non-market growth may have had 
serious adverse effects. It was also found that for a given rate of 
market sector productivity growth, employment in non-market sectors was 
expanding especially rapidly (relative to marketed output) in LDCs. 
This confirms the suggestion in chapter 2 that social service employment 
has expanded rapidly in many LDCs, but has occurred prior to, or 
without, commensurate increases in marketed output. 
Chapter 9 examined the role of non-market sector growth in Egypt 
during 1960-75. It was shown that the share of marketed output going 
to the non-market sector, g, rose considerably over the period. 
Movements in this share were generally mirrored by inverse movements 
in the proportipn of marketed output available for consumption 
by those 
in the market sector, c. It was also argued that in Egypt market m 
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sector productivity growth was a positive function of investment in that 
sector and that a reallocation of resources froth government consumption 
to market sector investment could have had significant effects on 
marketed output growth. 
It was noted above that non-market sector expansion could be 
expected to increase inflationary pressures. Bacon and Eltis argued 
that reductions in market sector workers' share of marketed output 
particularly could stimulate inflation. The hypothesis that reductions 
in the proportion of marketed output consumed by the market sector, 
cm, would increase inflation was therefore tested, and found to 
significantly affect the inflation rate. 
In examining the relationship between market and non-market 
0 
sectors it has been stressed that the methodology adopted does not 
investigate causal relationships between variables. The 'Bacon and 
Eltis identity' (given in equation 9.114) obviously expresses the 
ex post relationship between the sector shares in marketed output and 
observed changes in these shares may be the outcome of a number of 
complex, inter-related changes in the various variables. Chrystal 
(1983) has summed up the approach as follows: 
'The Bacon and Eltis taxonomy undoubtedly provides an 
interesting framework within which to view the economy. 
However their methodology at best establishes correlations 
but not causation'. (p. 139). 
While this may be accepted, it should not prevent consideration of the 
likely causal mechanisms inherent in the observed correlations. it 
must therefore be on the basis of a priori reasoning that the direction 
of causality between variables in the-identity may be established. 
Thus 
for example it has been argued that a 'crowding out' effect of an 
increase in gm is more likely when the economy is fully employed 
than when unemployed resources exist. In Egypt's case 
it was argued 
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that government control of a large proportion of production and the 
planning policy it has followed make it more plausible that an increasing 
share of marketed output consumed and invested by government has in 
part caused the reduction in resources available to other sectors. However 
it is clear that more theoretical and empirical work on the relationships 
between market and non-market sectors is necessary in order to clarify 
some of the issues of causation. It may also be noted that not only 
does the extent of the resource shift from market to non-market sectors 
vary across countries, (as evidenced in chapter 3) but the causal 
mechanisms may similarly vary. It is important therefore that individual 
country studies are carried out before conclusions are drawn on the 
nature of market/non-market sector relationships in particular countries. 
1-0 Finally the results obtained in chapter 3 indicate that high rates 
of growth of non-market sector employment (relative to market sector 
output and employment growth) are common to many countries. The 
required increase in government expenditure to enable this growth 
must be financed by taxation and/or government borrowing. The ability 
to finance these expenditure increases must be important for their 
continuation and this study has therefore examined the prospects for 
tax revenue growth. These are summarised below. 
11.4 TAX REVENUE GROWTH 
In order to examine how tax revenues can be expected to change 
as per capita income rises, chapter 4 investigated the built-in 
flexibility properties of a progressive income tax using a model which 
could approximate many actual systems in use. In chapter 5 this was 
integrated into a wider fiscal model which enabled examination of the 
built-in flexibility properties of a number of commonly used, inter- 
related taxes. In both chapters elements of the U. K. tax system were 
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approximated. However since many countries operate broadly similar 
systems (which vary primarily in the way taxes are levied and in the 
nature of the interdependencies between taxes) it was argued that the 
model could be adapted to examine other tax systems. Although the model 
could not be applied directly to Egyptian data, in chapter 10 it was 
shown that it could be used to identify certain flexibility properties 
of the Egyptian tax system. 
/ 
In chapter 4a non-linear income tax structure was used in 
conjunction with a lognormal distribution of income, to obtain 
schedules for effective average and marginal tax rates and 
elasticities, as per capita income increases. As may be expected 
effective average and marginal rates were found to rise with income 
increases. However the effective average rate schedule was sigmoid in 
shape, rising steeply at relatively low average income levels, but 
becoming fairly 'flat' at high average incomes. The revenue elasticity 
which declined as average income increased, also appeared to become 
almost constant at higher average incomes. 
Examining the built-in flexibility of the tax/transfer model in 
chapter 5, it was clear that this was a function of different forms of 
tax threshold indexation and the rates of inflation and real earnings 
growth. Effective average tax rate (EAR) results were presented for an 
inflation rate of 5% and real earnings growth of 2%. Obviously the 
values of EARs at each average income level are sensitive to the rates 
of inflation and earnings growth. However this did not appear to affect 
the general properties of the EAR schedules. 
The results obtained suggested that although the built-in 
flexibility of all taxes was removed in the extreme case of all tax/ 
transfer thresholds indexed to nominal earnings, in the more likely 
cases of threshold indexation equal to or less than the rate of price 
increases, significant flexibility remains. Effective average rates of 
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income tax for example rose significantly as average income increased, 
especially when compared with other tax revenue schedules. National 
Insurance EAR schedules displayed little (though slightly downward) 
built-in flexibility as may be expected from their slight regressivity. 
VAT revenue possesses little flexibility due to its structure, but 
li 
effective average rates were found to fall slightly in most cases, due 
to the effects of income tax and transfers on the VAT tax base - 
expenditure. The effective average transfer was also observed to 
decrease as average income increased, in most cases. Indeed it seemed 
likely that unless transfer payments were linked to nominal earnings 
they would be expected to become less generous. In the U. K. system 
where some individuals both pay tax and receive benefits, transfers 
were found to be sensitive to income tax indexation. It was also found 
that the relationship between the level of benefits paid, b, and the 
gross income level below which benefits are payable, YB, varied 
according to income tax rate and threshold changes. 
Finally changes in tax rates were also considered in chapter 5. 
It was shown that increases in the standard rate of income tax and NI 
rate substantially increased income tax and NI revenue per person, 
but also slightly reduced VAT revenue and transfer payments. The 
relationships between these tax rates and revenues were found to be 
linear while the relationship between the VAT rate and VAT revenue was 
found to be slightly non-linear reflecting the non-linearity in the 
relationship between expenditure and VAT payments as shown in Figure 5.1. 
Tax revenue growth in Egypt was examined in chapter 10. The 
Egyptian tax system is similar to that in many LDCs, and unlike most 
developed countries, in that international trade taxes form a large 
proportion of total tax revenue. In Egypt they accounted for 35-50% 
over the 1960-78 period. However, excluding trade taxes (mainly 
import 
duties) it appears that taxes on incomes (including profit income) are 
as important a revenue source as indirect taxes. These indirect taxes 
take two main forms; specific 'consumption' duties levied on particular 
items, and 'price differentials' on selected items whereby the 
government sets ex-factory And wholesale prices with the difference 
accruing to the tax authorities. 
It was argued in chapter 10 that though some aspects of the tax/ 
transfer model are not applicable to Egypt's tax system there are 
similarities between both structures and some of the models results 
are relevant to the Egyptian case. Firstly empirical evidence on 
income distribution in Egypt appears to be broadly consistent with the 
use of the lognormal income distribution in the model. 
Secondly while the administration of income tax in Egypt is 
complex, nevertheless the overall progressive structure of Egypt's 
income taxes is similar to that included in the tax/transfer model. 
The results of the tax/transfer model therefore suggested that Egypt's 
income tax possesses substantial built-in flexibility while little 
flexibility could be expected in the social insurance tax. In fact 
because of discretionary changes and tax evasion actual flexibility 
appears to have been slight for most of the period considered. 
The Egyptian government has considered the adoption of a general 
sales tax which would probably resemble the VAT system used in the 
model. Should such a tax be introduced the results in chapter 5 suggest 
that unless the tax was structured in a progressive or regressive manner 
(for example by varying rates across types of goods) it could not be 
expected to possess significant built-in flexibility. However, changes 
in the income or social insurance tax schemes or transfer system could 
influence revenue growth from the sales tax. The present system of 
indirect taxes in Egypt amc- probably fairly neutral or slightly 
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regressive sugg9sting that with the existing system also there is 
3 30 
unlikely to be large revenue changes as a proportion of average income 
as incomes grow. 
These results allow some general observations on the growth of 
I 
tax revenues during development. Firstly it would seem that at 
higher average income levels (that is, those relevant to developed 
countries) the capacity of the tax system to generate automatic increases 
in tax revenue is particularly limited. / The growth of net revenue, 
which is mainly affected by income tax revenue growth, was shown in 
chapter 5 (see Figure 5.6) to be increasing relative to average income 
but at a diminishing rate, as average income rises. At higher average 
income levels the profiles are fairly 'flat' compared to lower income 
levels. This is of particular concern from the point of view of 
funding government expenditure increases since evidence in chapter 2 
suggests that a relative growth in publicly-provided services is 
particularly rapid in developed countries. If automatic revenue 
increases are less, then for a given increase in expenditure relative 
to average income, greater reliance on tax rate changes or other 
adjustments to the tax structure is required, or greater use of 
borrowing. This last alternative may of course simply widen the gap 
between expenditure and tax revenue at higher average income levels 
(if incomes grow over time). 
Secondly National Insurance and VAT cannot be relied upon to 
,a 
produce significant revenue increases as average income increases. 
Indeed it would seem that the slight regressivity of NI is most likely 
to reduce effective average rates of NI, while VAT revenue is also 
likely to decrease (relative to average income) due to the progressivity 
of income tax. However compared to income tax effective average rates 
of NI and VAT change very little under plausible indexation assumptions, 
as average incom6 increases. In addition to obtain any 
increase in EARS 
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of VAT it was found to be necessary to index income tax thresholds such 
that income tax EAR schedules became horizontal, ) 
Thirdly income growth, as may be expected is in general 
associated with a declining share of resources devoted to transfer 
payments as fewer individuals remain eligible. However the form of 
indexation of benefits is important for changes in the 'effective 
average transfer', T/y. Indexation at the rate of growth of earnings 
will, if real earnings growth is positive, cause T/y to rise as average 
income rises, so increasing the burden of financing transfer payments. 
Keeping real benefits constant however does allow the financing 
burden to decline with income growth. 
It is also interesting to note that in the U. K. the National 
Insurance scheme is not 'self-financing'. That is, total contributions 
are not expected to cover the total cost of transfers (unemployment 
benefit, pensions etc. ) paid from the fund, nor are contribution rates 
necessarily changed in line with changes in payments. Nevertheless 
the results in chapter 5 indicate that financing certain transfers 
from National Insurance could become more difficult as incomes grow,, 
since earnings indexation of benefits raises T/y, while price indexation 
of NI thresholds reduces R /y. This combination of indexations could 
certainly occur in practice although in the U. K. benefit levels have 
not typically increased in line with nominal earnings. 
Finally the analysis in chapter 5 suggested that the relationship 
between average income levels, benefit levels and the income level 
determining eligibility for transfers needs careful consideration. 
Studies of the effects of the relative returns to working and not 
working on incentives have often examined the relationship 
between 
benefit levels and income from employment. However the 
level of 
income below which benefits are paid may also be critical 
for 
incentives to supply labour. The results of the tax/transfer model 
3N 
suggested that, depending on the form of threshold indexation, these. - 
two variables - the benefit level and the incomt level below which 
benefits are paid - may not move uniformly relative to average income 
as incomes grow. Where this occurs it may be for example that although 
a 'benefit/earnings' ratio remains fairly constant, more individuals 
are becoming eligible for transfers with consequent effects on 
incentives. 
However the observation of most concern is perhaps that in 
developed countries the prospects for automatic increases in tax 
revenues relative to average income it becoming increasingly limited. 
Conversely of course, if less developed countries can overcome problems 
of tax evasion, progressive income taxes offer large rises in tax 
revenue as development proceeds. 
rN 
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FnntnntP_S 
1. The more widespread decline in industrial empI loyment shares may 
partly be due to the shorter-term effects of the post-1973 
and post-1979 recessions and may not therefore represent 
evidence of a permanent shift away from industry. 
2. See, for example, Chenery and Syrquin (1975), Chenery (1979). 
Chenery and Syraquin found small but significant shifts over 
time in their cross-section relationships between per capita 
income and sector output shares. They attribute this mainly to 
technological changes taking place over time. See Chenery and 
Syrquin (1975, pp. 32-42). 
3. As Hansen and Radwan (1982) indicate, this plentious supply of 
labour to urban areas was to some extent reduced in the later 
1970s as emigration to other middle-eastern states mainly in the 
Gulf increased in the wake of the 1973-4 oil price rises. 
4. The identity used by Bacon and Eltis is decomposed slightly 
differently from that given in 9.11. See Bacon and Eltis 
(1976, p. 123). 
/ 
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CHAPTER12 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
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12.1 INTRODUCTION 
Earlier chapters of this thesis have examir{ed some aspects of the 
process of structural change towards service industries, in an international 
context and in the Egyptian economy. Particular attention was devoted to 
the growth of the public service or non-market sector and to the increase 
in tax revenues to fund such growth. It is often the case when under- 
taking research to answer certain questions that further questions are 
thrown up in the process which necessitate further investigation. This 
is certainly the case with this study and in this chapter, some of these 
questions are briefly considered and suggestions made on the possible 
directions of future research. 
It has been argued earlier that to understand the influences on, 
and effects of, the process of structural change towards services it may 
be necessary to examine the growth of public and private, or market and 
non-market sectors separately and consider the nature of the linkages 
between them. This thesis has not however been concerned primarily with 
the causes of structural changes. Rather it has examined patterns of 
structural change, some implications of non-market sector growth, and 
profiles or 'patterns' of tax revenue growth. In the Egyptian case study 
it was desired to establish factors causing service sector employment 
growth but since Egypt was shown to be a fairly extreme example of this 
phenomenon, it could not be presumed to indicate causal factors elsewhere. 
In addition some causal mechanisms alleged to have widespread relevance 
(such as income elasticities) did not in general find support in Egypt. 
It is however the causal mechanisms behind structural change and 
public sector growth which have proved most intractable, but which would 
seem most to require illucidation if understanding of the processes 
at 
work is to be advanced. Research is needed in three areas 
in particular - 
(i) causes of the growth of marketed services especially 
in the early 
stages of development/in LDCs, and in the 'post-industrial' phase; 
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(ii) causes of public expenditure growth during development; and (iii) the 
causal mechanisms between market and non-market gectors. The current 
state of knowledge in these three areas is unsatisfactory and in some 
cases has received little attention in recent years. Suggestions for 
future research in each of these areas are offered in turn below. 
12.2 MARKETED SERVICES GROWTH 
Hitherto research on structural change during development which 
has examined service sectors has usually considered an 'aggregate' 
services sector. A lack of concensus on the patterns of, and factors 
affecting, service sector growth has often been attributed to the 
varied nature of economic activities in this sector, and problems of 
output measurement. In Part 2 it was argued that patterns of structural 
change towards services in general, can be discerned, but that it is 
important to examine marketed and non-marketed services separately. 
Not only may factors affecting both these services be expected to 
differ because one is open to market forces in ways the other is not, 
but also methodological problems may be overcome. Output measurement Ift 
problems, for example, are largely confined to the non-market sector. 
Thus explanations of structural change towards marketed services which 
employ output variables may be regarded as methodologically satisfactory. 
For non-marketed services however inclusion of output variables requires 
strong qualifications or assumptions which are difficult to verify. 
Thus 
while patterns of service sector growth may be examined 
for 'aggregate' 
services, the evidence in chapter 2 suggests that patterns may well 
differ significantly between marketed and non-marketed services. 
This, 
together with a priori reasoning suggests that in pursuit 
of an explanation 
of service sector growth, these sub-sectors should 
be considered separately. 
This, of course, does not deny the possibility of 
both sectors sharing 
some causal factors. 
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It has been argued by Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and others 
that fundamental to the process of structural change is a transition 
from 'underdeveloped' to 'developed' and hence less developed and 
developed countries are not characterised by different structural 
relations. Their evidence and that of chapter 2 of this thesis lend 
support to that view. However in seeking to explain these patterns of 
structural change it does seem likely that the importance of various 
factors will differ between less developed and developed countries. 
Factors such as differences in income elasticities and differences in 
productivity growth have been found to explain, in part at least, the 
growth in some marketed services in developed countries. It is less 
likely that these factors can explain service sector growth in LDCs in 
quite the same way. This was certainly found to be the case for 
Egypt. Factors which might be expected to be important influences on 
service sector growth in LDCs, but which are not generally likely to be 
important in developed countries could include the following: 
(i) The rate of population growth - Faster population growth could 
be expected, under certain, conditions, to increase the growth of the 
service sector, through two mechanisms. Firstly higher population 
growth rates are often associated with lower per capita income growth 
rates. Ceteris paribus this creates more underutilisation of 
labour and 
poverty. These conditions appear to be catalysts for the growth of an 
informal sector, often service-orientated. The informal service sector 
with minimal capital and skill requirements may provide the opportunity 
for the unemployed or underemployed to create economic activity, 
mainly 
consumed by low income earners. Secondly, the surplus 
labour created by 
higher population growth often results in increased rural-urban 
migration. 
This 'urbanisation' effect further generates the 
informal services 
discussed above, demand for which exists particularly 
in geographically 
1 
concentrated conditions. 
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(ii) The rate of growth of industry - At first sight it may 
appear tautological to argue that structural charge towards services 
is a function of the growth of industry. This is not the case however. 
What is suggested is that the growth rate of service activities may be 
determined by the growth rate of the industrial sector. Thus for a 
given population growth rate and supply of urban labour as discussed 
above, faster growth in industry increases industrial employment and 
reduces those largely supply-determined services. In addition however 
industrial growth gives rise to demands for increases in some 'modern' 
distribution and retailing services. It is difficult to predict the 
effect of this on the share of resources in services but a relative 
movement from 'traditional' to 'modern' services could be expected. 
(iii) Government planning and poverty policies - In countries 
in which governments take an active role in planning development and 
seek to reduce poverty, more infrastructure services may be expected 
in the early stages of development. Public utility services (electricity, 
gas, water) particularly are often marketed, but where produced under 
public-ownership (or encouraged in development plans) grow more rapidly 
than when the government does not seek to influence the market mechanism. 
(iv) Income distribution -A less equal and/or worsening income 
distribution may be argued to encourage the growth of services in 
particular. Firstly, for a given level of income, a more unequal 
distribution may give rise to greater demands for modern services 
(such 
as banking, insurance etc. ) by those with high incomes. This could 
occur through the Clark/Fisher mechanism of higher income elasticities 
for services. Secondly the more unequal distribution may create more 
'traditional' services by, for example, increasing those services 
demanded by the poor and the traditional services such as 
domestic 
service demanded by the rich. 
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It is interesting to compare the evidence in chapter 2 on the size 
of the service sector in developing countries and income distribution 
statistics. Latin American countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Peru and, 
from Berry (1978) Columbia, together with Phillipines and Tunisia were 
found to have relatively large shares of employment in services. These 
are all countries with relatively high inequality (Gini coefficients 
> 0.5) while Pakistan and Yugoslavia were shown to have relatively 
small service sectors but have relatively low income inequality (Gini 
coefficients < 0.4)2. This very partial evidence does suggest that 
income distribution may have some effects on the sectoral distribution of 
resources, and warrants further investigation. 
It may be noted that the variables in (i) to (iv) above indicate 
that dynamic rather than static forces may have most influence on 
patterns of structural change. Examination of structural change patterns 
has tended to associate sectoral allocation with static variables such 
as income levels and population size. However since structural change is 
itself a dynamic process it may be expected that a dynamic explanation 
is required. This in turn suggests that the most fruitful results may 
n 
be obtained from time-series analyses in various countries rather than 
cross-section studies. 
Finally it seems that future research on the causes of service 
sector growth will have to devote more attention to the difference between 
statistical changes and behavioural changes. Some of the evidence on 
the alleged causes of relative service growth (such as income elasticities) 
has been challenged on the grounds that the statistics do not reveal any 
actual changes in the type of economic activity undertaken. 
Thus, for 
example, it is suggested that some evidence of increases 
in distribution 
services employment simply reflects the phenomenon of vertical 
disintegration in industry. Manufacturing firms which when relatively 
small may distribute their own products (and all 
their employees are 
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categorised as 'manufacturing'), when they become larger may prefer to 
contract out distribution services to specialist if irms. When this 
occurs employees engaged in distribution which previously appeared in 
'manufacturing' statistics now appear in 'distribution service' statistics. 
There is however little information on vertical integration and 
disintegration processes during development, yet these may give rise 
to spurious statistical changes. It is important for these statistical 
problems to be sorted out (by, for example, assessing their quantitative 
significance) before seeking behavioural explanations of service sector 
growth. 
12.3 PUBLIC EXPENDITURE GROWTH 
There is at present little information on, or investigation of, the 
causes of non-market sector growth per se. However there is a long 
history of attempts to explain public expenditure growth, of which the 
non-market sector forms a large part. Most theories of public 
expenditure growth may be categorised as either microeconomic or 
macroeconomic. The microeconomic approach has sought to explain 
expenditure growth by examining separately the determinants of the 
3 
demand for, and supply of, particular government services. An 
important contribution of this approach has been its emphasis on the 
need to separate certain types of expenditure for analytical purposes, 
4 
such as expenditure on goods/services, and transfer expenditures. 
However although this approach can help to explain why some public 
expenditures grow, it does not seem to explain satisfactorily a relative 
growth in the public sector. Thus predictions for an expenditure/GDP 
ratio are sometimes ambiguous. It is however the observed relative 
growth of the public sector in various countries and at 
different times 
which has created most interest among economists, and 
for which 
explanations are sought. 
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By contrast the macroeconomic approach to expenditure growth has 
usually been concerned with a relative growth. glacro theories take 
essentially three forms. Firstly variations on 'Wagner's Law' which 
predicts an expanding public sector during development primarily as a 
result of higher income elasticities and increased requirements for 
social provisions associated with industrialisation and urbanisation. 
5 
Secondly the Peacock and Wiseman (1961) analysis of public expenditure 
growth attributes expansion to 'social upheavals' such as wars, which 
increase the demands for publicly-provided goods and services and the 
acceptable levels of taxation, in discrete 'jumps'. Thus public expenditure/ 
GDP ratios rise during crises but remain at a stable and higher level 
thereafter. Thirdly there are 'political' models of expenditure growth 
such as those associated with Niskanen (1971) and Frey and Schneider (1978). 
These have argued that expenditure grows as a result of the political/ 
bureaucratic decision-making process. 
Each of these approaches seems to fail as an explanation of 
non-market sector growth during development, though each may contribute 
to an understanding. The Niskamen end Frey/Schneider approaches for 
example can account for 'overproduction' of non-marketed services, but 
they cannot explain why this process occurs across vastly different 
political regimes and appears to be especially strong at certain stages 
of development. Greater understanding of the causes of the relative 
expansion of the non-market sector may be best achieved through a 
macroeconomic approach which incorporates the demand and supply aspects 
utilised in the microeconomic studies. It is useful to categorise causal 
factors into three types: 'built-in flexibility' factors, demand- 
induced factors, and supply-induced factors. 
Built-in flexibility factors - Governments frequently make 
financial commitments involving expenditure in future years, and 
may 
have only limited control on the factors governing the value of 
that 
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future expenditure. This applies particularly to transfer expenditures. 
In many countries governments commit themselves to the provision of old- 
age pensions, social security payments, unemployment compensation and 
so on. These may be indexed in some form to price or wage increases 
and governments may have little or no control over the numbers of 
individuals eligible to receive payment. Thus an increasing age 
structure of the population or a long term rise in unemployment 
automatically increases these transfer expenditures. The analysis 
of transfer payments flexibility in chapter 5 suggested the likelihood 
of a decline in the transfer expenditure/mean income ratio in certain 
circumstances but of course this did not account for automatic 
increases due to increased participation in the benefit schemes. 
Transfers accounted for about 20% of public expenditure in the U. K. in 
1980 suggesting that any built-in flexibility in these expenditures 
could be significant overall. 
Debt interest (accounting for about 10% of U. K. public 
expenditure in 1980) also represents a 'built-in' commitment on 
public expenditure. The extent of borrowing to fund past levels of 
expenditure is obviously an important determinant of current debt 
repayments. Thus to the extent that governments have incurred deficits 
in the past (which may be linked to tax flexibility), governments are 
committed to increased public expenditure. Whether expenditure/income 
ratios rise will be dependent on how fast incomes rise over time and 
the effect of interest rates on the value of repayments. It seems 
entirely plausible however that debt interest/mean income ratios could 
rise with increases in incomes and this can be fairly readily 
investigated. 
Demand-induced factors - In earlier chapters 
the arguments for 
relative increases in the resources devoted to certain services 
being 
induced by demand shifts were considered. It seems probable 
(though 
difficult to test) that the elasticity of demand for some non-marketed 
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services does increase with income. Education and health services 
(or parts of) could come into this category. In countries where these 
services are marketed (e. g. U. S. A) some relative increases in demand as 
incomes rise have been found. In countries such as the U. K. where these 
services are non-marketed, if governments respond to increases in demand 
this will be evidenced in rising public expenditure. Indeed the absence 
of a market price for these services may encourage greater increases in 
demand than occurs when they are marketed. 
Secondly increased demand for non-market services may arise 
from changes in the composition of consumption of private goods and 
services. Thus, for example, if rises in per capita income are associated 
with increases in time devoted to leisure pursuits which require 
complementary non-market services, public expenditure may increase. 
Similarly changes in consumption patterns may require more publicly- 
provided complements. Increased purchase of cars and travel for example 
may result from high income elasticities and increased leisure, which 
may give rise to demands for increased public spending on roads. The 
possibility of marketed and non-marketed goods and services substituting , 
for, or complementing, each other has received little research attention 
but may have important implications for non-market sector expansion. 
Supply-induced factors - The existing literature on public 
expenditure growth has identified at least two channels through which 
supply may affect observed public expenditure. Peacock and Wiseman's 
'tolerable burden of taxation' concept suggests that governments' capacity 
to meet demand for non-market services may be limited by the extent 
to 
which taxes can be raised to fund such expenditures. 
Thus observed 
increases in expenditure may be supply-determined and coexists 
with 
excess demand. The analysis in chapters 4 and 5 
is again relevant here. 
If automatic increases in effective average rates of 
tax diminishes as 
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incomes rise, governments may have to rely on discretionary tax 
parameter changes (such as tax rates) which can neet more political 
resistance. More importantly where significant automatic increases in 
tax revenue occur this is perhaps more likely to encourage expansion of 
expenditure than reductions in the tax burden. 
Chapters 4 and 5 attempted to give some indication of how tax 
revenue could be expected to increase with rises in incomes. Government 
expenditure is, of course, often funded in part by borrowing. To 
understand the total constraint on governments' ability to provide 
publicly-funded services therefore it is necessary to consider how the 
capacity to borrow may vary as incomes rise. It may be, for example, that 
if savings exhibit some tendency to rise as a proportion of income, as 
incomes rise, that government may be able to channel some of these 
savings towards government debt and hence increase their borrowing 
capacity. 
A second mechanism by which supply factors may determine public 
expenditure growth is through 'over-supply' rather than 'under-supply'. 
This is the basis of the Niskamen model whereby the bureaucratic 
decision-making process leads to excess provision of 'bureaus'. This 
theory undoubtedly does help to explain the growth of some public 
expenditure. However it should be noted that growth in administration 
services by governments which do not appear to be 'demanded' may 
in fact 
represent a necessary complementary expansion to growth in some other 
government services which is demanded. Thus for example there may 
be 
demand for increased education services from consumers who are unaware 
that provision requires complementary increases in administration 
services. 
If these two items are separated in public budgets the 
'true' cost of 
meeting demand for increased education may not be appreciated. 
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This approach to determining the causes of the growth of public 
expenditure would seem to be the most fruitful ahd should thereby provide 
a better explanation of growth in the non-market sector. Such an 
explanation is likely to be important also in furthering understanding 
of the interdependencies between the market and non-market sectors. 
This is considered further below. 
12.4 MARKET AND NON-MARKET SECTORS 
Fundamental to the Bacon and Eltis explanation of Britain's 
macroeconomic ills during the 1960s and 1970s was the argument that 
expansion of the non-market sector had substituted for expansion in the 
market sector. There was therefore some 'crowding out' of the market 
sector by the non-market sector. Their analysis has however been 
criticised on the grounds that the use of an identity (as discussed in 
chapters 3 and 9) does not allow conclusions on the behavioural mechanisms 
at work. For this reason they (and earlier chapters of this thesis) 
have stressed that the identity is an ex post relationship which identifies 
the effects on certain variables in the economy if government expenditure 
on the non-market sector is allowed to increase more rapidly than 
output from the market sector. Where this occurs it may simply result 
from the fact that the determinants of government expenditure and 
market sector growth are different and there is therefore no reason 
to 
expect both to grow at the same rate. However a relative growth 
in the 
non-market sector is easier to explain if it can be established 
that 
growth in the non-market sector actually constraLns the growth of 
the 
market sector. While mechanisms which may act 
in this way have been 
suggested, as yet there has been little systematic examination 
of these 
at either the theoretical or empirical level. Future research 
should 
seek to fill this gap. Three elements to such an examination 
may be 
suggested. 
3ý 
Firstly, the multiplier effects of government and private 
expenditure may be different, and may have an effect even if there is 
no crowding out of investment, employment etc. in the market sector in 
the sense that the market sector would not otherwise have utilised 
these resources. Bacon and Eltis have argued for example that where 
governments invest heavily in 'prestige projects' the productivity of 
investment may be less than alternative investment in the market sector. 
The composition of government expenditure may therefore be important. In 
addition differences in the labour-intensity of production or wage rates 
between the two sectors may give rise to changes in consumer demand (and 
the resulting multiplier effects), if resources are transferred to the 
non-market sector. 
Secondly the method of financing increases in the non-market 
sector may cause the effects on the market sector to vary. Taxation- 
financed expenditure by removing an equivalent amount of expenditure from 
the market sector may be expected to prevent excess demand effects. 
6 
However if the increased government expenditure is not 'demand-induced' 
this may simply result in inflation (as Bacon and Eltis have argued) 
and/or reductions in savings to maintain purchasing power. The effects 
of borrowing-financed expenditure on the market sector will of course 
depend on what market sector investment opportunities are foregone in 
preference for lending to government. 
Thirdly, where increases in the non-market sector are associated 
with increases in government budget deficits economic theory has already 
established channels through which this may reduce market sector output 
growth. Although the relationships between budget deficits, growth and 
inflation remain contentious issues, this would seem to 
be one area where 
further research may establish causal links between non-market 
sector 
growth, inflation and constraints on market sector growth. 
"1 
Much research has recently been undertaken on some of these 
issues and this may provide guidance on the specification of a more 
formal model to analyse the causal relationships between market and 
non-market sectors. 
Finally, some of the research of this thesis, and this chapter in 
particular, indicates that in seeking to understand the processes of 
structural change and public sector growth, the causal mechanisms at 
work are the most difficult to identify, and verify. Economic theory 
and empirical evidence have frequently been unable to offer unambiguous 
guidance, yet it is undoubtedly in this area that progress needs to be 
made. This chapter has made some tentative suggestions concerning the 
most likely directions in which progress will be made which, it is hoped, 
will enable some conclusions to be reached on the causes and effects of 
structural change during development. 
9- 
Footnotes 
1. In urban areas for example workers may live further from their place 
of work than workers in rural areas, thus requiring more transport 
facilities. In conditions of low per capita income this will tend to 
lead to the purchase of transport 'services' rather than transport 
'goods', such as privately-owned vehicles. 
2. Income distribution evidence is given by Todaro (1981, pp. 128-9). 
3. This approach is associated particularly with the two British 
economists, C. V. Brown and P. M. Jackson. For more detail see 
Brown and Jackson (1982, pp. 100-126). 
4. This distinction is also incorporated in the 'macroeconomic' 
approach of Chrystal and Alt (1979). 
5. Although it has often been assumed that Wagner's analysis implied 
a rising share of resources in the public sector, this view has 
been challenged. See Bird (1971), Chrystal and Alt (1979). 
6. This will of course depend on how changes in tax levels affect 
consumption and savings patterns in addition to any work incentive 
effects. - 
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